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CONTROL AND CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS
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]Xiring the late nineteenth century and early part of the
twentieth, the Service Departments (Admiralty and War Office)
had wanted compulsory government control of the press in
war-time; they discovered both before and during the war that
a rigid system of control requiring the submission of press
material before publication along Continental lines was unnecessary
in view of the generally cooperative attitude of most newspapers
towards the military and other authorities. There was no official
government control ot the press during the First World War in
Britain as there was in France and Germany. But the press became
subject, in August 1914, to a system of press censorship which was
an uneasy compromise between compulsory government control and
censorship of international cables and the censorship of voluntarily
submitted press material. The thesis examines how such a system
came into being, its objectives, its organization through the Press
Bureau and its effectiveness, particularly through the operation of
instructions and requests to the press known as D Notices. bst
newspapers and journals cooperated with the censorship authorities;
some did not and the thesis traces the Press Bureau's unsuccessful
attempts to achieve departmental status with a view to imposing a
nre rigid control over a newspaper press hich for the most part,
remained free to publish its news, opinions and criticisms through-
out the war. Despite this relative freedom, newspapers remained
highly critical of 'the censorship', regarding it as uufair,inefficient
and in the light of their own self-censorship, an unnecessary
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PREFACE
'... censorship is no fourth grade subject'. Robert E. Suniners,
Wartime Censorship of Press and Radio (New York, H.W. Wilson Co.,
1942) p.23.
Studies about the press and related subjects in this country have until
recently been left almost entirely to journalists. Many of these accounts,
like those of A.G. Gardiner, Tom Clarke or Kennedy Jones hue recalled
their editorial days in Fleet Street in terms of great personalities and
racy anecdotes. A few journalists, notably Norman Angell, Francis
Williams and more latterly John IThale have sought to redress the balance
with more scholarly accounts of press behaviour and influence but it has
only been in the last decade or so that academics in this country have
been turning their attention to the press which as Cohn Seymour-Ure
has written in The Press, Politics and the Public is 'widely believed by
those who care about politics to have an important political function'.1
Just how important that function is in the formation of public opinion and
its effect on political decisions is the subject of endless debate among
historians and sociologists but a principal component of that function as
identified by Seymour-Ure is the way 'newspapers help choose the subjects
a
we have views about', a point made by H. Hamilton Fyfe, a former editor
of the Daily vil and one of the 'grat personalities' school of
journalistic writers in appropriately anecdotal form. In his book, Sixty
Years of Fleet Street, Fyfe recalls how a northern editor, upon being
asked by a visitor to his office if he was the man who put things in the
3
paper ,replied 'No madam, I 'in the man who keeps things out'. In other
words ,censorship is an integral part of any study of the press for in the
words of Nicholas Garnham : 'All news is censorship. That is to say, it
is the imposition of a structure of significance on inchoate reality'
1. Cohn Seymour-Ure, The Press, Politics and the Public,
(London, Methuen & Co., 1968) p.14.
2. ibid, p, 27.
3. H.H. Fyfe, Sixty Years of Fleet Street (London,W.H..A].len,1949 p.96.
4. The Sunday Times 3rd September 1978.
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We are all censors in the Freudian sense of excluding certain subjects
or forms of thought from our minds. In most societies a cultural
censorship exists which frowns upon or excludes some forms of behaviour
or expressions. It is possible to belong to a group or organization in
which particular subjects are not easily discussed - Christian ethics
would not usually be discussed at branch meetings of the Comunist
Party but they would be freely discussed elsewhere. Climates of opinion
can exist in a society in which pressure is brought to bear to avoid
the mention of certain subjects - Lord Lansdowne's difficulties in
finding a newspaper to publish his letter advocating peace negotiations
in 1917 is an example as is George Orwell's problems in finding a
publisher for Animal Farni in the pro-Soviet climate of 1944.
While we must bear these categories in mind as ever present forces at
work upon journalists, particularly during a period of heightened tension
such as a war, there are two further categories of censorship which are
of particular relevance to the present study of press censorship during
the First World War. They are voluntary group censorship and legal
censorship imposed by government authority. In 1912 newspaper
organizations representing the national and provincial press agreed to
participate in a voluntary censorship of Defence subjects operated by
a ccininittee of Press and Service representatives known as the Admiralty,
War Office and Press Coimnittee, (but known more generally as the Joint
Ccinmittee, a title used throughout the present study). This was the
beginning of a voluntary code of group censorship which continued to
operate during the war and has existed in one form or another to the
present day.
As for the legally imposed category, plans existed in the War Book quite
apart from the operation of this voluntary system, for the official
censorship of cables arid wireless messages during a war which would
inevitably affect international press cablegrams. The principal object
of such a censorship was to prevent any information of possible value
to an enemy from being published in the press. The Service Departments
would have preferred to have had the power through a Parliamentary Bill
5. These categories of censorship are largely taken from the work of
the fimerican sociologist, William Albig bdem Public Opinion,
(New York, MGraw 1939), pp. 243-6
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to take control of the press in the event of a war. The 1912 voluntary
agreement was the closest they came to getting this in peacetime and
after 1912 not much thought was given to what role the voluntary
agrent and its committee would have in relationship to the legal
machinery and organization set up to operate the cable censorship. A
situation ripe for confusion and misunderstanding which duly materialized
lilhen war broke out in August 1914, the War Book plans for the censorship
by the War Office of cables and the censorship of wireless messages
by the Admiralty went into iimnediate effect causing unexpected delays
and a temporary shortage of hard news. Defence of the Reaim Regulations
(D.O.R.A.) were instantly passed by Parliament, several of which directly
affected the press and which on paper looked extremely severe. The
Joint Committee, without an executive staff and with its Service members
heavily engaged in urgent war preparations, was besieged with enquiries
frcm editors both for up-to-date information and for guidance over D.O.R.A.
Regulations. Out of this chaotic situation emerged the official Press
Bureau (a pre-war brainchild of Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty)
whose primary task, although this was not made clear to the public;
was to take over the supervision of the voluntary press censorship
hitherto performed by the Joint Coninittee. 6 Parliament was told that
the Bureau had been established to provide a better supply of reliable
news to counteract the spread of false rumours and exaggerated headlines;
it could hardly be told that its principal task would be to take over the
work of a Ccunittee whose existence had never been publicly acknowledged.
With the establishment of the Bureau, the Service Departments could feel
well satisfied. They had direct control over press cablegrams, and
through the D Notice system and the dependence of the Bureau upon their
decisions, indirect control over the voluntarily si'bnitted press copy
without becaning too involved or publicly associated with censorship
or publicity issues. The press wore far less happy with the turn of
events. They had been prevented fran sending war correspondents to the
front, they were at first uneasy both about the D.O.R.A. Regulations and
6. To add to the confusion, the Joint Coninittee remained in being
throughout the war without any clearly defined function or purpose.
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of the varities of authorities - Hone Office, Service Departments and
locally based Competent Military Authorities, all of them empowered
under the Regulations to act against them. The newspapers were
experiencing delays to the cablegrams and they were submitting copy
for censorship which was not always fairly or efficiently dealt with -
all factors which adversely affected their commercial competitiveness.
Not surprisingly, but often quite unfairly, they vented their spleen
upon the Press Bureau.
One of the most outstanding contributions to the academic study of
the press and related subjects in this century has been made by the
American historian, Lucy mard Salmon in two books both published
in New York in 1923. In The Newspaper and the Historian, 	 Salmon
has produced an invaluable guide for all academics seeking to use the
press as a source material although it is the chapters on press
censorship in The Newspaper and Authority, 8 which are clearly of most
immediate relevance to the present study.
In a discussion on censorship, Salmon argues forcefully that military
censorship is 'the most primitive form, of censorship exercised by the
State...' , the easiest to justify on the grounds that information
should be kept from an enemy and the easiest to enforce. She is
also quite adamant, citing mainly examples from the war-time German
experiences of press censorship, that such a military censorship
inevitably leads to other forms, in particular to political censorship
of press material. We shall see in this study that this was certainly
the British experience where by 1917/18, news from Bolshevik Russia was
severely censored and where the publications of those minorities opposed
to the war were the most affected by the censorship and other authorities.
Salmon distinguishes between what she describes as preventive and
repressive systems of press censorship. 'A preventive censorship exercises
a previous control' 10 over press material by supervising and possibly
7. L.M. Salmon, The Newspaper and the Historian (New York, Oxford
University Press, 1923).
8. L.M. Salmon, The Newspaper and Authority (New York, Oxford University








amending copy for publication whereas, Saimon suggests, a repressive
system criticizes articles and punishes newspapers for publishing
them after the offending items have appeared. British press censorship
during the First World War was a mixture of both. Preventive censorship
was attempted mainly through the operation of the D Notices system and
repressive censorship featured, albeit haphazardly, directed principally
against small and generally insignificant newspapers and journals
rather than against the large circulation and influential newspapers
like those of Lord Northcliffe or Edward Hulton.
Although there has been plenty of work done on war-time propaganda, there
have been relatively few academic studies concerning the First World War
press since 1923 and even fewer of press censorship during the period.
Philip Towle, in an article in the War and Societyeries has provided
a useful introduction to the subject by examining pre-1 914 Service
distnist of the press which manifested itself in demands for control of
the press in the event of war. The present study has built upon Towle's
work by showing how far this Service view of the press as being unreliable
over Defence topics was shared by certain journalists and editors whose
influence was decisive in the emergence of a voluntary code of group
censorship, so vital an ingredient in the war-time press censorship
system.
Three books appeared immediately after the war concerned with the press
and the Service Departments - Sir Edward Cook's The Press in War-Time2
Major General Sir Charles Caliwell' Experiences of a Dug-Out, 13and Sir
Douglas Brownrigg's Indiscretions of the Naval Censor 14
 - all written
by officials directly involved with the press censorship, all containing
valuable insights into how the system worked but all clearly composed
under the shadow of the Official Secrets Act. As Brownrigg mused in
the fonu of a postscript : ' (I wish I could have told the whole truth)'1 5•
11. Philip Towle, The Debate on Wartime Censorship in Britain,
1902-14 in Brian Bond and Ian Roy (eds.) War and Society
(London, Crocin Helm, 1975) pp.103-116.
Sir Edward Cook, The Press in War-Time (London, Macmillan and Co., 1920).
Major General Sir C.E'Callwefl, Experiences of a Dug-Out
(London, Constable and Co., 1920).




Cook's work is a neatly written monograph about his days as joint
Director of the Press Bureau from May 1915 but it contains little
detailed information about what was censored, by whom and to what effect.
Cook says little about the uncertain constitutional and administrative
relationship between the Press Bureau and the departments of state which
caused meny problems during the war and although he mentions that over
seven hundred D Notices were issued, his book contains few examples of
these or any evaluation of their effectiveness - all areas which the
present study has sought to clarify.
It was not until 1970 that any academic study of the British war-time
press censorship appeared with the publication of Deian Hopkin's article
Domestic Censorship in the First World War, 16 a study which touches on
such issues as press power and the anomalous constitutional position
of the Bureau. Hopkin rightly points to the paradoxical situation which
had been reached by 1918 when calls were being made in Parliament for
restraints on press per and influence at a time when the press was
subject to an allegedly strict censorship. Hapkin has looked mainly at
Home Office files, H.O. s in particular, with its emphasis on administrative
attempts (largely unsuccessful) to repress pacifist groups and their
publications. By examining other Home Office papers, particularly H.O.
139 (fifty-six boxes of Press Bureau files), Admiralty and War Office
papers, the private papers of editors and proprietors and a representative
cross section of mainly metropolitan newspapers, the present thesis has
sought to take a closer look at this intriguing phenomenon of a free yet
censored press, a press which in the main, far from objecting in principle
to the occasional repressive strikes against pacifist journals, actively
encouraged and applauded their official prosecution.
By concentrating a good deal of his attention on Home Office influence
over the press censorship, Hopkin does confirm the strongly political
bias at work in its operation, a factor largely denied by Stephen Inwood
in his impressive study of the political role of the press during the
First World War. 17
 Inwood follows the line adopted by spokesmen for the
Bureau both during and after the war that the press censorship was lacking
16. Journal of CoiIe.History, 1970, Vol 4, pp. 151-169
17. Stephen Inwood, The Role of the Press in English Politics during
the First World War (unpublished Ph. D., thesis,University of Oxford,1971)
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any political inspiration or importance - a view certainly challenged
in the present work. The suppressi.on of The Globe and
Forward albeit for very short periods, as weu7the censorship of
pacifist and minority publications were essentially politically
ntivated actions. The Press Bureau Directors are on record as being
on the look out for any news which appeared in support of strikes or
industrial unrest and the censorship of Bolshevik propaganda (on the
direct orders of Lloyd Geo's War Cabinet) cannot be described as
anything but political. I4ich of the press and Parliamentary abuse levelled
against the Bureau was political in that it sought to use the inefficiencies
and uncertainties of the press censorship as a weapon to undermine public
confidence in both the Liberal administration of the war and Asquith's
premiership. 'The censorship' was far less an issue in the press and in
Parliament after Lloyd George became Prime Mininster in December 1916.
Finally to self-censorship, an aspect of the subject which few of the
works mentioned above give more than a passing mention but which, in
a largely voluntary scheme pervaded the whole manner in which the press
reported the war. It is an area not easy to docunent or evaluate and
like a detective, the historian must track down private references and
relate them to public silences or distortions. All journalists censor
as part of their job but in war-time the temptations to suppress or re-
write 'in the national interest' are at their greatest. The Times openly
confessed to doing so. Why have an official press censorship, ran their
argument, when we can do the job much better ourselves? But the Service
Departnents were in no doubt as to the efficacy of an officially inspired
but voluntary press censorship which they successfully insisted should
be revived with much the same ambiguous powers and manipulative practices
in 1939.
Who were 'the press' referred to throughout the thesis? The press
censorship during the First World War was very much a metropolitan
affair - the Press Bureau and the Service Departments were in Whitehall
and there were no regional offices. It was principally the Fleet Street
agencies, newspapers and journals who most frequently suhnitted copy
for censoring and, perhaps not surprisingly, most often caiplained about
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the censorship and who therefore have received most attention. Of
these metropolitan newspapers and journals, those looked at in most
detail have been those featured on E.R. Robbins's '40 List'
(Robbins, General nager of the Press Association, distributed the D
Notices on behalf of the Bureau and the '40 List' consisted of those
newspapers and journals considered by Robbins in consultation with
Sir George Riddell of the Newspaper Proprietors Association to be the
most influential and responsible to receive the most confidential
Notices). Not that the provincial press has been ignored - a sample of
the leading provincial journals has been looked at concerning all the
major issues and events involving the censorship. A more detailed look
at the pre-war structure, personalities and history of the press has
been undertaken in Chapter 1 as a corollary to discussion on the pre-




'Censorship of the press as it is known today seems like Minerva to
have sprung full armed from the head of Jove.' Lucy M. Salmon, The
Newspaper arid Authority op. cit.,(1923) p. 14.
Distrust and dislike of the press were endemic in the Service departments.
Wellington had detested the press and war correspondents. 'What can be
done with such people', he wrote to his brother, Sir Henry Wellesley,
from the Peninsula about the activities of The Times foreign correspondent
Henry Crabb Robinson '...excepting to despise them'. 1 Wols$, Commander-
in-chief of the British army at the turn of the century described war
correspondents as '...a race of drones.. . a newly invented curse'
Experience in the Crimea where Sir William Russell's revelations in
The Times had led to the replacement of the Commander-in-Chief and the
fall of the government at home, and persistent 'indiscretions' 3 in the
press about the Fashoda crisis and defence subjects in general had.
convinced the War Office by the late nineteenth century of the need
to have ready a Parliamentary Bill providing for some form of control
of the press in time of war or national emergency. The aim of such
a Bill being to prevent any infornntion reaching an enemy through
press disclosures particularly in a period imediately prior to an
outbreak of hostilities.
In March 1899 Sir Evelyn Wood, Adjutant General at the War Office,
concerned as he put it at 'the possibility of (an enemy)...reaping
advantage.. .by the nultiplication and acceleration of the means of
communication and the feverish competition of modern journalists to
obtain news which will interest the enorinais reading public they cater
for' 4 had first suggested a scheme of press censorship. This would have
1. J.H. Stocqueler, The Duke of Wellington p. 152, cited by Salmon
The Newspaper and the Historian op. cit., (1923) p.198.
2. Cited by Michael MacDonough, 'Can We Rely on War News?' in the
Fortnightly Review (April 1898).
3. Memorandum by Sir Evelyn Wood, Adjutant General, War Office, 1st
March 1899, P.R.O. WO 32/6/381.
4. ibid.
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involved military censors working in newspaper offices but 'after
consultation with the D.M. I. (Director of Military Intelligence)
and amongst owners arKi managers of papers', Wood came to the
conclusion that 'the difficulties of carrying out a press censorship
in a country such as England are insuperable . . .no working machinery
for the purpose could be devised'. 5 Writing in the Fortnightly Review
in March 1906 under the pseudonym 'A Journalist', Sidney Brooks,who
was to play an important role as a go-between in pre-war press/Service
Department negotiations,elaborated on press objections to such a
stheme : 'a censorship is theoretically conceivable but ...unworkable
in practice . . . one censor (in each newspaper office) would pass what
another would delete . . .moreover in a real national emergency the
capacity and intelligence that go to make a good censor could be
employed far more effectively elsewhere and a poor censor is worse than
none at all'.
thdeterred, Wood went on to suggest, and believed the press would prefer,
'to accept the simple and effective remedy of prohibiting the publication
altogether of any military or naval news, except what could be supplied
to them daily by the War Office and Miniralty' 6 by means of a
Parliamentary Bill. IVhile not rejecting this idea in principle,Wood's
political master, Lord Lansdowne, Secretary of War, believed that
such a contentious piece of legislation would be difficult if not impossible
to get through the House of Coninons. Instead Lansdowne argued that the
War Office should talk to 'the leading newspapers ... (who) I believe
will do their best to help us a- the indirect method of press control
which got nowhere in 1899 but which was eventually to be successfully
adopted.
But the far reaching changes in British military strategy, by which
Germany rather than Russia became regarded as the most likely enemy in
a future conflict involving Britain, was the single most driving force
behind the renewed calls for war-time press control. 8 An Imperial Law
5. Wood ,War Office morandun , P.R.O. M) 32/6/381.
6. ibid.
7. Lord Lansdowne, War Office morandurn, 30th September 1899, ibid.
8. N.W. Summerton, The Developnent of British Military Planning for
a War Against Germany, 1904-14 (Unpublished Ph.D.thesisUniversity of
London, 1970). Chapter 1, passiin.
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of 1874 gave the German army total control over the press during war-
time, a fact not overlooked by either Lord Esher or Sir George Clarke,
secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.), principal
architects of this new anti-German policy which they successfully
pursued through the C.I.D.9
1\qo wars, the South African War of 1899-1902 and the Russo/Japanese War
of 1904-05 added impetus in 1905, to an attempt by the C.I.D. to
proceed with a draft 'Publication of Naval and Military Information
Bill' along the lines pursued by Wood in 1899. In South Africa, war
correspondents like Edgar Wallace and G.W. Steevens clashed regularly
with the field censorship authorities who operated the regulations,
according to Sidney Brooks with 'irritating and unpredictable exhibitions
of caprice and favouritism'.0
In the Russo/Japanese conflict the Japanese authorities closely supervised
the copy of all war correspondents accompanying their forces and
nothing appeared in the Japanese press without official approval. The
Russians, more casual in their approach, allowed war correspondents
complete freedom. News of the departure of the Russian fleet from
Viadivostock in August 1904 was telegraphed by correspondents to London
papers. The Japanese embassy in London relayed the news to Japan thus
enabling Admiral Kaininura to intercept and defeat the Russian fleet.
On land, information from journalists with the Russian CQ1niander-in-Chief
assisted the Japanese to overcome the Russians at the battle of Sha-ho
in October 1904! 1 With military attaches observing on both sides, the
lessons were not lost upon the War Office or the Service press which
began to call for the control of the war correspondent and a policy
towards the press in general in the event of a future conflict.12
9. J. !vkDermott, The Revolution in British Military Thinking from the
Boer War to the lvbroccan Crisis in Paul M.Kennedy (ed.) The War
Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914 (London, George Allen & Unwin
1979) pp. 108-112.
10. 'The Press in War-Time', Fortnightly Review, rth 1906. The identical
description is used in an article in the Fortnightly Review for
April 1913 again signed 'A Journalist'%thicll along with other phrases
in Brooks correspondence help to establish his authorship of the articles.
11. FJvkCullogh, With the Cossacks (London, Eveleigh Nash & Co.Ltd,1906)
p.181, cited by Philip Towle, op.cit. (1975) p.106.
12. Asked what the army had learnt from the Russo-Japanese War, one forthright
British army officer stated : 'how to muzzle the press', Towle, ibid., p115
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The proposed C.I.D. Bill would have forbidden the publication of all
naval or military information at a time of national emergency unless
authorised by the Service authorities. Owners, publishers and editors
of newspapers and journals who 'knowingly published any information...
in contravention of this Act' 13 faced a fine of one thousand pounds
and/or twelve month prison sentence. Active support for the measure
by the press was seen by Sir George Clarke (later Lord Sydenham),
Secretary of the C. I .D., as of paramount importance. Sidney Brooks,
the free-lance journalist already cited above was recruited by Clarke as
an informal negotiator to 'convert press opinion' to the C.I.D. view.14
In a letter to editors in October 1905, Brooks pointed out that press
disclosures during the Fashoda crisis and during the Dogger Bank incident
'when every movement of our Fleet was chronicled' 15 had shown that without
realising it journalists could place the country in great jeopardy. Brooks
argued as a journalist that'...it is a question which involves the
credit and utility of our profession. . . there is a grave risk of the Press
becoming a public danger and unwittingly jeopardising the success of our
naval and military operations'6
Brooks gained a wide degree of support from proprietors and editors, both
privately and in public for the general principle of some form of control
of news in war-time. Bell, Manager of The Times, replied that he
'approved generally'; A.G. Gardiner, editor of the Daily News, had no
objection 'to any well considered scheme' and Robert Donald,editor of the
Daily Chronicle, informed Brooks that he was 'prepared to support a Bill'
13. P.R.O. Cab 17/19.
14. In a letter to Clarke on 23rd October 1905 Brooks stated that 'I
do not think they need any conversion-the leading London editors-
to the official view', ibid.
15. Circular letter, Brooks to proprietors and editors, October 1905,
P.R.O. Cab 17/91/B23(b).
16. ibid.
17. 7th November 1905, 2nd Novei±er 1905, 31st October 1905, P.R.O. Cab
12/91/B23(b).Surprisingly, in view of his later attacks upon all
forms of official interference with the press, Alfred Harmsworth,
later Lord Northcliffe, replied : 'I am entirely in favour of making
penal the publication of news detrimental to national safety in
time of war or before the outhreak of war. . . one would have thought
the Government would have tackled this vital question years ago'.
Harmwsorth to Brooks, 1st November 1905, ibid.
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The Times under a leader headed: ?The Press as an Intelligence
Agent in Time of War' agreed that 'we are bound to consider without
prejudice whether a judicial measure for controlling the publication
of war intelligence ought not to be tolerated for the coniin good
of all' (21st May 1906). The Morning Post on the 23rd of July
1906 stated that 'we should be perfectly willing to advocate the
passing of an Act that would make the unauthorised publication
of all naval and military movements a penal offence'.
But this support was forthcoming principally because as Brooks
pointed out in his circular : 'if carried, the Bill would leave the
Press entirely free, as now, to criticise, coment upon and if
necessary, expose the conduct of any campaign. . . and it would involve
a fuller and more adequate supply of information' •18 And as
Northcliffe's Daily Mail observed on the 18th of November 1906,
'It would be difficult to oppose a Bill making it a penal offence
to record naval or military movements as .. . it would in no way interfere
with the war correspondents, whose despatches, if they passed
the censor at the front would rank as official intelligence and it
would apply impartially to all papers'. Here rehearsed in 1906
were the principal themes of the later war-time 'drama' between
press and government. Mutual agreement on the need of some form of
censorship so long as news, the life force of the press, remained
untanipered with and on tap. There remained the essential problem to
be resolved of how to introduce restrictions on a free press which
in no way impeded their activities as coirinercial competitors and
patriotic propagandists.
Despite press support for seine form of legislation to restrict
defence infonition at a time of national emergency the Liberal
Prime Minister Campbell-Banrierman, displaying an awareness of
public sensibilities noticeably lacking in hi successor Asquith,
considered 'that the public which was always anxious for news
would be affected as well as the press ...(and) ...such legislation
would be opposed in the House of Coninons'1 The proposed Bill was
she ived.
18. P.R.O. Cab 17/91/B23(b).
19. P.R.O. Cab 2/2.
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Despite this set-back, Brooks and. the C. I.D. continued to iork for some
form of agreement but with the formation of a new press proprietors'
association, the Newspaper Proprietors Association, (N.P.A.), a more
aggressive attitude emerged amongst the leading proprietors. At a
special conference convened by the Institute of Journalists in February
1908 to approve an amended and less drastic version of the proposed
legislation of 1906, the Secretary of the N.P.A. 'without warning read
a paper strongly condemning the proposed legislation' •20 The proprietors
saw no reason 'why newspaper proprietors and journalists should be engaged
in promoting such a Bill' and they .. .had bece increasingly concerned
at being 'the persons who would be chiefly affected by the proposed
legislation'. It was .. . 'their property (which) would suffer in reputation
and they 'would be personally liable to a fine of £1000 and to twelve
montis imprisonment' •21 They also saw 'no evidence that material
information concerning naval or military matters during time of war has
been improperly published in the 	 2 and with such powerful opposition,
the Service departments withdrew the proposals. An unidentified coimient
attached to the C.I.D. minute concerning the conference succinctly
suninarised official frustration in dealing with the press : 'It
may be observed that throughout the negotiations with the Press, which
have continued intermittently since 1905, the journalist body has almost
universally agreed that some form of control is logical and necessary
but has generally objected to the statutory powers contemplated when
they are set forth in detail. ,•23
It was a little after this juncture that Winston Churchill makes his
first appearance in this account and two ideas emerge - that of a Press
Bureau and the notion of a voluntary system of press censorship - which
were both to play a vital part in the story of press censorship during
the First World War. In !rch 1910, as a result of a reconmiendation of
of the Report of the Sub-Coninittee on Foreign Espionage, Asquith established
20. P.R.O. Cab.16/27.
21. ni.festo of the Newspaper Proprietors' Association read by
Mr Ernest Park at the War News Conference, 6th February 1908.
P.R.O. Adm 116/1058.
22. ibid.
23. P.R.O. Cab 16/27, op.cit.
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a sub-coninittee of the C.I.D. with Churchill as chairman with the
prime objective of reaching agreement with the press, using the proposed
1906 legislation as a basis for negotiation. The indefatigable Sidney
Brooks was again brought in as a go-between, although by this time he
had begun to despair of reaching any agreement.24
What emerged fran the deliberations of this sub-coninittee was an idea
here described by Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Ottley, Clarke's successor
as Secretary of the C.I.D. to Brigadier General Henry Wilson, at the
time Director of Military Operations at the War Office : 'Mr Churchill
is evidently strongly of the opinion that some organization for the
dissemination of naval and military intelligence of a harmless kind is
desirable and it might be considered by the 'Press as some slight
canpensation for being muzzled'. 25
 Ottley sought and obtained Wilson's
cooperation for joint Admiralty/War Office action along these lines.
This organization, soon being described in the minutes as a 'Press
Bureau' would be staffed by Service men 'with trained minds (who) would
be the only ones to realise what items of information are of value to
an enemy and wIiat are not' 26 - no mention, it should be noted, of using
any journalists or those with journalistic experience. Ottley believed
that if this Bureau dealt liberally with the press, in other words fed
it with plenty of stories however innocuous '... it might by indirect
means secure..in large measure that control which the Naval and Military
authorities so greatly desire ...the Press as a whole is patriotic and
has no desire to publish information injurious to the national cause and
if skilfully handled, it will in all probability come to regard the
Bureau as a source of information and a friendly adviser. Consequently
even without legislation a considerable measure of the control desired
might be attained'. 27
 Wilson concurred. Ottley's minute to Wilson is
24. Brooks at the time was suggesting 'the alternative course
to get hold of Lord Northcliffe whose influence in the Press was
great. This might succeed'. Letter to Ottley, 28th October 1910,
P.R.O. Cab 17/91.




illustrative of the Service mentality with regard to the- press. While
it recognizes the basic need the press has for news, it has about it
that ring of patronage, of having to deal with a strong-minded, albeit
recalcitrant child, an attitude which so infuriated the likes of
Northcliffe during the war. It also displayed a naive view of the
realities of the newspaper world to believe that such a Trojan Horse
would quell the demand for hard news or stein criticism at a time of
national emergency however 'skilfully handled'. The idea got no further
at this stage but we can note that the idea of a Press Bureau had sprung
to life and not be too surprised when it makes its sudden appearance
in the first days of the war, seemingly plucked out of the air by
'magician' Churchill.
The second idea which developed before the war and was to play, like the
Press Bureau, a vital part in the story of war-time press censorship -
that of a voluntary censorship - took firm root at about the time when
the Press Bureau idea was being quietly laid to rest in a Whitehall
filing cabinet. Press revelations at the time of the Agadir crisis in
1911 had led some Service chiefs to demand press legislation for use in
a time of emergency with or without press support. 28 The 1brning Post ,
so anxious to see some form of restrictive legislation in 1906, had on
2nd September 1911, in an article entitled'Guardiariship of British
Forts'given a detailed account of the defences of many of the coastal
fortifications on the East coast.
Sir Reginald Brade, Permanent Secretary at the War Office, was instructed
to negotiate with the 'dominant press interests with a view to arriving
at sane friendly arrangement for regulating the publication of naval and
military news' Brade, whose wisdom and subtlety in dealing with the
press, distinguished him from the uninspired and arrogant approach of many
of his fellow civil servants, iniidiately approached Leo Amery, Unionist M.P.
28. In Brooks letter to Sir Charles Ottley on 28th October 1910
(already cited, f. 23 p.17) he too had urged Ottley to go
ahead with a Bill 'with or without press support as this would'
save the press from itself'.
29. P.R.O. Cab.16/27.
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and former war correspondent and the editor of The Times, Geoffrey
Dawsonwho advised him 'to secure the cooperation of the proprietors'
as these were 'better organised' (than the Newspaper Society) and
'what was more important, had more complete cantrol of the Press'.31
Brade lost no time in addressing a meeting of the Joint Committee of
the Federation of Newspaper Owners who agreed to elect a small
standing committee to negotiate with the Service .departinents 'with a
view to preventing the publication of naval and military intelligence,
when such publicity could be likely to prove prejudicial to the
interest of the country'. 32 There appear to e two reasons for this
more conciliatory response from the proprietors - fears, prompted by
Brade's visit, of a revived Press Bill and fears over the recently
enacted Official Secrets Act. (Sir charles Matthews the Director of
Public Prosecutions, shortly after Brade's address, had interviewed
an editor to warn him that in publishing information considered by the
Admiralty to be prejudicial to the national interest, he was liable to
prosecution under provisions of the new Act)
Two conferences took place in 1912 between Service department representatives
and a representative committee of the press comprising the four national
Proprietors Federations, a representative of the Agencies and a
representative of the Newspaper Society. 34 At the second of these
conferences in October 1912, both sides agreed to the establishment of
a Joint Standing Coimnittee, the Admiralty, War Office and Press
Couunittee, (to be known as the Joint Committee) and that 'upon reference
to it by either department, the Committee should be empowered to decide
what information should be withheld from publication and that the press
30. At this time, he was known as Geoffrey Robinsoii but changed his surname
to Dawson in 1917 in order to benefit from a legacy. As he is better
known as Geoffrey Dawson, this title has been used throughout the thesis
31. Cited by Sir Reginald Brade, 'Memorandum on the Formation of a
Standing Coninittee of Official and Press Representatives to deal with
the publication of Naval and Military News In Times of Emergency', 5th
November 1912, P.R.O. Cab 38/23/6.
32. ibid.
33. This was in breath of sri unoffical undertaking given to the House of
Commons by the sponsors of the Bill, that the Act was addressed
specifically to spies and would not be used against the press. D French
'Spy-Fever in Britain, 1900-15' in Historical Journal, xxi,(1928) p.360.
34. 'The four News Associations represent every newspaper interest in
the UK, except monthly and weekly publications, magazines and certain
technical papers but steps were taken to get these involved' . Brade
Memorandum, op. cit.
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would accept and act upon every such decision' 	 The proprietors
agreed that military or naval information should be liable to
prohibition if in the opinion of the Joint Committee 'at times of
emergency it might be against the public interest to make known'36
and they also agreed to refer defence information which came to theni
fran other sources to the Service departments for advice as to
publication. But they in turn stipulated that the press members
of the Joint Coninittee 'should not be used as a medium for the
dissemination of false information or for the purpose of stifling
criticism of policy or except in really important cases where national
interests were at stake, for the restriction of news'.37
Brade had bypassed the need of a formal Press Bill and had astutely
emphasised the voluntary nature of the agreement in his dealings with
the press. Like the settlement of many industrial disputes, both sides
could claim a victorious breakthrough. The press in thinking that they
had avoided both a statutory Press Bill and possible prosecution under the
Offical Secrets Act (although there was no formal undertaking to this
effect in the agreement) and the Service departments, with more
justification for celebration, in believing that they would now have more
control over the flow of defence material appearing in the press without
the opprobrium and limitations of statutory legislation. The departments
had got all that they believed they could get in peace-time - the press
rking ' in conjunction with us' 38 although they still secretly
intended in 1912 to control the press by means of a statutory Bill in
the event of a war. However, between 1912 and the outbreak of war in
August 1914 Defence of the Realm Regulations had been prepared by the
inter-departmental camnittees responsible for the War Book, which as we
shall see in Chapter II, made such a Bill i.nmecessary.





Sidney Brooks who had been so actively involved in the past to bring
about an agreement between the both sides, had little faith that his
own profession would be capable of abiding by such an arrangement in
the tiiie of a real crisis. As he told readers of the Fortnightly
Review on 1st April 1913 : 'I have little faith in its durability at
a manent of crisis when an excited nation is clamouring for all the
news it can get'. Brooks never wavered from his belief that a clearly
defined Parliamentary Bill would be needed in time of national emergency
so that both sides would know exactly where they stood. He believed
that there should be statutory control over what was published or none
at all and the experience of voluntary war-time censorship in Britain
amply bears out Brooks's argument in this respect.
But it does not bear out his contention that the press were incapable
of controlling their appetite for a good story. From the Service
derartments' view, the 1912 agreement was an outstanding success or, in
Sir Reginald Brade ' s more prosaic language,between October 1912 and
August 1914, the Joint Comnittee 'performed its offices successfully'.39
At the request of the Joint Ccminittee, no mention was made in the press
of War Office excercises involving the detrainnient and embarkation of
an Expeditionary Force at Southampton in 1912. It prevented reports of
increased ordnance work being carried out at Woolwich the following
year. But the most outstanding achievement of the pre-war voluntary
agreement was the compliance by the press, with a request of the Joint
Comnittee of 27th July 1914 which led to the effective 'blacking out'
of the whereabouts of the British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.) until.
18th August 1914 when it had safely reached its destination on the
continent.
Thus before the outbreak of war the voluntary element in British press
censorship had been firmly established and both the press and Service
departments could claim substantial progress since the October 1912
agreenent. The Service departments were controlling the flow ot
published defence material and the press proprietors had steinned the
calls for a statutory Press Bill. But the 1912 agreement was achieved upon
the strict understanding by the proprietors that not only was the right
39.	 P.R.O. HO l39/17/A682/Part 1/ (26th October 1914).
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to criticise to remain sacrosanct but that 'a more adequate supply of
information' 40 would be forthcoming in the event of a real national
crisis. In 1912 and in the previous periods of negotiation, the press
had assumed that war correspondents would accompany any British
forces in action. The arbitrary manner in which, at Kitchener's direction,
a ban on war correspondents was imposed in August 1914 without explanation
and the initial insensitive government control over all press cablegrams
poisoned within weeks the cooperative spirit painstakingly built up
during the pre-war years. After years of consultation the press was
ignored by the government and the very departments which had so
assiduously sought their cooperation and the feeling of bitterness and
betrayal thus aroused was at the root of much of the war-time antagonism
between press and officialdom
Several themes which run through the story of the war-time press censorship
can be usefully identified at this pre-war stage. The British press
was then predominantly patriotic and imperialist in its attitixles.
It had no desire or motive to publish information which could in any
way prove harntful to the interest of national security. Resentment
and antagonism certainly existed over the evident lack of trust in the
press displayed by the Service departments in at first banning war
correspondents, then later restricting their number and in the imposition
of a cable censorship. But this in no way prevented the majority of
proprietors and editors from actively cooperating in the D Notice system
and in other officially inspired pro-war propaganda schemes.
But reporting wars and defence subjects does pose a major ethical problem
for the press - is inefficiency or personal failure to be accurately
reported, which could possibly assist an enemy, potential or otherwise,
or are such items to be discreetly suppressed in the interest of
patriotism? The case of General Redvers Buller was often cited in
Service circles as a man 'done down' because of a bad press over his record
40. Brade morandum, P.R.O. op. cit.
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during the South Africa war. 41 In a free society it is a continual
dilemma. Should The Times have suppressed Russell's reports from
the Crimea, should the Washington Post have published Daniel Ellsberg's
tapes about United States policy failures in Vietnam? Doubtless
Delane and Bradlee would answer that the press owed society a duty
to report such inadequacies in the interest of the greater national
good.
But those in authority in the Service departments might argue - yes,
investigate and discover any failure but let us advise you on how to
present what you find and what should or should not be published in
the interests of national security. Delane and Bradlee resisted such
pressures, the 'dominant press interests' 42 in Britain prior to the
First World War did not. They began to accept Service 'advice' while
maintaining an outright hostility to any form of institutionalised
government control of the press, a position they maintained in varying
degrees throughout the war in their hostility to the Press Bureau.
What the 1912 voluntary agreement represents is not so much a step towards
direct government control of the press as its more insidious manipulation
and control through the process of official guidance - a trickle before
the war, a flood during it. Colonel Seely, Secretary for War, told the
annual dinner of the Institute of Journalists in December 1912 that
'it would be a dreadful thing if the Press of England with its high
traditions were to be supposed for one instant to be at the beck and call
of Downing Street or Whitehall'. 43 The widespread acceptance of official
instructions on how to cover stories and what subjects to censor placed
the press in just this ignominious position and at the same time greatly
entrenched the inclination towards self-censorship. Any agreement
between the press and government to suppress information must in the
long term be detrimental to the best interests of society and the 1912
41. It was a view actively put about by Buller himself on his return
fran South Africa. In a speech to the Queen's Westminster Volunteers
on 10th October 1901, he complained that sane newspapers 'have
devoted more time to finding fault with their countrymen than they
have to praising them' and he went on to couiplain of The Times in
particular, which he accused of ganging up on him in an attempt to
dislodge him fran the Aldershot Cannand. Derby Papers, 920 Der (17),
Liverpool Public Library.
42. Brade morandun P.R.O. Cab. op.cit.
43. The Times 16th December 1912.
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agreement is no exception. If a free press is restricted and manipulated
through a conspiracy of silence and acquiesence rather than subject to
openly decided laws, then society will eventually become cynical about
what it reads in its press - a situation which had begun to occur in
Britain towards the end of the war and continued into the post-war
years. Such an agreement inevitably encouraged a decline in the ethical
standards of journalism in general and of defence reporting in
particular, leading to the current situation in which some defence
correspondents are little more than Ministry of Defence apologists.
So far the press has been discussed as if it was a collective,
structured organization but this was true in the period under study of
only the outer trappings. The various press organizations had come
together to negotiate with the Service departments out of mutual fear
of restrictive legislation. Such unanimity was rare and the 1912
agreement was observed by most journalists because it appealed to
their patriotism rather than to any loyalty to an organisation. The
proprietors were organised into federations, the N.P.A. being the
most influential and well organised by 1914, primarily because it
included in its membership, owners of most of the major Fleet Street
newspapers. 44 The journalists were organised within the Institute of
Journalists, although by 1914 the National Union of Journalists was
gathering new membership and strength at the expense of the I.O.J. But
none of these organizations had much control or influence over their
membership in what was one of the most individualistic and entrepreneurial
of businesses.
There was a profusion of titles, papers were launched, folded or
amalgamated with bewildering rapidity and ruthlessness and there was
a huge readership eager to be informed and entertained. Northcliffe, a
genius at using other people's ideas tocreatea journalistic empire,
had spearheaded a revolution in the press in the years between 1901 and
1914. The staid Victorian journal had all but vanished, the 'Yellow Press'
had become firmly established in Fleet Street and the selling of cheap,
easy-to-read news had become a ruthless competitive business.
44. Newspapers represented through the N.P.A. included Northcliffe's
Daily Mail, Evening News, Weekly Dispatch and Daily Mirror, leading
Unionists papers like The Daily Telegraph and W,rning Post, and. the
two Liberal newspapers, the Daily News and DaiI5 Chronicle.
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In 1914, there were 27 dailies, 8 evening papers, 284 weekly or monthly
periodicals and 7 Sunday newspapers all published in Fleet Street
and distributed nationally. 	 ny provincial dailies and weeklies
had offices in Fleet Street and published syndicated feature articles
written by Fleet Street columnists. The circulations of the Fleet
Street papers varied quite substantially and were by no means related
to the political.influence a paper wielded. The most prestigious
British newspaper, The Times, had a circulation of only 41,000 in 1911
(although under Northcliffe ' s direction this figure increased dramatically
to 278,348 by August 1914) . 46 The Westminster Gazette's daily sales
in 1914 were 27,000 but it was regarded both at home and abroad as the
authentic voice of the Liberal Government, 'undoubtedly commanding a
greater weight of influence per reader, having regard to the character
of its readers, than any other London paper...' 47 Many of the metropolitan
Fleet Street dailies had circulation figures in the 300,000 - 400,000
range although by 1914, Northcliffe's Daily Mail was far ahead of the
field with a certified figure of 945,719.48 But even this figure was
eclipsed by the circulation figures of the Sunday press where in 1914
the News of the World was claiming a figure of 1,200,000 arid where
Northcliffe's Illustrated Sunday Herald in 1915 quickly reached 2,000,000
after only two issues.
With the exception of the two Liberal dailies, the Daily News and
Daily Chronicle and the two Liberal evening papers, the Westminster
Gazette and The Star, most Fleet Street papers were either straightforward
Unionist or inclined to the right of centre in their political allegiance,
although there were almost as many Liberal or Left inclined periodicals
as Unionist. Although there were,between 1890 and 1910 'almost 800 papers,
half of them explicitly socialist, published in the interests of labour',49
45. Newspaper Press Directory, 1914
46. The History of The Times, The 150th Anniversary and beyond?
191 2-20. Part 1, Chapters 1 - Xli, (Londona The Tines Publishing
Co. Ltd, 1925) pp. 105-125.
47. Wilson Harris, J.A. Spender (London, Cassell and Co. Ltd,1946) p.29.
48. A.P. Wadsworth, Newspaper Circulations, 1800-1954 in Transactions
of the Manchester Statistical Society, Vol LV (1954-5), passini.
49. Deian Hopkin, The Socialist Press in Britain, 1890-1910 in
Newspaper History from the 17th century to the present day,
%blrO.7P.2	
Pauline Wingate, (eds), (London,
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there was during this period no socialist daily newspaper published in
Fleet Street. The Daily Citizen published in Manchester, claimed tobe a
national daily, but despite the great war-time boon to circulation and
finances of most newspapers, including those of the Left,the Daily Citizen
folded in June 1915. Socialist papers tended to be monthly periodicals and
localized in the industrial areas principally in the North and in Scotland.
The Northcliffe 'revolution' left Fleet Street (and to a lesser extent
the provincial press) in a divided state between the new journalism of
papers like the Daily Mail - 'a journal produced by office-boys for
office-boys' 50 and the survivors of the more sedate nineteenth century
papers like the Westminster Gazette, Daily Telegraph and the Daily
News. The division was bitter and personal. The old school journalists
detested th.è. Northcliffe style and everything associated with it -
sensational news gathering, personalized interviews, canq)aigns and
gossip and the continual emphasis on circulations and profitability.
A.G. Gardiner, editor of the Liberal Daily News, and very much one of
the old school, told Northcliffe in an open letter in the Daily News
of 5th December 1914 : 'You have been the most sinister influence that
has ever corrupted the soul of English journalism'. Reading the
presidential speech of Robert Donald, editor of the Liberal Daily
Chronicle to the Institute of Journalists in 1913 is like reading the
laiint of a defeated warrior fresh fron the battlefield gazing bleakly
towards an unknown future where 'the old proprietor system has almost
disappeared. Instead of individual ownership, we have corporations,
private and public'.51
Gardiner's 'sinister influence charge was typical of the double standards
exercised by his critics which so infuriated Northcliffe. To meet his
cmrcial challenge, the old style quality papers, including
Gardiner 's own paper, had sought and obtained financial backing which
was little more than outright political subsidy. During the period
1910-1914, The Standard, The Globe, The Obsrerver and the Pall Mall Gazette
50. Remark attributed to the Marquis of Salisbury, Hamilton Fyfe,
Northcliffe, An Intimate Biography (London, George Allen & Unwin
1930), p68.
51. Newspaper Press Directory, 1914.
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wer& all receiving financial support, either directly or indirectly
from Unionist Party funds. The Liberal Party through George
Cadbury and Lords Cowdray and M.rray of Elibank were backing the
Westminster Gazette, the Daily Chronicle and the Daily News, - in fact
few editors of the so-called quality press in 1914 were free of some
form of obligation to party political sponsorship. 52
 Northcliffe's
great strength was that he was independent of this 'Byzantine network
of relationships' 53
 which existed between editors and politicians and
was thoroughly disliked and feared for being so. These deep and
emotionally felt divisions within the press erupted openly at times during
the war and many of the disputes and antagonisms in which the Press
Bureau became embroiled were to some extent a continuation of this Fleet
Street internecine warfare.
Finally the Service departments. Although they provided the initiative for
some form of control over published defence material, they were, like
the press, by no means a united body pursuing agreed and formulated
policies. The strategic disputes and rivalries between the War Office
and the Admiralty and later between the Press Bureau and the Service
departments, (particularly the Admiralty) were no less bitter and
personal because they were conducted behind closed doors. But the
departments were generally united in a mutual fear and dislike of the
press - fear of reports of personal failure, dislike of an activity
considered by Servicemen then (and now) to be a not quite respectable
occupation for a gentleman to pursue.
Neither Service were very clear what sort of information constituted
useful intelligence for a potential enemy, which is perhaps not
surprising given what has been described by one scholar recently as the
'fundamental uncertainty on whether Britain would adopt a maritime or
continental strategy'
	
The impetus for the pre-war negotiations came
52. See S. Inwood, op. cit.(1971), Chapter 1 passim,foramore detailed
account of the relationship between the press and the political
parties during this period.
53. Stephen Koss, Fleet Street Radical, A.G. Gardiner and the Daily News
(London, AllenLane,London 1973). p.8.
54. David French, Some Aspects of Social and Economic Planning for War
in Great Britain, C. 1905-1915, (Unpublished Ph.D.Thesis,
University of London, 1979) p.18.
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fran the War Office - it was after all the army which had the closest
experience of dealing with the problems of censorship and in dealing
with journalists in the flesh both in South Africa and in a variety
of Colonial fracas. The Admiralty, the senior Service, took a more
lofty view of the press both before and during the war leaving the
more tedious task of negotiations to the military but constantly
demanding to be consulted and insistent on being regarded as the senior
partner to any agreement reached.
The Admiralty favoured a pre-war Press Bill along the lines of the Japanese
press laws (total government control of all published defence information
in time of emergency and complete control over war correspondents). In
the words of the First Sea Lord, Prince Louis Battenberg in 1905 : 'My
views (of the Press Bill) are those of the Japanese General Staff which
means our measures cannot be stringent enough' 	 It was the Admiralty,
faithful to this Battenbrg hard-line ,which nearly wrecked the 1912
negotiations when Sir Graham Greene (Permanent Secretary at the
Admiralty) insisted that the press should submit all defence items which
came their way to the Service departments for permission to publish.
Only Brade's adroit intervention appears to have averted a press walk-
out from the negotiations by suggesting what in fact became the agreed
arrangement whereby editors were requested to seek advice on any
defence item which in their editorial judgement they considered doubtful
for publication. 56 It was the first but by no means the last time that
Brade for the War Office was to perform such a service in modifying
Admiralty intransigence and repairing bridges between the press and the
Service departments.
The military proved to be far more flexible in coping with their natural
dislike and distrust of the press than their naval colleagues. A
number of senior military comnanders began to develop, in the pre-
war years, very close personal links with proprietors and editors,
much to their mutual benefit during the war. Living in their cloistered
55. P.R.O. Cab 17/91.
56. Brade morandum, op. cit.
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world of fleets and ships far frorii any close civilian contact the
sailors remained generally indifferent if not hostile to journalists,
regarding such phenomena as war correspondents as a purely military
problem. While the War Office by 1916 had established an elaborate
press and publicity network, as late as rch 1918, despite
persistent attempts by Rear-Admiral Sir Douglas Brownrigg, the
Admiralty Chief Censor, to improve naval publicity, Hubert Brand,
Admiral Beatty's private secrçtary was writing to Brownrigg from H.M.S.
Elizabeth at Rosyth :'The C-in-Casks me to tell you that he is averse
generally to Press visits, lectures, etc. partly because they are
a considerable nuisance but principally because they are a source
of danger...'57
But in one area, that of submarine cable communications, and their
strategic implications for an Imperial power the Services were united
in an 'extremely professional and competent' 58 mariner. In the late
nineteenth century, the responsible Inter-Department Coninittee (the
Colonial Defence Committee) displayed not only 'a virtual fetish'59
for laying 'all red lines' - Service cables independent of the
commercial networks - but also a canny regard for the strategic
usefulness of censoring press and commercial telegrams.
In 1911 an embryonic system had been established whereby upon government
orders for mobilisation, all such commercial telegrams would be subject
to a censorship conducted by retired military personnel at the Central
Telegraph Office under the direction of the War Office Chief Censor.
The censorship was to stop a hostile power comnunicating with its allies
or colonies, to stop spies from sending messages and thirdly to prevent
the publication in Britain and the Empire 'of true or false infonnation
57. Hubert Brand to Sir Douglas Brownrigg, 15th March 1918. P.R.O.
PIN 1/8514.41
58. Paul M.Kennedy,Imperial Cable Coninunications and Strategy
1870-1914 in Kennedy, op.cit, (1979) p.94
59. Kennedy, op.cit. (1978) p.79.
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which might exercise a prejixlical effett on the population' 6° No
legislation was sought empowering such actions as this was thought
to be 'disadvantageous from a military point of view as calling
attention to arrangements which it is desirable to keep secret'.61
Not surprisingly in view of the latter statement, these arrangements
were not discussed or disclosed during the pre-war Service/press
negotiations, leading to the 1912 voluntary censorship agreement.
Between then and the outbreak of war in August 1914 the Services
do not appear to have considered any changes to the planned system
of cable censorship or of even informing the press of their existence
despite the increasing cooperation proffered by the press over defence
items. Given the instant cooperation of the press to the request for
silence over the movements of the B.E.FS, the impact of the cable
censorship-delays and confused decisions - together with the surprise
ban on war correspondents, came as a rude shock to leading journalists.
To ameliorate the press and ensure its continued participation in
a voluntary censorship scheme which was close to collapse, as well as
to counter some of the wild rumours beginning to circulate, Ch,
the First Lord of the Admiralty announced to the House of Commons
on 7th August 1914 the establishment of a 1>ress Bureau '...to provide a
steady stream of trustworthy information supplied by both the War Office
and the Admiralty'.62
But Churchill 's statement which had said nothing about the cable censorship,
was short and ambiguous ,containing no clear definition of the Press
Bureau's precise role or powers. Was it a manifestation of the authorities'
intention to maintain the pre-war voluntary principles, leaving the press
free to criticise and comment about events and policy or was it the first
step towards the Continental model of total control of the press during
war-time? As we shall see in Chapter II, despite all the pre-war
negotiations and planning, in the confused, chaotic days of early August
1914 ,no-one in Government or in the Service departments seemed at all
clear about the issue of press control and press censorship. The Press
Bureau and its 'client', the press, were left to come to terms as best
they could.
60. P.R.O. Cab 18/16/4,22nd Octoberl898 cited in Kennedy, op.cit.(1979).91
61. ibid.




The censorship ... 'should be handled discreetly and carefully, since
it is an exotic in unnatural surroundings; but it should be handled
consistently and boldly, for otherwise it does not justify its
existence'. Quarterly Review, January 1916.
By June 1914 the Coimnittee of Imperial Defence had prepared a War Book
which drew together the pot-pourri of plans arrived at by the two
Service departments and other civilian ministries in the event of war
or national emergency.t A section of this War Book catered for a
'Strained Relations' period in the event of possible hostilities and
it was under this heading that the Admiralty and War Office made
preliminary censorship arrangements in late July 1914. No direct
censorship or control of the press by government or the Service
departments was envisaged in the War Book or the need of a Press Bureau.
The Admiralty established a censorship section under Rear-Admiral
Brownrigg with a strict notion of secrecy as outlined in the Admiralty
section of the War Book : 'It was understood that the Admiralty would
2
be free to take such precautions as long tradition had sanctioned...'
War Office plans appeared at least on paper, to take into account recent
negotiations with the press. A sub-section of Military Operations,
M.O. 5(h) was established with two general staff officers to supervise
arrangements for field censorship and with the duty of 'drafting and
furnishing to the press suitable comunique on military organization,
the channel of comnunicat ion being the Admiralty, War Office and Press
3
Cannu.ttee, (the Joint Coiiunittee)' In the event it was this sub-section,
far from furnishing 'suitable communique's' which issued the 'request' on
24 July through the Joint Committee for total press silence on the
organization and whereabouts of the British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.).
1. 'Military Press Control Part 1,' December T918 P.R.O. W032/9304
2. Cited by Julian S. Corbett in History of the Great War - Naval
Operations, Vol I.(London, Longman Green & Co., 1920), p.21.
3. 'Military Press Control, Part 1.', op. cit.
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On the afternoon of 4th August 1914 the Government, by proclamation,
took over the whole system of land telegraphs, submarine cables
and wireless stations. The censorship of messages sent by these
means, including press cablegrams, was placed in the charge of
ninety military censors based at the Central Telegraph Office
(C.T.O.) and other telegraph offices in London under Colonel A.G.
Churchill of the War Office. On the morning-after the British ultiiiatium
to Berlin had expired,the two ends of the German Atlantic cable
were cut and the two ends taken into the harbours of Falmouth and
Iralifax. The fleet was fully mobilised by 3rd August and apart
from this and the announcement of Jellicoé's appointment as commander
in-chief of the Grand Fleet (5th August), as far as the Admiralty
were concerned that was all the public need know about naval activities.
From 5th to 12th August the entire B. E . F. embarked for the Continent
in a highly efficient logistical exercise involving 1,800 special
trains and the despatch of over 250,000 tons of supplies mainly
from Southampton. Reporters and editors were aware of . this
momentous activity yet not a mention was made of itin the press
at the tiine,not even in the local South Coast papers.
But such a ban on news of the B.E.F., coupled with silence from the
Admiralty and inevitable delays to press cablegrams due to the
inexperience and incompatibility of the mainly retired officers
drafted in as cable censors, led to an immediate shortage of
'hard news' and a spate of wild rumours and exaggerated reports. The
more celebrated rumours, like those of the presence of Russian
soldiers travelling through Britain with snow on their boots or
railway signalmen allegedly murdered by German spies, have been
well documented and recounted by writers such as	 Lord Sandhurst
and Arthur Pcnsonby. 5 But it was not so much absurd rumours of this
4. Geoffrey Dawson, Editor of The Times wrote to Harold Child on
14th August 1914 : 'It is surely the most extraordinary fact
in modern history that 120,000 armed men should leave this
country without a word being said about it in the newspapers...
Everyone knows what is going on. • .we have actually in the office
a good deal of material which we have rigorously suppressed'.
Dawson to Child, 'Dawson' The Times Archive.
5. Lord Sandhurst, From Day to Day (London, Edward Arnold & Co.Ltd.,
1928) p.51 Arthur Ponsonby, Falsehood in War-Time (London,
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1928) pp.63-66.
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sort as the distorted and wildly exaggerated reporting of war news
which concerned the Government and Service Departments and the idea
of a Press Bureau was quickly resurrected. Optimism was one thing, a
positive assistance in the prosecution of a war. A dream world of
victories was another, liable as it was, to lead to an instant shattering
of morale, if things went wrong. Many newspapers and journals wrote
up the opening days of the war solely in terms of an outstanding Allied
victory and an unmitigated disaster for the Central powers - faith
replaced facts for many journalists in those early days of the war, a trait
they shared with the commanders of the Allied forces in the Western
theatre of operations.6
The attempt of Von Btilow's 2nd Army on 5th August to storm the Belgian
fortress of Liege was poorly executed and resulted in heavy German losses.
This setback was seized upon by most sections of the British press as a
clear sign of imminent German collapse. The Daily Mail's main headline
for 8th August ran: '25,000 Germans Killed' followed by this opening
paragraph : 'It is certain that the Germans have received a grievous
blow. . . . they have opened the war with a reverse (which has).. . .destroyed
the morale of....their best army corps'. The main news column in the
Liverpool Daily Post was headed 'Victorious Belgians/Germans defeated
at Liege/Severe German Losses/Request for Armistice'. The Manchester
Guardian headlined 'German Losses in Desperate Attack on Liege/Berlin
makes Admission'. The Scotsman in a leader quoted the Belgian Minister
of War as saying that the German losses were becoming 'enormous' and
concluded that 'Time is against Germany and on the side of her enemies
in the field' (7th August). At a time when the German 7th army in
Lorraine was inflicting a severe rebuff to French 1st Army forces who
had attempted to apply the offensive doctrine so beloved by the
French High Command, the Weekly Dispatch on 9th August ran the banner
headline : 'Seven German Regiments Surrender' : 'Yesterdays news', its
main story went on, 'confirmed and threw further light on the severe
reverse the Germans have sustained during their first encounter ...
6. For an accurate and very readable account of the blind optimism
which often confused the actions and decisions of the Anglo!
French High Command, see John Terraine, Mons (London, B.T, Batsford,
1960), passim.
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in France. The next column on its main news page described the
scene at Liege, (where the Germans were well on their way to taking
all the forts), as 'German troops lying feet deep in the trenches'.
Isolated incidents of German setbacks were written up as major
defeats and French and Belgian reverses generally ignored or glossed
over - a practice not confined to the popular press. The very few
French advances at the time were understandably written up as outstanding
achievements heralding the inevitable collapse of German militarism
The Manchester Guardian headed a piece about the French occupation of
Muihouse in A].sace as 'Germany Hard Pressed' (10th August) and on 12th
August a main news story headed 'Extraordinary Rumours/from Berlin!
Anti War Disturbances' which was nothing more than a series of comments
from an unnamed French deputy. Repington, military correspondent of
The Times quoted Napoleon to allay his readers' fears when the Germans
entered Brussels, : 'there was no glory in entering the undefended
capital of an enemy country', (21 St August). At a time when the
French army was losing 300,000 men in Lorraine, the Saturday Review
uncritically quoted the French Ministry of War statement that 'it
was an affair of outposts - a fight with only one division on either
side' (15th August).
The prize for this class of rose tinted reporting must surely go to
Reynolds'5 Newspaper which on the 16th of August with the Germans
having taken the forts at Liege and on their way to Brussels reported
that 'The Belgians are reported to have lost fewer than 200 killed
and wounded and the Germans are now reported in retreat'. A small
paragraph on an inside page warned its readers to beware of 'the
current vogue in false rumours'. Such roseate reporting indicates
the national paranoia about Germany which simply had to believe that
the Germans could be beaten, that their superior and efficient methods
were not invincible when pitched against the intuitive genius of the
French and British races. The Nation on 8th August illustrated this
mood of national insecurity with the hopeful comment that the B.E.F.
Corps would perhaps be able to. • .tax the superior training, higher
intelligence and the more scientific leadership of the Germany army'.
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The establishment of what was in effect a two-tier press censorship -
a voluntary one supervised by the Joint Committee and an obligatory
cable censorship, as well as Admiralty insistence on controlling
the issue of all official war bulletins quickly led to chaos in
Fleet Street. Journalists were forced to wait outside the room of
Sir George Armstrong, an Admiralty censor, for such snippets of news
as the Admiralty considered suitable for publication. In France and
Belgium, no journalists were allowed Within miles of the front lines
and apart from the often absurdly optimistic French and Belgian
War Ministry statements, were obliged to rely on Parisian gossip or
impressions from stragglers to meet their deadlines. Editors began
to besiege the Joint Committee for guidance over censorship decisions and
for reliable news of the war. But in the words of an official report
on the censorship issued later on in the war, 'it was not, however,
possible during war-time for the greatly increased volume of work to
be dealt with by this committee, the official members (Servicemen) of
which had other duties to perform'
Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty and a former war correspondent,
seems to have recognized in his pre-war idea of a Press Bureau, the
answer to these problems and as the Minister most concerned with the
pre-war negotiations with the press, was able to convince his Cabinet
colleagues of the urgency of its establishment. The Bureau would take
over the Joint Committee ' s role as the guiding light of the voluntary
censorship undertaken by the press itself,'a difficult and thankless
task' 8which was to be sweetened by having 'the duty of supplying
from time to time, for publication in the press official news which
the departments themselves had previously intended to transmit direct
to the newspaper editors. '9 Churchill told the House of Commons on
the 7th of August 1914 that a Press Bureau had been established which
would 'provide a steady stream of trustworthy information supplied by
both the Admiralty and the War Office') 0 But because both the press
7. 'Memorandum on the Official Press Bureau', March 1915, British
Parliamentary Papers,(Cd. 7680), p.4.
8. ibid.
9. ibid.
10. House of Commons Debates 5th Series, 7th August 1914, Cols 2153-56•
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and the Services had conspired to keep the 1912 agreement a secret
Churchill said nothing to the Commons about the Bureau's principal
task of replacing the Joint Conmittee as a censorship authority. To
further obfuscate matters, the Committee was to remain in existence
as an intermediary body and its Secretary to continue to distribute
the confidential Notices to the press.
Churchill told the House of Conunons that F.E. Smith, a K.C. and
leading member of the Unionist Opposition, was to 'preside over' the
Bureau. No details of the precise role or powers of the Bureau were
announced by Churchill and statements by Government Ministers further
confused matters with contradictory and erroneous explanations. Kitchener,
when asked by Sir George Riddell, chief proprietor of the News of the
World and Secretary of the N.P.A., what were to be the duties of the
'Press Censor' declared magisterially : 'He will see that nothing
dangerous goes into the newspapers. Go away and settle the matter
with Brade. We must make the English people understand that we are
at war and that war is not pap." 1 Thus with characteristic perspicuity
Kitchener envisaged both a repressive and propagandist role for the
press censorship which it was soon to adopt.
On 8th August the day after Churchill's statement, McKenna, the Home
Secretary,portrayed the Bureau as a vast, all powerful Ministry of
Information. Questioned in the House of Commons by Mr Joynson-Hicks
about a story in that day's Daily Mail of a fictitious naval battle
off the East coast which asJoynson-Hicks said 'appears to be absolutely
untrue in every detail", Kenna condemned 'the fabrication of false
news ... which might be wilfully done for the purpose of assisting
the circulation of a newspaper' and went on boldly to expound that
'the public have a reasonable right to expect that no news will be
published except such news as is furnished through the Bureau.
It was a preposterous commitment for a Home Secretary to make when
at that moment Smith had not yet been allocated a staff or premises
11. G.A.Riddeil Lorc'I Riddells War iar,914-1Londofi, Nicholson & Co.,
1933) p. 10.
12. House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, 8th August 1914, Cols.2101-Z203.
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to work frcin. Asquith, in contrast, narrowed the range of the Bureau's
activities to that of 'the official mouthpiece of all military and
naval information' and made a stab at defining the principle upon which
such information was to be distributed. This was that 'all information
which can be given without prejudice to the public interest shall
be given fully and at once' •13 Churchill had made no mention of
censorship and when Mr Tennant, Under-Secretary of State for War,was
asked on the 25th of August if a press censorship had in fact been
established, he side-stepped the question by stating that the press
were to refer to the Service Departments if in ub 14 These
seemingly off-the-cuff Ministerial statements reflect the ad hoc
nature of the Press Bureau's early days for as Mr ?vCallum Scott
complained to the House on 31st August, 'it is a remarkable fact...
that there has been no full and precise definition of the objects and
functions and powers of the Bureau. . .many difficulties and embarrassments
have arisen...owing to this misunderstanding'.15
Lord Haldane, the Lord Chancellor, answering this and other criticisms
of the Bureau in the House of Lords later that same day and aided no
doubt by years of experience as a philosopher identified the crux of
the problem of definition and powers as far as the Press Bureau was
concerned : 'There is no existing legislation by which Parliament has
control over the Press and on the whole it has not been necessary')6
Haldane went to point out that the press, like every other section of
society was subject to the Defence of the Realm Act (D.0.R.A.)
Regulations approved by Parliament on 8th August 1914.17 The Regulations
which were of particular concern to the press, although not specifically
directed towards it, were Regulations 18,27 and 51. Regulation 18
forbade the collection, and publication of any information, military
or naval, of possible use to an enemy; regulation 27 forbade
13. House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, 27th August 1914, Cols 150-152.
14. House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, 25th August 1914, Cols 8-10.
15. House of Comnons Debates, 5th Series, 31st August 1914, Cols 502-3.
16. House of Lords Debates. 5th Series, 31st August 1914, Cols 560-562.
17. P.R.O. Public General Statutes (4 and S Geo 5), Chapter 29.
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the spread of false reports likely to cause disaffection among the
armed forces or likely to prejudice Great Britain's relations with
its allies; and regulation 51 which gave powers to the Competent
Nil itary Authorities to search any premises where breaches of the
Regulations were suspected. Until May 1915 ,offences against the
Regulations, under Section 1 of D.O. R.A., were to be tried by court
martial (with maximunr penalties for conviction of life imprisonment) or
in minor cases by Courts of Sumary Jurisdiction.
With such all embracing powers (on paper) it was hardly necessary for
the Government to have drafted specific regulations to suit the press.
There never was a legal definition of the powers or functions of the
Bureau throughout the war nor was there any public attempt made
to define what was meant by press censorship. The Bureau was a hybrid
creature, trailing behind the legal tail-coats of its mainly un-
sympathetic Service masters. It had no legal existence or authority
and could act only through them against newspapers considered to
have transgressed the regulations. As we shall see in Chapter V in
most cases, by the time the War Office or Admiralty had been persuaded
to initiate a prosecution, the moment had passed for a likely conviction.
The Regulations left the press free of any obligation to submit copy
and a breach of any instruction or advice from the Bureau was not in
itself an offence. In other words press censorship was essentially
voluntary in principle. If a paper published a piece, without sub-
mitting it to the Bureau, which was then considered by the Bureau or
any Government Department to be a breach of the Regulations, it was then
left exposed to the full force of the law. Thus editorial judgement
played a major part in the censorship operation and hence the Bureau's
continual emphasis in its dealings with the press upon what it saw as
its role of protector of press liberties.
F.E.Smith appears to have been given very imprecise instructions as to
how the censorship was to function but his behaviour towards the press
in his brief sojourn as Director of the Bureau sharpens the picture of
confusion that existed within the Bureau in its early days as it
veered between the two poles of repressor and protector. Smith
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had been one of the few front bench Unionists in favour of joining
a coalition in August 1914 and his appointment, which according to
The Times was greeted with 'some laughter from the Ministerial
members' (18th August) appears to have been a gesture by the Government
towards national wartime unanimity. Initial press reaction to his
appointment veered from the plain puzzlement : 'The choice of Mr.F.E
Smith . . . seems curious...' (?vnchester Guardian , 8th August) to
the downright eulogistic : '...a better selection could not have
been made. His acute mind and steady judgement will be brought to
bear in a department that will need to be controlled with a sensitive
appreciation both of public requirements and national interests. All
the qualities necessary for this delicate and important task of
distributing authentic war news to the Press will be found in the
Member for Walton' (Liverpool Daily Post and Mercury, 8th August 1914).
The Daily Post could not have been more prescient in its appreciation
of the qualities necessary for a Director of the Press Bureau or more
mistaken in attributing them to F.E.SITL1th. It was a delicate post
requiring both a high degree of administrative ability to graft a
totally new, undefined and ramshackle presence upon the Whitehall fabric
and a cool, tactful approach to gain the respect of a suspicious and
potentially hostile press. The appointment of Smith, a celebrated
lawyer and politician, was bold and imaginative but in this case
disastrous and within two months, Smith had resigned.
Smith was held responsible in the public mind for aspects of the
censorship operation, such as cable censorship and the calibre of
the censorship staff, which were not his direct responsibility but
he compounded his problems and those of the Bureau's with irrational
judgements and bad tempered behaviour. He failed to master the
organizational ccinplexities of the situation he inherited arid he
treated the press, with an arrogance bordering on contempt. His was
the case of a men who had fought his way to the top of his profession
free from any concern about public opinion who was not agile enough
to adjust to the demands and compromises necessary in running a
government agency exposed to public glare and Parliamentary criticism
and where patience and good humour are as essential as a sharp mind.
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He was given a staff of three secretaries and a few semi-retired
officers as naval and military censors with no rules for their
guidance other than general instructions received periodically from
the War Office and Admiralty.
The Bureau began its life at 40, Charing Cross Road in totally
inadequate premises in view of the large number of journalists
who lingered there awaiting the latest official couununique. The
selection of the semi-retired officers was the responsibility of
the Service departments and not Smith's but the selection of his
brother Harold, was and as his unpaid secretary, he was not a wise
choice. Harold Smith's curt manner did not go down well with
journalists and led Sir Arthur Markham in the House of Coimnons to
complain : 'I have letters from newspaper editors who complain
that (he)...acts like one of the Kaiser's officers in his dealings
with the press'.18
Stung by examples of delayed and inconsistent censorship decisions
emanating from Charing Cross Road, H.G. Wells widened the target of
criticism to include the entire personnel of the Bureau. 'It was'
he wrote in The Nation on 5th September 'almost inevitable that the
censorship.... should be abandoned to anyone who happened to be left
over from the more urgent business afoot. . .the officials contrived
to do a very considerable amount of real mischief by withholding
information, mangling important telegrams and snubbing thousands of
helpers who were ready to help'.
But the officers at the Bureau were not trained as censors, they were
without adequate instructions and guidelines and they were constantly
forced to seek advice and decisions from the Service departments which
inevitably meant delays and occasionally the withholding of information.
But these decisions, particularly in the early days, were taken by the
Service chiefs and handed down to the censors at the Bureau, often
without reference to the Director of the Bureau, much to the annoyance
of Smith and later Directors who had to face the public consequences.
18. House of Cousnons Debates, 5th Series, 31st August 1914, Cols. 453-511.
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Smith's failure was that he did not explain these problems to the press
and although hampered by an inexperienced staff not under his absolute
control, he rejected out of hand the suggestion that the Bureau might
benefit from the presence of journalists on the staff with the
brusque statement that 'it is not part of our function to manufacture
news'. 19
 His dealings with the press reveal a blunt tactlessness that
was out of key with the demands of his post and can hardly have
engendered a spirit of cooperation. Dawson, editor of The Times
regularly complained of the 'tone' of Smith's letters 20which is hardly
surprising to judge from the letter Smith sent to the editor of a
small provincial paper, the Burnley Express about an item published
about the East Yorks Regiment's move to Egypt, (a clear but isolated
breach of the D.O.R.A. Regulations) : 'You would be well advised before
answering this letter ... to take advice as to your legal position in
relation to (D.O.R.A. Regulations) as the scandalous nature of your
publication is engaging the careful attention of the War Office and the
A&ciiniralty' •21 Such a letter has the ring of a bullying counsel addressing
a potential victim in the dock rather than the Director of an agency
created according to some of its own claims, to assist and protect the
press against the rigours of military justice. The public 'tone'
of Smith's statement differed little from the private. When pressed in
the House of Commons to answer detailed questions on a censorship
question, M.P's were met with a blank refusal and the plea : 'I would
point out that I have had no dinner...'22
One of the most persistent criticisms of the Bureau throughout the war
was that of unfair discrimination. A paper would submit an item for
censorship which was then stopped only to discover it published in
another and often rival journal which had not sought out the Bureau's
19. House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, 31st August 1914, Col. 493.
20. Dawson to Smith, 27th August 1914, P.R.O. I-K) 139/5/Al27.
21. P.R.O. 11) 139/7/A277/1. There is no evidence in this file of any
such 'careful attention' of this case by the Service departments
as alleged by Smith but a number of files in the HO 139 series
were shredded.
22. House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, 31st August 1914, Cols. 453-511.
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'assistance'. It was a problem inherent in any system of voluntary
censorship. Under Smith the Bureau took the somewhat legalistic vies
that the grievance felt by papers which had suffered because of this
should be held against those papers which had failed to submit their
copy and not against the Bureau. This attitude infuriated editors and
when it was raised in the Coninons by Mr Sherwell, the member for
I-Iuddersfield, Sinith,instead of explaining the difficulties involved in
any disciplinary action against offending newspapers adopted a sarcastic,
combatitive attitude, describing as 'futile' Sherwell's suggestion that
other papers should be warned when the Bureau held up a story submitted
by one of their competitors : 'I rejoice indeed that this is the most
serious (criticism) which the Hon. Gentleman has thought necessary to
bring before the House after five weeks of work in an office for which
there was hardly any arrangements' and he invited Sherwell to visit
the Bureau 'and tell the House what he thinks of our methods and in
what respect he thinks they can be improved'. 23 Such an attitude won
few admirers for Smith or the Bureau.
When the Press Bureau was established the censorship of press cablegrams,
along with other international cables, remained under the charge of
Colonel Churchill and was conducted in a shift system in twelve different
cable offices in London. Britain was the telegraphic crossroads of the
world and placed in a position of great strategic advantage in being able
to monitor all messages from the European Continent to the New World.
It was therefore not surprising that such a ramshackle censorship
arrangement, undertaken by men with little or no journalistic or telegraphic
experience should lead to delayed telegrams, missed deadlines, inconsistent
judgements and the firm international belief that telegrams, particularly
those from Germany to America, were as BethwnHollweg alleged in August
1914 'consistently poisoned'. 24 T.P.O'Connor, an M.P. and well known
23. House of Cannons Debates, 5th Series, 10th September 1914, Col 743.
24. The Times 3oth August 1914. At first all messages from Germany to the
U.S.A. were being stopped by the C.T.O. censors. After loud protests
fran across the Atlantic this was soon changed and messages even
critical of Great Britain were passed untouched. P.R.O. Ii) 139/7/A248/
Part 1/8. The Enlish Review argued in rch 1916 that the press had no
reason to complain about the cable censorship because as the British
Government had pointed out to all cable subscribers in August 1914,
transmission of messages was 'an act of grace' on the part of the British
authorities who accepted messages only 'on the understanding that they
would be"subject to censorship by the British authorities; that is that
they may be stopped, delayed or otherwise dealt with in all respects at
the discretion of the authorities and without notice to the senders..."
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journalist and proprietor of The Star although critical of the
effects this system was having on public opinion in Mierica, did
concede in the House of Comons that no Fleet Street sub-editor
with years of experience could hope to get through the 100,000 words
a day which passed through the telegraph offices.25
Criticism in the national and international press and in Parliament
led to a change in the system in early September 1914 after MKenna
had been placed by the Cabinet in overall charge of censorship operations
following the imiens Despatch dbcle (to be discussed later in this
chapter). Thirty of Colonel Churchill's censors were made specifically
responsible for the censorship of press cablegrams and a consultative
cQnrnittee made up of ex-officers, academics and civil servants was
procured to guide the censors in cases of major difficulty. Like
&uith, who for the first time, was given responsibility, albeit a joint
one with the War Off ice,for the cable censorship, this committee sat
at the Press Bureau in Charing Cross Roact while the censors remained
at the Central Telegraph Office in the City. 'It is to be hoped',
declared D. 26 announcing the changed arrangement, 'that in this way
the policy of the Censorship will become more consistent and that many
of the grievances of the past will be corrected' •26
It was a vain hope for the errors, delays and lack of uniformity
continued, not surprisingly when &uith and the consultative committee
were in separate buildings hampered by poor telephonic communication
and when &nith, although now jointly responsible with Mejor General
Callwell of the War Office for the press cable censorship, had never
been shown the guide lines upon which the C.T.O. censors operated.
'They are secret in character', Buclqnaster,Sm.ith's successor was later
told by R.P.Hills, legal secretary at the Bureau, 'we have never
seen them in this office although we are supposed to control the Cable
censors...' 27 Thus &nith was held publicly responsible for the operation
of a censorship, the guiding principles of which he had never seen.
25. House of Ccinmons Debates, 5th Series, 10th September 1914, Col..739.
26. D. Notice sent to Editors, 8th September 1914, P.R.O. I-ID 139/6/A149.
27. Hill's Memorandum to Sir Stanley Buckmaster, 27th September 1914,
ibid.
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The system continued in this bizarre fashion after Smith' s departure
on 24th September 1914, until at Buckmaster's insistence, on 26th
October 1914 the censorship of all press cablegrams was brought under
the direct physical control of the Bureau at its new offices in the
Royal United Services Institution (RJJSI) in Whitehall. Things were
not perfect after this, as we shall see in later chapters, but
there was a major improvement in efficiency and less criticism of this
aspect of the censorship in the press and Parliament.
The pre-war Joint Connittee remained in existence after the formation
of the Bureau and although Smith became a co-opted member, its
relationship with the Bureau was not clearly defined. The Canmittee 'S
machinery for the issuing of private and confidential warnings to
the press on defence matters, known as Parker telegrams was adopted
by the Bureau. These became known as D Notices, issued by the Press
Bureau usually after close consultation with the Service Departments
and were distributed under the supervision of Ernest, later Sir Ernest
Robbins, a member of the Joint Coiiunittee through the P A. news agency
office, for whom Robb ins worked as Manager. Thus again Smith was
responsible for a system of news distribution the technical running
of which was out of his direct control. Despite the elaborate
arrangements, this side of the Bureau's work functioned reasonably
well throughout the war even after the 'withering away' of the Joint
Caanittee itself.
In reaction to the establishment of the Bureau which had been unofficially
consulted or rather instructed by Kitchener (through Riddell), the
Joint Comittee issued a notice to the press on 7th August which
went straight to the heart of what the press looked for from the
Bureau - news in authoritative and plentiful supply and freedom from
Ixireaucratic control. The Joint Ccunittee Notice told editors that
'the Miniralty and War Office have organised a Bureau for the co-ordination
and distribution of official news relating to Naval and Military matters
concerning the progress of the war which can. be made public'. It went
on to observe how the press had been canplimeutei on its cooperation
with the authorities and that 'if the Press continue to act in this spirit
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there will be no necessity for the officials to alter the present
voluntary rranemen' •28 No mention was made of 'censorship'
voluntary or otherwise for it was presumed that the press had became
accustomed to the voluntary submission of any item it considered
doubtful for reasons of defence security. 'Defence security' now
became 'war security' and we can see how the system established in
1912 could so easily be adapted to suit the war-time circumstances.
Perhaps taking their lead from this Notice, it was as a source for
mere reliable information that the Bureau was greeted, where mentioned
at all, by newspapers and journals. The Scotsman, the first but by no
means the last newspaper to give the Bureau some advice, urged it 'to
do something to check an evil (sensationalist rumours) which the
more reputable newspapers have, by the exercise of their own discretion,
kept within bounds'. (8th August 1914) •29 The Liverpool Post and Mercury
similarly emphasised the need to limit 'ill-founded and harmful sensationalism'
(8th August 1914). The Merthyr Express,echoing the view of the Bureau
taken by McKenna of a powerful Ministry of Information) said : 'all news not
authenticated by the Press Bureau must be accepted with the traditional
grain of salt'. (15th August 1914). These reactions and others like
that of the Manchester Guardian which misleadingly reported that 'a
News Commissioner has been forimed at the Admiralty' (8th August 1914)
and The Spectator which wrongly stated that 'the newspapers are now under
control by law' (15th August 1914) illustrate how starved the press felt
itself to be of reliable news and how much confusion and misunderstanding
surrounded the formation and function of the Bureau in the minds of
journalists as well as government spokesmen at the beginning of the war.
Few papers or journals mentioned the issue of censorship but where
discussed it was generally given cautious treatment. The Liberal
Daily Chronicle with its ear close to the ground warned the government
on the day before Churchill 's announcement in the Commons, that it was
useless to attempt the suppression of information which was already
being passed by word of mouth 'and that censorship should only be used
when 'the news published would be of service to the enemy' (7th August 1914).
28. Cited by Riddell, G.A., op cit., (1933), p.2.
29. This somewhat self-righteous attitude had not prevented The Scotsman
from publishing rumours 'that there was a battle between the British
and German fleets to the South of the Dagger Bank' (7th August)
which were totally without foundation.
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It was riot only Liberals who expressed this fear of a politically
motivated censorship. The pro-Unionist Spectator hoped that 'it
(censorship) will never be allowed to become a precedent for any
attempt on the part of a Government to confuse opinion and facts.
It is all too easy for a Government to make use of such an Institution
(the Press Bureau) . . . if it wants to gain currency and popularity
for certain ideas'. (15th August 1914). But these two voices were
almost alone in expressing such fears at this stage because as we have
seen, editors had been told that the pre-war voluntary arrangements
were to continue which, if not pure in terms of journalistic ethics,
had worked and were working in practice for, as the Daily Chronicle
tacitly admitted,the press were already voluntarily sitting tight on
one of the hottest items of news for home consumption, the movements
of the B.E.F. It was not political censorship that most newspapers and
journals were apprehensive about with the arrival of the Bureau but as
a provider and distributor of news, a bureaucratic agency blundering
about and upsetting their finely tuned and ruthlessly competitive
system.
It was news the press wanted from the Bureau and it was news the
Bureau failed to provide in sufficient quantity, speed or consistency
that quickly brought down the full force of journalistic rage upon the
Press Bureau and its Director E.E.Smith. As soon as the Bureau commenced
operations at Charing Cross Road. on 12th August, it began to issue
bulletins at various and unspecified times of the day written by Admiralty
and War Office officials (although published in the name of the Press
Bureau) in the style of Whitehall minutes containing the minimum of
information expressed in the bleakest of styles and often garnished with
the most trivial of details. News of large scale engagements were often
summarised in one or two lines. On 14th August, the Press Bureau
bulletin at 3.45 p.m. referring to the severe fighting taking place in
Lorraine stated (Paragraph 2) that 'At Sade nunerous desertions from
the German troops are notified. The French have taken many prisoners
and captured some machine guns'. Yet Paragraph 8 of the same bulletin
contained a ten line report about General Joffre conferring the
Knighthood of the Legion of Honour upon a lieutenant of the French Dragoons.
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A bulletin referring to the opening engagement of ithat turned out to
be the battle of Mons stated : 'The British forces have successfully
reached their new positions . . .fighting has gone on more or less
continuously but the enemy has not effectually harrassed. c.ir  operations
...casualties cannot be estimated but are not heavy ...the enemy
suffered very heavily' •30
Such sparse announcements caused deep resentment and suspicion when
further information began to trickle forth usually indicating a less
optimistic state of affairs. As The Star said on 27th August 1914 :
the censor doles out announcements with a verbal frugality which is
exceedingly unwise'. The bulletins were not for the most part written
by &nith or the Press Bureau staff but came frcxi the Service Departments
who in turn took their content and tone from G.H.Q., G.Q.G. or individual
naval cciimanders. Very often, no one at certain periods during or
even after a battle is in full coniiand of all that has happened and this
was certainly the case in late August with the B.E.F. in daily retreat
while fighting sporadic and often intense rearguard actions. Very
of ten at that time G.H.Q. was completely out of touch with what was
taking place on certain days which explains the vagueness of certain
bulletins. 31
 But it was 'the Censor' who was blamed for this even by
such far-sighted cxinentators as Arnold Bennett, who writing in The Nation
acknowledged that a lot of the criticism levelled at the Bureau was
unfair and should be laid 'at the door of higher authorities'. But even
he attributed the Bureau as the sole author of 'these childish bulletins'.
The fault was partly &nith' s for failing to take the press into his
confidence and explain how the bulletins were written by men fighting a
war and not waging a publicity campaign. It was also a direct result
of the absence of war correspondents near the front line.
30. Daily Chronicle 25th August 1914.
31. As Field Marshal Sir John French Ccmiander-in-Chief of the B.E.F.
cciiiplained to Kitchener at the time of the engagement at Le Cateau
'The French do not keep me sufficiently informed as to the general
situation and they try to conceal reverses or compulsory retirements'.
French to Kitchener, 25th August 1914, Kitchener Papers, P.R.O.
30/57/49/WAS.
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Resentment had already been created by what some papers considered to
be the unfair and unnecessary way in which the British press voluntarily
suppressed news of the B.E.F. until the official announcement of its
arrival at Boulogne a week before . As the ?nchester Guardian complained :
'To keep our own people in the dark without deceiving the enemy is doubtful
in morals and dangerous in practice,(18th August 1914). The Nation on
22 August was more openly hostile : 'On Monday night(17th August 1914)
the Press Bureau, twelve days behind the Belgian and eight days behind
the French newspapers, issued a laconic statement that our Expeditionary
Force had landed' ...unlcnown to the British public...Sir John French
has become a fajn.iliar hero to French crowds'.32
Once the restraints were lifted on mention of the B.E.F. so too did
editorial restraints on coments and criticism of the censorship
operation. The 18th of August marks the end of the Bureau's brief
honeymoon period with the British press. Criticism of the press censorship
seemed to occur in periodic waves, on occasions clearly orchestrated
by an editor or proprietor with an axe to grind or more often by a
number of papers reacting to a specific incident and feeding upon each
other's indignation. The first of these periodic attacks began
imnediately after the B.E.F. announcement and involved both an orchestrated
canipaign and a more widespread, spontaneous reaction to Press Bureau
decisions. Of all press critics of the Bureau and of censorship in
general the most sustained and virulent emanated from the Northcliffe
stable of newspapers, with The Times for once leading this particular
pack. The relationship between Geoffrey Dawson, the editor of The Times
and the proprietor, Lord Northcliffe was at best an uneasy, fragile
affair, which deterited during the war to outright hostility. But
upon one thing they were constantly agreed,that a press censorship as
established by the Government was unnecessary and a hindrance to the
efficient prosecution of the war. The essence of their case was
that the Bureau however well intentioned, delayed the transmission of
war news, in particular news of the heroic deeds of British soldiers,
32. The criticism was taken up by Sir Arthur Markham in the House of Coninons
on the 31st of August who described how he had purchased a copy of the
New York Herald at Charing Cross Station on 12th August which had
contained a report of the departure of the B.E.F. yet British newspapers
had remained silent. House of Commons, 5th Series, 31st August 1914,
Col. 456-7.
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which they argued, had a directly adverse affect on recruitment and
the fighting nuDrale of the British public.
The first campaign against the Bureau was very much a Times affair and
was about the effects of the decision to ban war correspondents.
Criticism of this had been stifled mainly because it was not clear for
a while whether the decision was a temporary one connected with the
movements of the B.E.F. When it became plain that the ban was to be
a permanent one involving all the Allied armies, The Times fired the
opening round of a long press campaign which resulted in the compromise
decision in y 1915 of the appointment of five war correspondents
at G.H.Q. In a leader on 19th August, bearing all the hallmarks of
the Times asstmiing to speak for and understand the nation's feelings
it declared : 'Now the veil is down once more and our anxious people
are informed that they can be told nothing .. . the suspense thus
imposed upon the nation is almost the hardest demand made by the
authorities and with sori misgivings we trust it may be patiently borne'.
The bleak Press Bureau bulletins of late August brought a two-pronged
attack on 26th August. Repington, their prestigious military
correspondent who perhaps should have known better, given the rapidly
changing situation in France at the time, wrote a piece arguing that
if the Government desire to receive that support from the public without
which the war and recruiting would both languish, they must issue
more of the doings of our people at the front'. The leader that day
written as most of the principal ones were at this period by Lovat Fraser,33
broadened the attack : 'If (the press) asks for better news and more
skilful censorship it does so in the public interest. Influences are
at work which do not fully comprehend the psychology of the nation
Britons cannot forever cooperate with unrestricted enthusiasm in a war
they cannot see and about which they are denied all knowledge . . .We
know little of Mans yet the French press is full of details of our
33. Dawson wrote only five leaders during the first five months
of the war and none during the first six weeks, Sir Evelyn
Wrench, Geoffrey Dawson and our Times, (London, Hutchinon &
Co., 1955), p.120.
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soldiers' great deeds ...this failure to tell the nation what was
happening was bound to affect recruiting'. It was not only the British
nation but the British Government also which was virtually 'denied all
knowledge' of what was going on in France. Sir John French's
telegrams to the War Office and the Cabinet at this time were confused
and misleading to the extent that by the end of the month Kitchener and
senior members of the Cabinet were beginning to have serious doubts
as to the mental condition of the British Comander-in-Chief, obliging
Kitchener to make his notorious trip to France to see French. It is
not surprising then that official announcements were so sparse.
Then occured an incident, so graphic of the chaos that surrounded press
censorship in the early months of the war and which led to the second
and more widespread press attack on its operations, that it is worth
recounting in detail. On the afternoon of Saturday the 29th of August
The Times news desk received a despatch by courier fran France, date
lined 'Mdens, 28th August' written by Arthur Moore, an experienced
foreign correspondent. Dawson was at Hatfield House for the week-end
and George Freeman, Acting Editor and Wickham Steed, Foreign Editor,
read the despatch with some incredulity for not only did it vigorously
attack recently published French High Coninand reports as 'childish
prattle'but it went on to give the first news of a massive British retreat
(from Mons).
Referring to official bulletins issued in Paris describing the
situation, Moore wrote that 'It seemed incredible that a great people
should be so kept in ignorance of the situation it had, to face...
it is important that the nation should know and realise certain things'.
Moore went on to tell 'the bitter truths' of a 'retreating and broken
(British) army' whose 'losses are very great' and which had not received
sufficient support from the French forces on its right. Having described
the Gennan machine guns as 'of the most deadly efficiency and very
nuirous, Moore softened the blow slightly by describing Gennan losses
as 'colossal' and emphasising that there had been no failure of
(British) discipline'. At the same time, the Northcliffe Sunday paper
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the Weekly Dispatch received a similar 'plain tale of misfortune and
defeat' from their special correspondent Hamilton Fyfe recounting in
more lurid detail than ?vkiore, his meetings with 'cheery but defeated
Tomnies' who 'had been set an impossible task'. Like More he
appears fully aware of the explosive nature of his story and in words
directed as much to his editors as to the Government he declared
'Let us not try to hush up the facts...'
As far as the operation of press censorship is concerned it is . instructive
to observe the reaction to these dispatches in Fleet Street. As the
law stood both papers could have published the story without official
approval. They would then have been open to prosecution. if the
Govenmient subsequently decided that publication of the dispatches
constituted a breach of the D.O.R.A. Regulations. Neither newspaper
had any desire to wander into such unlawwn and potentially risky
territory, especially at The Times with Dawson away. Thus quite
independently, for no paper even in the same group would share such
a scoop, both papers submitted their dispatches, having censored them
first, as in MDores dispatch where all mention of Gennan atrocities
had been deleted.
Freeman and Wickhain Steed had little doubt that the dispatch would be
stopped but not only was their scepticism unfounded and the dispatch
returned a few hours later passed for publicatien but it was clear to
them from the copy that the decision had been taken by F.E.&nith himself.
Srnith had not only censored a few sentences but had added a paragraph
stressing the need of iimiediate reinforcements to be sent to France.
In a signed note explaining his actions he asked The Times to'forgive
my clumsy journalistic suggestions but I beg you to use the parts of
this article which I have passed to enforce the lesson - re-inforcements
and re-inforcements at once' .' The Times took this to be virtually a
Government order as did the Weekly Dispatch which had received a similar
note from &nith and both published their respective stories on Sunday
34. The History of 'The Times' op. cit (1952) facsmile facing pp.182-3.
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30th August. A furious row followed publication which brought in
its trail a swingeing press onslaught against the publishers, (especially
The Times) and about the general running of the Press Bureau, leading
to the early departure of F.E.&nith.
Dawson returned to London on Sunday to find a suninons to appear before
Kitchener who soundly berated him for publishing Moore's dispatch and
'requesting' him to feature prominently a Press Bureau bulletin
prepared by the War Office which with the hindsight of history gives
a far more accurate account of the events after the engagement at
Mons than either of the garbled and histrionic messages of Moore
and Hamilton Fyfe. The War Office issued through the Press Bureau
a statement accurately pointing out that the German attempt with far
superior nunbers to force the British forces into the fortress of
ubeuge had failed, that the necessary retirement of the B.E.F. had
been carried out 'in good order though with serious losses' and also
again quite truthfully that 'German losses were out of all proportion
to those which we have suffered'. The Press bureau, now thoroughly
alarmed at the row building up, issued at the same time a statement
saying that it was allowing the publication of reports from special
correspondents so long as no names or military organizations were
mentioned but 'these messages . . . should be received with extreme caution.
No correspondents are at the front and their information 	 (that of
the special correspondents) however honestly sent is derived at second
or third hand from persons who are often in no condition to tell a
coherent story and who are certain to be without the perspective
necessary to construct or understand the general situation'.35
The Times in a leader the following day, Monday 31st August, tacitly
acknowledging Kitchener ' s personal involvement in the War Office
statement, emphasised that the Allies were still holding back the
enemy, that recent events were in no way the decisive blow needed by
Gernny and taking up the optimism inherent in the War Office statement
35. The Times 1st September 1914.
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in contrast to the more sombre impression created by their own special
correspondent on the spot reminded its readers that 'for every step,
Germany pays a high price iii blood'. Such a demure posture was of
course too late to save it from the deluge of self-righteous cr.ticism
heaped upon it in that morning's papers.
It was the War Office statement issued through the Bureau which gave
other newspapers a chance to haniner The Times and Weekly Dispatch (and
through them, Northcliffe) for what had been a superb scoop thus
reviving the pre-war press rivalries and antagonisms. It was a scoop
rapidly turning into a nightmare. The Morning Post calling for tougher
censorship regulations, described London as 'tortured last night by a
newspaper report. . .published with the dubious prestige of a name once
illustrious inEnglish journalism' (31st August). The Nation
described Moore's dispatch as 'an article calculated to disturb and
distress the public mind' but the Press Bureau had 'happily shown
(that) the story is in all its essentiala false'. (31st August). The
Scotsman believed the dtspatch 'should have been instantly suppressed.
It gave a most alarmist and totally erroneous report of the condition
of the British troops' and in a neat Caledonian thrust at the decadent
South it went on : 'Circulated .. . throughout the country on Sunday,
it created anxiety and distress not only in London which is easily moved
to panic but in other centres as well'.(3lst August).
The issue was raised in Parliament the same day (31st August) both
in questions to Asquith and during the Adjournment Debate. Asquith,
while describing the stories in The Times and Weekly Dispatch as
'very regrettable exceptions...to the patriotic reticence of the Press',
refused to be drawn into any discussion about the Press Bureau but
promised that 'steps were being taken to improve the supply of news
from the front' •36 But Smith, in a thoroughly bad-tempered defence of
the general operation of the press censorship later that day during
the Adjournment Debate, made matters far worse for himself and the
reputation of the Bureau by attempting to place the full responsibility
for the publication of the dispatches upon the editors concerned.
36. House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, 31st August 1914, Cols 372-74.
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Smith said that had he been given more time he would have written to
the editor (of The Times) asking 'whether he considered it a wise
article to publish ...quite apart from the legal powers we possessed...
I have no doubt whatever that he would have suppressed the article'.37
In view of his letters to both editors begging them to publish, such
a rendering of events, even for a lawyer was perverse, if not downright
misleading.
Stung by these remarks the Northcliffe entourage launched into the
attack. The Daily Mail on 1st September published a facsimile of
Smith's note requesting publication of Fyfe's dispatch (propriety
prevented The Times from doing likewise) and the Evening News that
same day described Smith's remarks as showing 'either complete ignorance
of the facts or an indulgence in party or professional spite... painful
to contemplate' 38 The Times in an angry leader obliquely attacking
Smith, supported the idea of a censorship in war-time 'as a valuable
support to the press...' but the censor The Times wanted (unlike the
present incumbent) would be 'a censor with real military knowidege and
in close touch with the military authorities...' As for the Amiens
Despatch, they had been requested to publish it and if they had not done
so 'we should have failed in our public duty'. (1st September 1914).
These attacks and revelations devastated what little was left of Smith's
credibility as Director of the Bureau and he remained there for only
two more weeks. They did nothing either to encourage confidence in the
voluntary submission of copy although there is no evidence that newspapers
refrained from doing so. The Scotsman in a view representative of the
majority of the newspapers and journals looked at, related the Amiens
Despatch incident to the general performance of the Press Bureau which
it considered to be : 'capricious, hesitating and obviously governed
by no leading principle ...it is impossible to feel that the Press Bureau
37. House of Couuxns Debates, 5th Series 31st August 1914,Col. 467.
The History of The' Times described Smith's statement as 'regrettably
ambiguous' Vol. Iv, The 150th Anniversary and beyond,1912-20 tLondon
The Times Publishing Co., 1952). p.226.
38. It was upon Smith's legal opinion that Lever had successfully taken
Northcliffe to court on libel charges in 1907. Pound & Hannsworth,
Northcliffe (London, Cassell & Co., 1959) p.303.
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is performing its work efficiently.' (31 August 1914). Some papers,
like The Globe and the Westminster Gazette published apologies for
their attacks upon The Times and Sir Arthur rkham, M.P. wrote to
the paper on the 3rd of September saying : 'The Prime Minister owes
you an apology for the attack made upon your journal. . .your action
has been completely vindicated'. Even the Liverpool Daily Post and
Mercury normally adulatory in its references to the Bureau admitted
'that on the whole the Bureau has not fulfilled the expectations
formed of it on the strength of Mr Churchill's statement'. (1st September
1914).
This early controversy illustrates the anomalous position of the Bureau
and the delicacy needed for its operation. It was dependent on
information coming from the Service Departments to perform its function
as a source of reliable news and it was dependent on the press for
their voluntary submission of copy to perform its role as censor. The
staff of the Bureau regularly complained throughout the war of being
caught in this invidious position exposed to the fire of both parties.
The .Azniens dtspatches gave Smith and the Bureau the chance to act
independently on their own initiative for all the evidence suggests
that Smith consulted no-one over his decision. The result was a
lamentable fiasco and a major set-back in terms of the Bureau's
ambition. of becoming an independent department with authority of its
own.
Few newspapers emerge from the affair with much credit either. Moore
and Fyfe's dispatches were as uncritically dismissed as the War Office
statement was incredulously accepted. As it happens the statement was a
fairly accurate appraisal of the situation in France whereas the two
dispatches were distorted and misleading. But most newspapers came to
that conclusion nre by blind faith than critical judgement. There is
little to admire either in the attitude of nwspaper like the Morning Post
which were highly critical of the censorship when it affected them but
were only too anxious to see its powers fortified and used against its
rivals. The whole affair reflects the fragile and insecure state of public
opinion in Britain at this time which turned savagely upon any messenger
who dared to bring news of defeat.
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A theme running through the criticism, of the Bureau in both the
press and. Parliament was that such an incident would not have
occured had fully accredited war correspondents been on the spot.
Mr Llewellyn Williams, in a neat sumary of this argument, asked
Asquith on 11th August if 'the Goverrunent will return to the time-
honoured practice and allow press correspondents to accompany our
army to the front.. . for. . . if the glorious traditions of our Armies
are to be maintained then the public must get to know, not through
any official documents but. . . in the yellow and rhetorical descriptions
given by correspondents from the front, what really occured'.39
Asquith in line with other Government spokesmen on this subject
echoed pre-war service doubts as to 'whether (this) is the best way
under the altered conditions of modern warfare of dealing with the
40
matter.
'The Press lives by disclosure' 41 said Delane but there could be no
disclosures or action-packed stories of British heroism without
correspondents. Instead the press had to rely on the opaque official
accounts or upon the roving correspondents like ?ore and Fyfe
As the Westminster Gazette stated : '...the veto on correspondents
at the front throws us back on stories obtained at second or
third hand not at the front and likely to be coloured and exaggerated'
(1st September 1914). Newspapers had assumed under the terms of
the pre-war voluntary arrangement that war correspondents would
accompany any British forces and that their copy would be censored
in the field as in South Africa. Correspondents had been engaged,
kitted up and were idling their time in Fleet Street offices much
to the chagrin of profit conscious managers and proprietors. But
they could expect little sympathy for their predicament frcn Kitchener
the man who had once described war correspondents as 'drunken swa1 t•42
39. House of Comons Debates, 5th Series, 31st August 1914, Cols. 372-4.
40. ibid.
41. The History of The Times, Vol IV op.cit. (1952) p.420.
42. Paul Ferris, House of Northcliffe (London,Weidenfeld&Nicolson,
1971) p. 38.
- 59 -
Nor was the press alone in assuming that correspondents would be
at the front. As Hankey, Secretary of the C.I.D. in the years
immediately before the outbreak of war wrote later 'the
arrangements for Press correspondents in the field were fully
worked out by the War Office but when war broke out, did not
appeal to Kitchener and for some time remained a dead letter'.
Kitchener defended his decision to ban correspondents on the grounds
that Joffre had forbidden correspondents to accompany the French
forces and that he had little option but to fall in line with
Britain' s senior ally in the field. But as he later admitted to
Riddell, his rapid and wholehearted concurrence with Joffre's decision,
without consultation with the Joint Committee or his own officials,
indicated how much he shared the orthodox, Service attitudes to the
press. 44 It is also an early example of the negative effect of
Kitchener's remoteness from what had been going on at the War Office
in the years immediately prior to the war. What aggravated the
annoyance felt by newspapers was that they were never officially
informed of the ban, its reasons or its duration, very much a hallmark
of Kitchener's method of business. At first, freelance journalists
like Philip Gibbs, Moore and Fyfe operated close to the scene of
operations unofficially, treated as one journalist later wrote '...
as pariah dogs. They might escape arrest so long as they kept out
of sight...	 After the furore of the Amiens d.spatch, the army
rounded up most of these and sent them back to England.
43. M.Hankey, The Supreme Conuiiand, (London, . 4LLa 	 & (A..i.i. 	 ,19 1 ) p. 114
44. Kitchener told Riddell in 1915 that he considered the proximity
of newspaper men had a potentially bad effect on soldiers' morale :
'An officer will make friends with a correspondent who will write
him up with the result that demands for protion come from home
when the man has done nothing deserving promotion. This is
prejudicial to the morale of officers who ca to think that the
way to promotion is through the Press....'G.A. Riddell, op. cit.,
(1933) pp.79-80. Kitchener was in a good position to make such a
comment having been itten up as a national hero by G.W. Steevens
of the Daily Mail in With Kitchener to Khartuni (London, Wihian
Blackwood & Sons, 1900). Chapter Vi passim.
45. C.E. Montague, Disenchanted (London, Chatto & Windus, 1922) p. 94.
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Because of the uncertainty surrounding the issue, the decision about war
correspondents was not at first taken up by the press or where mentioned
was either welcomed as a sign of government resolve Spectator(15th
August), Saturday Review (22nd August) or viewed as a purely temporary
affair Manchester Guardian (12th August). But after several weeks
of 'war in the dark' (The Times 5th September 1914) the Amiens di.spatch
incident ignited the fires of indignation felt by most sections of
the press over the issue of correspondents. The Liberal press was
concerned at the political aspects. The Daily Chronicle considered
it 'an insult to a free and enlightened democracy...entitled to be
told the ru' that there were no war correspondents at Mons to
describe the events there in 'vivid prose' (31st August 1914). H.V.
Nevison, himself a veteran of the South African and other campaigns,
argued in The Nation on 12th September that the war correspondents
performed a vital service to democracy, referring to the achievements
of Russell and Archibald Forbes. The Northcliffe press maintained
an almost daily barrage of protest in early September. The London
Evening News was the most vociferous with banner headlines like
'When Silence is Not Golden' (4th September) and 'A Protest against
Secrecy' (5th September) referring to a letter in The Times fron
Alfred (Vicount) Mimer, the former colonial administrator and
future member of Lloyd George's cabinet 'who had called for the appointment
of correspondents. The Times accused the censorship authorities of
trying to destroy 'enthusiasm for the war. • .we have received infinitely
more information. . .from Petrograd'. (5th September).
The decision about war correspondents struck at the heart of Fleet Street -
act ion and dran. sold newspapers. It was 'the censorship r
 that was
blamed, not in the main Kitchener or the War Office. It was upon the Press
Bureau and its director that the abuse Over lack of information was
heaped, for a decision like others of concern to the press, for which it
was not responsible. The Evening News on 5th September had called
for 'one or two highly skilled men representing no particular paper but
the British press as a whole' to be allowed to accanpany the British forces
in France. Several days later, partly as a result of the clamour in the
press and partly due to ?vkenna's more active involvement in the affairs of
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press censorship, a Colonel Ernest (later Sir Ernest) Swinton, the
author of several books about the South African campaign which had
won the approval of both Kitchener and Churchill 46 was appointed as
an anonymous 'Eye Witness' to provide 'prompt and authoritative
information of what is happening at the frt' 47 But his appointment
and performance did nothing to meet the call by the press for fully
professional, accredited war correspondents.
It did nothing either to retrieve F.E. Smith's credibility and
personal confidence as Director of the Press Bureau. When Lord Crewe
suggested he take up a 'very important duty' on the staff of the
Indian Army 'to look after the despatch of men to India', 48 Smith
happily resigned as Director on the 25th of September. He left unlamented
and temporarily discredited. The measure of hostility he had engendered
in the press during his brief stay at the Bureau can be judged from
the acerbity of this Manchester Guardian leader written nine months after
his departure, in response to rumours of his return to government office
'He had the chance a little time ago as head of the newly formed
Press Bureau - a very important office requiring for its proper
discharge, coninon sense. A more ccinplete and disastrous failure than
his, when thus tested, it would be difficult to recall...' (20th y 191 5)9
Smith's departure is a suitable point in the story of war-time press
control and censorship to summarise its somewhat shaky start before
examining the functions and powers of the Press Bureau in greater
detail. The Bureau was born out of panic and its early history is the
46. E.D. Swinton had taken the pseudonym 'Ole Luk-Oie'. His most
celebrated book set in South Africa and republished during the
war was The Green Curve (Edinburgh, William Blackwood & Sons, 1915).
He subsequently became Chichele Professor of the History of War
at Oxford (1925-43).
47. House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, 31st August 1914, Col. 372.
48. Crewe to Kitchener, 20th September 1914,Kitchener Papers, P.R.O. 30/57169
WJ/4.
49. Smith's biographer, H.A. Taylor considered that this verdict on Smith's
period at the Bureau 'would not be confirmed by responsible people in
Fleet Street'. H.A. Taylor, Smith of Birkenhead(London,Stanley Paul & Co
1928), p.7. I have seen no evidence to support this assertion and
neither did Taylor produce any in 1928.
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familiar British story of ad hoc improvision. No detailed plans
had been drawn up for its existence and no clear definition of
its functions and responsibilities was given to the press, the
public or its own staff. Its first Director was temperamentally
unsuited to the task imposed upon him, his staff were untrained
nor were they fully under his control. Unlike in France, or
Germany, the British press was not totally controlled by government;
British press censorship was voluntary in principle, substantially
increasing the chances of confusion and recrimination in its
operation. A censorship which is in total control of all published
information is far easier to administer than a system dependent on
voluntary initiative and tolerance particularly in a sphere of
activity notoriously competitive and suspicious. The cry of
'unfair' was almost inevitable.
Press censorship was little more at first than a continuation of the
pre-war voluntary arrangements and the government had no direct
control at any time during the war over the press. Ironically the
three government ministers who between them enunciated this principle,
Churchill, Haldane and Asquith were the three ministers most subject
to vicious and devastating press attacks during the war and who may
well have regretted at times their stalwart defence of such liberal
ideals. From the outset the Bureau made no attempt to stifle
criticism of government, the conduct of the war or the Bureau itself
which along with its Director came in for more than its fair share
of press attacks in the first months of its operations. The Bureau
had been created primarily to replace the Joint Connnittee in providing
official 'advice' and more news and this latter function it failed
to do in the early months of the war, mainly through no fault of its
own. It had also been established to eradicate the wild ruixurs.
These were less in evidence br the end of September but this was due
more to press restraint and a calmer public atmosphere than any
action by the Bureau. Press cablegrams and copy were delayed or
stopped but there was no noticeable change in the look or content of
British newspapers after the arrival of the Bureau - there were
no blank spaces as in French papers where the censors showed their
hand.
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Like all government agencies, the Press Bureau soon sought to
wrest more independence from its principal sponsors, the Admiralty
and the War Office. Its first major attempt, by approving,
altering and then disowning the Azniens dLspatch, not only
acted as a temporary curb to its expansionary aims but retarded
what little public rapport it had created with its principal
client, the press. Under more forceful and competent directors,
the Bureau was to continue to seek more power while at the same
time some government departments and the press questioned the
need for its existence at all. Yet all the time the Bureau faced
the brickbats from both sides with consumate loyalty and
forbearance. For by its presence, departmental responsibility
for errors could be evaded and press self-censorship concealed
in welters of self-righteous indignation at alleged curtailments
of 'liberty' or 'information'. Perhaps in this respect it is
fitting to close this chapter by giving the last word to F.E. Smith
who after all has been the principal actor in the drama so far.
Answering a complaint by Blumenfeld, editor of the Daily Express
he wearily observed : 'We are good enough for the kicks but are
to have no half pennies'.50
50. Smith to Blumenfeld, 29th August 1914, Blunienfeld Papers,




'When the war is over no one will be the least interested in the
Press Bureau, what it did, what it was unable to do or the curious
conditions under which it worked'. The English Review, March 1916.
When F.E. Smith was first given the job as Director of the Press
Bureau he had no office, no staff and no clear idea of what had
to be done apart from a vague notion to keep any news likely to be
of value to the enemy out of the newspapers. When Smith left in
September 1914 things were not nuich better as we have seen in
chapter II. It is a tribute to the efficiency of his successor,
Sir Stanley Buckrnaster, that by late October 1914 all those responsible
for censoring cables and newspapers were housed in one building under
one central authority, that the four main departments within the
Bureau were established and a system of instructions had been established
for the guidance both of censors and editors as to how the censorship
was to be conducted.
The early days of the Bureau's existence in an Admiralty building - 40
haring Cross Road - have been described by Sir Edward Cook, Joint
Director with Sir Frank Swettenhani of the Bureau from May 1915,as a
'hopeless arrangement (in) very inadequate premises'. 1
 We have discussed
the problems and chaos of those first days in chapter II - how the press
looked in vain to the Bureau for full and up-to-date news of the
progress of the war, how the censorship of press cables was undertaken
at the Central Telegraph office (C.T.O.) under direct War Office
supervision and how decisions on press material voluntarily submitted,
were often delayed for long periods because of referral to Service
Departments indifferent topress deadlines. Most of these complaints
remained a source of irritation for the press throughout the war but
Buckmaster did effect a major improvement in the operation of the
cable censorship shortly after taking over from Smith.
1.	 Cook, op. cit.,(1920) pp. 32-33.
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The arrangement whereby the censorship of an enormous volume of
international press cables done at the C.T.O. by untrained Service
personnel subject to the guidance of a committee which met at the
Press Bureau was recognized by Buckmaster and the press organizations
to be a totally inadequate one. From the moment of his appointment
as Director, Buckmaster strove to achieve as much independent
responsibility for the Bureau as possible, which was understandable in
the case of the cable censorship in that it was Buckmaster's un-
enviable task to answer the frequent criticisms levelled against it
in the House of Commons. He was a politically ambitious man and had no
desire to be associated with the failings of those who were held to be his
responsibility but were not under his direct control.
He began discussions with Sir Reginald Brade Permanent Secretary at
the War Office, and Colonel Churchill, the Chief Censor at the War
Office, to get the cable censors moved to the Bureau's new home at
the Royal United Services Institution in Whitehall and under his
direct supervision. They agreed in principle but, reluctant to
relinquish direct control over Servi.ce personnel, did nothing about
it. Matters quickly came to a head when on the 8th of October 1914,
the cable censors at the C.T.O. passed a Reuter's telegram about
reinforcements being sent to the relief of Amsterdam (then under siege
by the Germans), reference to which in the newspapers had already
been prohibited by a Notice issued by the Press Bureau on War Office
instructions. Buckmaster immediately complained to vkKenna, the Home
Secretary,'about the urgency of getting the Cable Censors moved here...
to make their actions co-ordinate with ours. .the attempt to prevent
the publication of the news (of the reinforcements) has broken down...
(and)...this office is once more made ridiculous'.2
When Buckmaster took up the issue with Brade, he was met with a
new argument, that the War Office, despite the problems, was 'doubtful
of the wisdom of bringing the C.I.O. to the Press Bureau in view of
the annoyance and expense this uld mean to the press' 3
 In the light
2. Buckmaster to MKenna, 8th October 1914 P.R.O. HO 139/13/A488/I.
3. Brade to Buckmaster, 9th October 1914, ibid.
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of these delaying tactics Buckmaster went into action. Armed with a
N.P.A. resolution of the 15th of October 1914 expressing total
approval for the move of the cable censors to the Bureau, Buckmaster,
with McKenna's assistance, obtained Cabinet approval for a resolution
which stated that 'the Press Cable Censors whether working at the
Central Telegraph Office or elsewhere are a branch of the Press Bureau
(and) that the Director of the Press Bureau is responsible for the
work of all the Press Censors'. 4 Faced with such neat political
footwork, the War Office agreed to the transfer of the cable censors
to the Press Bureau which duly occured on the 25th of October 1914.
Following the transfer of the C.T.O censors, Buckmaster created
four departments to carry out the work - an Issuing Department
responsible for the release of all official information, a Cable
Department for the censoring of all press cablegrams, a Press Department
for the censorship of all material voluntarily submitted (articles,
photographs, maps and later books and leaflets) and a Naval Department
responsible for all Admiralty censorship and related subjects. 5 It is
an indication of the fierce independence insisted upon by the Admiralty
that Buckmaster was obliged to create a separate Naval Department
which behaved as we shall see later in this chapter in many ways as a
self-governing enclave within the Bureau. The Admiralty also (and not
the Bureau) had responsibility for the censorship of German wireless
broadcasts which were picked up by Marconi and sent on by the Admiralty
to the Bureau for press release as 'British Admiralty Intercepts' or
later as 'Admiralty per Wireless Press'. Buckinaster and his successors
as Directors of the Bureau faced two major problems in conducting the
censorship - an inexperienced and mainly semi-retired - staff and
an ill-defined relationship with the major departments of state, who
tended to treat this 'strange and amorphous office' 7 - the Press Bureau -
constantly demanding decisions and information, with a mixture of
contempt and suspicion. In this chapter we shall examine these two major
factors, staff and liaison problems before examining the range of news
items which were subject to censorship.
4. 19th October 1914. P.R.O. 1-10 139/II/A411/1.
5. 'Notice to all Officers of the Press Bureau' ,26th October 1914,
P.R.O. I-U 139/17/1202.
6. ibid.
7. Buckmaster to Major-General Callwell,2nd December 1914 P.R.O.
1-0 139/6/A169/12.
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Firstly then the staff. There are few occupations which earn such universal
detestation as that of being a censor, be it of the press, film
or theatre. Milton considered that 'there cannot be a more tedious and
unpleasing journey work', the only people likely to take it being 'either
(the) ignorant, impervious or basely impecunious' 	 Brendan Bracken,
Churchill 's Minister of Information during the Second World War compared
censors to 'mules, they have no pride of ancestry and no hope of posterity'.9
The Press Bureau censors were not fools, rogues or paupers but as Lord
Courtney of Penwith observed in 1917 : 'Censorship is an office which makes
a man a fool when he is not born into it'	 With more than a touch of the
malicious, The Times on 28th September 1915, commenting on the Press Bureau
staff, remarked that 'with the exception of two or three of the highest
rank, no one knows who they are, whence they caine, how they were chosen or
what their number may be'.1'
The censorship staff were mainly retired or disabled Service personnel with
a smattering of lawyers, civil servants and academics - selected quickly by
the Chief Censors at the War Office and the Admiralty in the frenetic days
immediately prior to and just after the outbreak of the war. Class, rank and
family background had quite a lot to do with the selection - the list of
naval censors in 1915 reads like a page out of Debrett 's Peerage. Captain the
Honourable Sir Seymour Fortescue, K.C.V.O., C.M.G., commanded two baronet
captains, two commanders, two lieutenant commanders and one Hon. Lieutenant.
8. John Milton, Areopagitica and Of Education, edited by K.M. Lea
(London, Oxford University Press, 1970) p. 35.
9. Andrew Boyle. Poor Dear Brendan (London, 1-lutchinson & Co., 1974) p.308.
10. The Nation, 2nd August 1917. This view of press censors was echoed
across the Atlantic. According to two American academics writing in
1939, George Creel, the chief of the Censorship Bureau during the
First World War was 'one of the most disliked and traduced members of
the national Government' J. Mock & C. Larsen, Words that Won the War,
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1942), p.12.
11. Sir John Simon the Home Secretary answered this charge a month later
by giving the House of Commons a detailed breakdown of the Press
Bureau administration and its costs. The Bureau by this time employed
a staff of 122 - 2 Directors, 2 Assistant Directors, a Secretary and
40 censors (25 appointed by the War Office and 8 by the Admiralty)
at a total cost up until 30th September 1915.of £4,547. Houseof Commons Debates
5th Series, 26th October 1915, Cols. 34-35.
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When Buckmaster sought two replacement censors for the Military Room
in November 1914 he recommended for one of the posts a Colonel Parker
on the grounds that 'he is a cousin of Lord Parker and if he has any
part of the fain.ily intelligence he ought to be very useful'	 The
military censors appear mainly to have been selected on an ad hoc
basis, some from the retired list, most with the rank of colonel. Of
the twenty-five military censors, seventeen were of active service age
but as Sir John Simon the Home Secretary told the House -of Conunons on
on the 26th of October 1915 'some are not fit for military
service'' 3prompting Mr Lynch, M.P. for West Clare to
ask 'whether those who are of military service would not be better
employed at the front than in hoodwinking the British publicl.i4
Between the glittering ranks of these Service personnel and the
resident press corps at the Bureau representing their papers or agencies,
were seven journalist sub-editors recruited in 1915 as an attempt to
silence the kind of snip ing already quoted above. These existed
at the Bureau in a state of limbo neither trusted or respected by
either side.
The Bureau had two lawyers as Directors, F.E. Smith and Sir Stanley
Buckmaster - both selected for party reasons - Smith, a leading
Unionist, as a gesture to Party unanimity in war-tine and Bucicmaster
a distinguished Liberal Solicitor General to counter what was believed
by some Liberals, notably Lloyd George, to be the Unionist bias of
the censors. 15 When Buckmaster became Lord Chancellor in May 1915
he was succeeded by a joint directorate of Sir Edward Cook and
Sir Frank Swettenham which lasted for the remainder of the war. Cook,
a Liberal Imperialist and former editor of the Pall Mall Gazette and
12. Buckmaster toColonelCockerill, War Office, 30th November 1914.
P.R.O. HO 139/8/A314/Part3/107.
13. House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, 26th October 1915, Cols. 34-5.
14. ibid. 'The right man was never in the right place' wrote Dr. KMihsarn
about the selection of unsuitable staff as censors in Germany
during the war. K. Mihsam, Wie Wir Belogenwurden, p.15 cited by
Salmon, The Newspaper and Authority op. cit., (1923) p. 128.
15. Smith denied this most strenuously in a letter to Lloyd George on the
9th of September 1914 in which he referred to having heard from
Churchill that Lloyd George felt the Press Bureau staff to be 'unduly
Tory'. Lloyd George Papers, C/3/7/5, House of Lords Record Office.
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and the Daily News had previously worked with the Neutral Press
Comuittee and had close experience of the work of the Bureau.
Swettenhain, a retired Colonial civil servant, had previously worked
as assistant to nith and Buckmaster. It was not an easy social mix
over which they ruled and there were frequent storms within the
Bureau apart from the constant battering it received from outside,
although personally Cook and Swettenham appeared to have worked well
together. Cook tended to have more direct contact with the press and
Swettenhain seems to have relished the frequent skirmishes the Bureau
had in the battlefields of Whitehall.
Retired colonels and baronet captains tend to mix with journalists
like oil and water and there were frequent clashes between the Service
personnel and the resident journalists. This was made worse by the
elitism of the naval censors who formed themselves into a separate
mess ,H.M. S. President, reflecting their administrative relationship
with the Bureau which was to work under the direct orders of the Chief
Censor at the Admiralty, Rear-Admiral Brownrigg, with little reference
to the Directors of the Bureau. A bitter row developed in 1916 for
example between the naval censors and the resident journalists, one
of whom had accused a naval censor, Conmander Davies, of being
persistently intoxicated while on duty. When the journalist in
question, a Mr. Watson, was banned from working at the Bureau, the
N.U.J. objected most strongly and the atmosphere within the Bureau,
became so strained that Sir Graham Greene, Permaneit Secretary at the
Admiralty wrote to Swettenham and Cook demanding 'protect ion' for
the naval censors against the 'threatening behaviour of the journalists' •16
Given the volume of work it is perhaps not surprising that tempers
frayed or that inconsistent and occasionaly foolish decisions were
made. In 1916, the only year for which such comprehensive figures are
available, the Bureau censored 343,668 cablegrams and telegrams, the
military censors dealt with 38,436 proofs voluntarily submitted and
the naval censors, 12,871. The number of photographs dealt with by
16. Sir Graham Greene to the Press Bureau, 30th January 1916.
P.R.0. I-U 139132/Al258.
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the military and naval censors was 25,064 and for transmission abroad
112,458. During one week (23rd - 30th September 1915) taken 'at
hazard' the Bureau received 388 letters and sent out 1,565 and for
the whole year 4,121 communiques (excluding casualty lists) were
issued to the press17
 - not an unreasonable achievement with a total
staff of 122.18
Censorship work is a matter of judgement, of holding in the mind of
any nunber of instructions, notices already sent out and statutory
regulations and then making an instant decision consistent with
previous decisions either to pass ,stop or refer. The difficulties have
been well described by Churchill in a minute to Neville Chamberlain
at the commencement of the Second World War : 'Censorship and release
are easy to people at the top of the Service Departments because they
have the whole state of business in their minds and lcnow or can
readily ascertain, what will do harm. . .Far more difficult is it to embody
this discretionary power into rules which can be worked by subordinates,
possessing only a limited view and bound to adhere to the letter of
their ins ru on 19
 The Press Bureau censors were obviously lacking
that superior view of 'the whole state of business' although this
disadvantage was to some extent overcome with experience but they
laboured under the additional handicap of knowing that the slightest
error might be picked up and made the subject of criticism or mockery
in the press or Parliament with government - nunisters on occasions
joining in the sport.
For example, there were frequent instructions to the censors and D
Notices issued to the press prohibiting all mention of the movements
of the King and members of the Royal family. Reading the line 'and
the kings depart' from the Robert Browning poem, an overzealous censor
cut it from an article submitted by The Times in October 1915 which
ininediately led to a public furore. Mr. Outhwaite, M.P. for Hanley
17. P.R.O. I{) 139/36.
18. Statement to the House of Commons by Sir John Simon, 26th October
1915, House of Couxns Debates, 5 Series, Cols.. 34-5.
19. Churchill to Neville Chamberlain, 22nd December 1939, P.R.O.
Cab/Prem/1 /439.
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asked Sir John Simon if 'the country (was) still paying for the
services of this idiot' 20 and a few days later Mr. Robert Macneil,
M.P. for the St. Augustine Division of Kent asked Simon if he would
be instructing the Press Bureau to issue a list of British poets whose
work might be safely quoted in the press. Simon, joining in the fun,
gave the answer that the incident had caused all censors'to strictly
meditate the thankless muse'. 21 When the War Office, in June 1915,
insisted that all Service personnel should submit written work for
publication (including sketches and drawings) for censorship, Mr. Ashley,
M.P. for the Blackpool division of North Lancashire asked Mr. Tennant,
Under-Secretary of State at the War Office, if he could 'guarantee any
sense of humour in the Press Bureau' to which Tennant replied :
'I should be very sorry to go so far as that'.22
Tennant' s awn department had in this case issued the instructions
for which the Press Bureau censors were being held responsible, a
vivid illustration of the second major factor affecting the work of
the Bureau, its reliance on the government departments for instructions
and up-to-date information for release to the press. It was galling
for the staff of the Bureau that so few members of even the 'informed'
public appeared to be aware of how completely dependent the Bureau was
for its efficiency on a close and cordial working relationship with
the Service and other departments, a relationship which never fully
blossomed during the war. As a former Secretary of the C. I .D., Lord
Sydenham (Sir George Clarke) wrote in t1e Evening News on the 22nd
of October 1915; it was a situation in which '...all the officers
of a ship engaged in shouting different orders to the engine room'.
Both Service departments had quickly established sections to deal with
press censorship issues, M.O.7 (a) at the War Office and a section
under Sir Douglas Brownrigg at the Admiralty. Although liaison between
the War Office and the Bureau was poor at first, it did improve as
the war progressed but that with the Admiralty, antagonistic at the
20. House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, 14th October 1915, Col. 1463.
21. House of Conons Debates,5thSer1es, 21st Qctober 1915, Col. 1987.
22. House of Conirnons Debates,Sth Series 22nd June 1915, Col. 831.
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start, never got much better. Like most inter-departmental disputes,
the acrimony was over responsibility and authority, or put more
crudely, who was to get the blame when things went wrong. When a
censor at the Bureau was doubtful about an item, he referred it to
his section head who, if also in doubt, submitted it to one of the
Directors (one of whom was always on duty) for reference, if necessary
to one of the Service or other departments. The item would then be
sent over to the department concerned where it might be passed,
stopped or referred to a senior officer or Minister for decision. All
this could take a matter of hours during the day but as a Press Bureau
submission to the War Cabinet coninented in 1917 : 'Very great inconvenience
and often quite unreasonable delay, is caused by the necessity of
reference to Government Departments, especially the War Office, Foreign
Office, the Ministry of M.jnitions and the Treasury, at times (say
between 8 p.m. and midnight) when there is no responsible person
available to answer the enquiries. These delays are naturally very
irritating to the Press and it is remarkable that they have not made
more insistent complaints in regard to the holding-up of cablegrams
and other press matters not only for hours but sometimes for days'.23
For their part, War Office officials such as jor General Caliwell,
Director of Military Operations wondered why so many items were
sent to them 'as there often appears to be no question about them' and
many were so often 'a matter of opinion. A message was sent over late
last night (26th November 1914) with regard to the raids towards the
Suez Canal and was considered by my orderly officer. I find that
he cut out something in connection with the capture of coastguards which
I should certainly have passed' 24 to which Buckmaster somewhat
acidily replied : 'Our people are not well informed as to what is
going on from any Department of State . . . a barbed wire entanglement
is an easier thing to manage than the rules by which this office is
controlled' •25
23. 'The Offica]. Press Bureau', 6th March 1917 P.R.O. Cab 21/93.
24. Callwelito Buckmaster, 27th November 1914, P.R.O. H) 139/19/A724/
Part 1/4.
25. Bucicmaster to Callwell, 28th November 1914. ibid.
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Instructions were sometimes given to the Bureau by the Services
which the Bureau had great difficulty in administering. Because
of the ban on war correspondents at the coimnencement of hostilities,
unofficial reports flourished and on the 24th of September 1914 the
War Office issued D 48 through the Bureau which sought to prevent the
publication of all unofficial reports of military operations within
twenty miles of the front. But as Swettenham complained to the War
Office in October, 'This instruction is being broken every day with
the result that (a) the censors are at sea and (b) the Bureau is
liable to a charge of winking at a breach of its own orders...' 26 When
accredited correspondents were allowed at the front (five at G.H.Q.
from May 1915) their copy was censored by military field censorship
along lines well established during the South African War (not that
their copy needed much censorship from the military field censors
as we shall discuss in Chapter VI). But in addition to these
precautions the War Office insisted that the despatches be re-censored
by the military censors at the Bureau before release on the grounds
that the situation could have -changed drastically by the time the
despatch had reached- London, an explanation which never convinced the
correspondents and editors who regarded it as an unnecessary piece
of bureacracy for which 'the censorship' was blamed.
Instructions were sometimes given to the Bureau only to be ignored in
particular cases by the issuing department. As a Press Bureau official
complained in December 1914 : 'The Admiralty in several cases and
the Foreign Office in one case at least have shown a tendency towards
sanctioning the publication of news which conflicts with a general
rule already issued on their authority' •27 Worse still from a
press view point were cases where Admiralty news for exanpie was
published for a number of hours and then as Buckniaster complained to
Graham Greene on 1st of February 1915, 'a change of direction from the
Admiralty' 28 1ed to the matter being stopped. Only two days after
26. Swettenhain to the War Office, 9th October 1914 P.R.O. HO 139/9/A337.
27. Menirandum from LP. Hills to Sir Frank Swettenham, 14th December
1914, P.R.O. HO 139/19/A724/Part I/S.
28. Buckniaster to Greene, P.R.O. HO 139/11/A411/Part 1.
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Buckmaster' s letter Brownrigg ordered the censors at the Bureau to
stop a
	 's telegram containing details of an interview given
by churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, to the French paper
Le Matin . (Churchill had boasted about how Britain had kept its
promise to defend the Channel and the North Sea which the Admiralty
Lords feared might not go down so well in places like Scarborough and
Bridlington, the victiius of recent German bombardments from sea).
A number of British papers had already published details of this
interview on 3rd February and Reuters were less than pleased at the
explanation given to them by the Bureau that 'there is no cause of
complaint against the Press Bureau'. 29
 As Reuters argued in their
reply on 6th February 'officially we can only come to the Press
Bureau with representations and complaints and the reply is to transfer
the responsibility to a Department of Government which in turn
shelters behind the Press Bureau'.3°
Liaison with the Admiralty caused the greatest problems for the Bureau
in its administration of the press censorship and in its relationship
with the press. Although military censorship policy was made by
section M. 1 . 7(a) under the Director of Military Intelligence at the
War Office, the Directors of the Bureau were able to excercise
executive control over the military censors at the Bureau. This was
not the case with the naval censors who referred even minor details
to Brownrigg for decision and whose working arranginents and staff
schedules were controlled from the Admiralty. This proved a major
bone of contention throughout the war, particularly as in the opinion
of Bukmaster (and later of Swettenhain and Cook), the naval censors
'do not appear to be able to deal effectively with their work' 3t -
for which the Press Bureau was often blamed - and about which the
Admiralty remained indifferent. As Buckmaster told Sir Graham Greene
on the 10th of November 1914 he could see 'no reasons in the national
interest for delaying information (about the sinking of the Germsn
29. Reuters to Press Bureau, 4th February 1915, P.R.& NC) 139/14/572/27.
30. Peuter to the Press Bureau, 6th February 1915, ibid.
31. Buclonaster to Greene, 27th November 1914 P.R.O. I-I) 139/1 l/A41 1/Part 1.
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Battleship 'Emden').....it is the Press Bureau which has to bear
the burden of all the abuse that is levelled at us by an exasperated
Press and Public'.33
The relationship between the Bureau and the Admiralty - described by
Brownrigg in his inenirs as one of 'pull devil pull baker between
them and me' - had reached such a level of non-coninunication by 1917
that an error made by one of the naval censors at the Bureau which had
become a matter of correspondence between the Admiralty and the War
Cabinet, was only discovered by the Bureau through a newspaper report.
The Directors of the Bureau, Swettenhain complained to the Admiralty,
'were ignored by all concerned'. 35
 It is thus not surprising to discover
in the Press Bureau's submission on how the press censorship should be
conducted in any future conflict that 'the position of the naval censors
should be regularized to the extent that, while appointed to the Admiralty,
they should like the military and civilian censors, be under the control
of the Director of the Bureau who should decide how many censors are
required, the system on which they work, their records kept and their
leave arranged'.36
Not that all the acriiiony and disputes were solely between the Bureau
and the Services. Confusion at the Bureau over instructions from the
Foreign Office often led to delays while items were referred. A
delay over news of the resignation of the Greek Prime Minister Venizelos
in 1915 caused such a press and Parliamentary row that Robert Cecil,
Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office persuaded the Government
in December 1915 to abandon the official censorship of foreign
news. It was a decision not approved of at the Press Bureau. In the
Bureau's submission to the War Cabinet already cited, Cook and
Swettenhain argued that Cecil's move 'has proved a failure and whilst
the Press are told that Foreign Affairs are not censored but left
to the discretion of Editors, messages whole or in part, are
33. Buckmaster to Greene, 27th November 1914. P.R.O. FBD 139/11/A411/
Part 1/1.
34. Brownrigg, op. cit., (1920), pp. 6-7.
35. Swettenhani to Greene, 26th May 1917, P.R.O. 110 139/11 , op. cit.
36. 'The Official Press Bureau', 6th March 1917, P.R.O. Cab 21/93.
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often referred to the Foreign Office' 37 In other words the Bureau
continued to unofficially censor foreign affairs items throughout
the war, despite a N.P.A. resolution of 30th October 1917 calling
on the Bureau to adhere to the spirit of Robert Cecil's 1915 decision.38
As fcr	 the supply of official bulletins to the press the Bureau was
again utterly dependent upon the departments but as the war progressed
and the authorities slowly recognized the crucial role being played
by the press in sustaining home morale and recruitment, the division
between news and propaganda became increasingly blurred. Although
the Department. . . (later Ministry) of Information and sections of the
War Office such as M. 1.7. were created primarily for propagandist
purposes, it was inevitable that they strayed into what the Bureau
regarded as its special prerogative, the supply of all official news
and photographs to the press. There was no love lost between the officials
of the Press Bureau and Department of Informat inn. John Buchan, the
Department's first director had said the press censorship 'bristles with
sins of omission and commission' ('how can censorship "bristle with
sins"?' asked Swettenhatn) 39and the Bureau took great delight in ocassionally
censoring items issued for release by Buchan's department.40
In June 1918 the Bureau stopped a Ministry of Information telegram
giving details of the Pemberton Billing trial on the grounds that
allegations by Billing that the Germans had in their possession a black
book containing details of the 3exual peversions of prominent British
politicians was '...hardly likely to help our cause in neutral countries'.4'
37. 'The Official Press Bureau' op. cit.
38. P.R.O. I-D 139/10/1.
39. Swettenham to Hankey, 28th February,1917,P.R.O. FK) 139/9/A368/
Part 2/24.
40. Buchan believed, erroneously, that the Bureau had been responsible
for the suppssion of one of his despatches from the Western
Front in 1915.
41. Swettenham to Hankey, 5th June 1918 ,P.R.O. 1-10 139/16/A672/Part 8/146.
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A bitter row developed in September 1918 over the Press Bureau's
insistence that all photographs from the Western Front, including those
destined for the Ministry of Information, be censored at the Bureau
before issue. The Ministry appealed to the Prime Minister who ruled
that henceforth all photographs after censorship at G.H.Q. should be
sent direct to the Ministry of Information and not the Bureau and
'that the Press Bureau should accept the instructions of the Minister
of Information on the same basis as it accepts the instructions of
other Ministers' •42 While inevitably obliged to obey this ruling
Swettenham remained adamant that the Bureau did not receive instructions
from other departments 'We understand that word as equivalent to
orders and as intermediaries between the Departments and the Press, we
see all the difference in the world between instructions and requests'.43
But Cook and Swettenhaiu, in a post war submission to the War Cabinet
in 1919 recognized the anomaly of two government departments issuing
official information to the press. They recommended that in any future
war • '.. . Censorship and Propaganda. . . (be) placed under the direct control
and personal supervision of a Minister appointed for the purpose...
42. W.H. Davies, Private Secretary to Lloyd George, to Sir George Cave,
Home Secretary, 11th September 1918, P.R.O. I-I) 139/16/A672/Part 1/9.
43. Swettenhani to Home Office, 27th September 1918 ibid.
The Bureau continued to censor or as Sir Henry Newbolt put it 'mangle'
the Ministry of Information ' s telegraphic messages until the end
of the war, Newbolt to Press Bureau, 13th November 1918, ibid.
44. Press Bureau Memorandum to Cabinet, 27th February 1919, P.R.O.
I-D 139/17/A682/Part 2/11.
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When the C.T.O. military censors transferred to the Bureau in
November 1914 they brought with them instructions defining their
duties which Buckmaster quickly incorporated into a private notice
to all staff at the Bureau outlining what he understood to be the
role of the Bureau and defining in broad terms their job as censors.
Buckmaster told the staff that the main duties of the Press Bureau
were to issue official war news and 'the censorship of the Press,
that is to say, the determination of what unofficial news may or may
not be published and the passing or stopping of Press cablegrams' The
main object of the censorship, Buckmaster stated, was ' Ci) To prevent
the publication of news injurious to the Naval and Military operations
of the British Empire or of its Allies (ii) To prevent the publication
of news likely to cause needless alarm or distress among the civil
population and (iii) To prevent the publication of news objectionable
on political grounds e.g. news calculated to injure the susceptibilities
of the Allied countries', along principles '...at present laid down
in existing (D.O.R.A.) regulations and in various 'D' Notices already
issued'. 45 The D Notice in other words was to serve two purposes -
as an operating guide for the censors as well as a means of instructing
and influencing newspaper editors.
In the light of Buckmaster' s three obj ectives what sort of items were
censored also bearing in mind the Bureau's staff and liaison problems?
As for the first objective, as a general rule nothing was to be passed
which revealed the movements, numbers or operations of ships, troops
or aircraft. The military were particularly concerned to stop any
mention or indication in the press of the battle order. D.15 (28th
August 1914) forbade the listing of the names of commanders of brigades
or divisions unless previously reported in official statements, D 48
(24th September 1914) prohibited 'speculation as to probable or
impending movements of the Allied Forces in France, Belgium or the Dardanelles'
and D 110 (5th December 1914) prohibited information being published
of the movements of any units or divisions until fourteen days have
elapsed since the movement was completed'. 46 By 1915 a substantial
45. 'Notice to all Officers of the Press Bureau', 26th October 1914,
P.R.O. Fl) 139/17/1202.
46. P.R.O. HO 139/43.
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number of instructions had been issued to censors but as we have
observed earlier, censorship is so often a matter of judgement on
the part of the individual censor who was presumably not assisted
in iiis' task by instructions (referring to the rule that no report
was to be passed from Northern France which was less than five days
old unless officially confirmed) which laid down that '...any
matter which is dangerous should be excised whether it refers to the
last five days or not and speculations of what the Allies are going
to do should be stopped. Otherwise if harmless such messages and
articles may be passed'.48
When the problem of shell shortages became apparent to the military
authorities, censors were told to stop all such references. Although
Marlowe, editor of the Daily Mail was able to provide Lloyd George
with a bundle of articles in which details of the shortages had. been
excised,49given the chance that such an item could slip past or be
considered 'harmless' by an individual censor, it is not surprising
that this instruction did not prevent the news of the shortages
leaking to the press well before Repington's calculated revelation
in The Times in May 1915. Soldiers letters on this subject, some
of which had been published, led to an instruction to the censors
that all soldiers'letters to the press were to be stopped, causing
a howl of protest in the Press.
What upset editors, particularly those in rural areas, was that these
letters continued to be published in parish magazines, often revealing
information prohibited or delayed by the Press Bureau. In September
1915, the Rev. Oken Parrish of Longfleet near Poole told his parishioners
about the sinking of ships in the English channel (not previously
published), of methods of capturing German submarines by 'wire mesh
made by Mr. Craddock' and he referred to ZepLin raids at Goole and
47. Censorship, with its long hours and night work was considered at
the time to be unsuitable for female staff.
48. Instructions to censors, January 1915. P.R.O. 1-10 139/27/A1036/
Part 1/46.
49. Marlowe, editor of the Daily Mail to Lloyd George, 24th May 1915,
D/18/1/1. Lloyd George Papers, House of Lords Record Office.
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other places all of which had been prohibited by Press Bureau D
Notices. 5° The Sandringharn Parish Magazine for September 1915
published a secret and hitherto unpublished despatch from General
Inglefield, Commander of the East Anglian Division at the Dardanelles
Gin which Inglefield painted a very gloomy picture of the prospects
for success) and a detailed account of the losses suffered by the 5th
Norfolk Regiment at Anafarta. The Bureau took up such complaints
from other editors very seriously and requested bishops to remind all
vicars that they like the rest of the comunity, were subject to the
D.O.R.A. Regulations. 51 The rule applied by the military authorities
was that anything for publication emanating from France or other
theatres of war was to be censored by field censorship and again by
the Press Bureau military censors in London and this applied to all
writers however distinguished. Anything which revealed, tactical
information' likely to be-of use to the enemy was cut. A despatch
about Loos written by the novelist John Buchan, then a free-lance
journalist engaged by The Times was suppressed on these grounds (not
as Buchan and The Times alleged because Buchan had praised the bravery
of the German soldiers).52
All maps and sketches illustrating naval or military operations had
to be submitted for censorship including all photographs which were
censored both at G.H.Q. and again at the Bureau, one purpose of which
was to ensure the complete elimination of 'the ones that show our
dead'. 53
 Care was taken over captions which were not to be altered.
When the Daily Mirror in October 1915 re-wrote the caption of a
photograph of soldiers dis embarking at Salonika, replacing 'Greek'
soldiers with 'British', the Bureau sent the case to the D.P.P. on
the grounds that such a statement was 'spreading a false statement
50. P.R.O. HO 139/22/A894/4. When Swettenhain referred this case to the
Admiralty as a breach of regulations, he was promptly told by
Brownrigg in mocking tone that 'The view taken here is that the
Parish Parson is not worth prosecuting..incidently I am asked
unofficially since when have you become interested in Parish
magazines?' Brownrigg to S'wettenham 6th September 1915, ibid.
51. Press Bureau circular, 13th September 1915, ibid.
52. P.R.O. Fl) 139/29/Al23/Patt 1/1.
53. Colonel Warbuton Davies, Chief Censor G.H.Q. to Press Bureau, 4th
October 1915, ibid.
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likely to prejudice His Majesty's relations with a Foreign Power'.54
The case was dropped but the Mirror was warned that a repeat
performance would result in its being denied any official photographs
which for a paper packed daily with photographs and illustrations was
a serious threat to its competitiveness. G.H.Q. sent a note to the
D.M.1. at the War Office in 1917 requesting that all captions for
photographs showing Chinese and other native labourers should read
'Native' and not 'Black' labourers as this could adversely affect
recruiting in China. 55
 (When an unsavoury row developed between the
news agencies in 1916 as to which agency was to distribute official
photographs, Sir Frank Swettenhain told Riddell of the N.P.A.
	 '...there
is no branch of the censorship which is more difficult and at the same
time more important than that of photographs').56
Very often, because the censorship was voluntary a particular article
or leader was published which upset the military and led to a fresh
instruction for censors and editors to absorb. A leader in The Times
on the 21st of January 1915 speculating on the likely time of arrival
of Kitchener 'S armies in France, described by Brade as 'stupidity beyond
belief' 57
 brought forth D 137 the following day reminding the press that
the German High Comand read the British papers and that such articles
assisted the enemy 'in their plans and dispositions against both our
forces and those of the Allies'. 58
 An article in The Times in July
1915 by a former staff reporter serving with the 13th Kensington
Battalion of the London Regiment, had suggested that the writer's
battalion was the only one which had done its job at the ferocious
battle of Festubert in May 1915. The article upset Field Marshal French
54. Press Bureau to D.P.P., 17th November 1915, P.R.O. 139/13/A503/5.
55. P.R.O. HO 139/27/A1036/Part 4/262.
56. Swettenham to Riddell, 17th April 1917, P.R.O. I-U 139/10/27.
57. P.R.O. HO 139/43.
58. P.R.O. I-ED 139/19.
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who sent a brisk note to Kitchener demanding that '.... greater
circumspection be exercised by those responsible for the transmission
of matter relating to operations in the Daily Press. The (article)
has not only given great offence to units who took part...but in
addition has had the effect of making the unit unpopular with the
battalion with which it has been honourably associated' . 	 French's
letter led to a notice to the press that 'articles other than those of
authorised correspondents purporting to describe operations at the
front as a result of personal observation are prohibited'.6°
But nowhere was Buckmaster's first principle of the censorship that
it should prevent news which might hamper naval or military operations
pursued to such extremes as in the press censorship undertaken on
Admiralty orders, described by Sir George Riddell in his diary as 'a
law unto itself'. 61
 No news of any success or mishap to naval vessels
was to be passed until officially announced and particular emphasis
was placed by the Admiralty in stopping reports of operations against
enemy submarines or damage caused by them - even speculation 'as
to how to deal with enemy submarines should be avoided' (1) 150,3rd
February 1915).62 When the Western Daily News submitted a report in
July 1915 taken frc*n the Buenos Ayres Standard of an engagement between
a British merchant ship (which had a Devonshire man on board) and a
German submarine, a large part of it was censored on Admiralty orders
on the grounds that 'it is undesirable to publish the chasing of
steamers by German submarines'. 63
 Such a decision 'will not wash'64
considered the editor of the Western Daily Press reflecting a more
general press view thatAdmiralty censorship decisions were taken more
to cover up Admiralty errors than to prevent news reaching the enemy.
59. French to Kitchener, 9thugust 1915, P.R.O. 1%O 32/4893.
60. D 46, 23rd September 1915, P.R.O. I-U 139/19.
61. Riddell op. cit., (1933) p.26.
62. P.R.O. I-U 139/19,
63. Swettenhani to N.P.A., 14th July 1915, P.R.O. NO 139/10/8.
64. Letter to Press Bureau, 21st July 1915, ibid.
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The Press Bureau, on Admiralty orders issued fourteen D Notices for
the guidance of censors and editors about the reporting of shipping
losses and damage to ships caused by the German U Boats - D 168 (25th
February 1915) being the first and typical of the genre : 'The
Press has probably realised the danger of publishing the loss of
British merchant ships as a result of the enemy's activity in the
use of submarines and the sowing of mines...These reports encourage
the enemy to further efforts while they are calculated to create in
the minds of shipowners...a growing hesitation to risk their vessels
(and) seamen will almost certainly demand greatly increased rates of
pay'. 65 At the height of the U Boat campaign in 1917 a more drastic
control was imposed, the only losses to be reported being the weekly
statement issued by the Admiralty CD 548, 28th February 1917).66
which excluded all losses of Allied and neutral ships and provided
only the number of ships lost in the previous week, not the tonnage.
In his memoirs, Brownrigg suggests that he used the censorship against
certain 'naval c r it cs to prevent them driving a wedge 'between any
two schools of thought in the navy or letting it be thought outside
that such a cleavage was possibly in existence'. 67 Thus the naval
censors were instructed to stop all stories of Admiralty staff
changes unless officially announced and at the time of Jutland to
stop any suggestion being published of 'internal Admiralty dissension'.68
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, Coninander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet and
later First Sea Lord was the prime mover in this closing of the ranks
and it was Jellicoe who was principally responsible for the suppression
of the prestigious and privately circulated Naval Review in 1915.
Jellicoe argued that articles containing detailed criticism of Admiralty
tactics, such - as one on the loss of Admiral Craddock' s squadron in the
South Atlantic in November 1914 (which had appeared in the May 1915
edition of the Review) were very harmful to naval discipline (and in
65.	 P.R.O. HO 139/43.
66. ibid.
67. Brownrigg, op. cit., (1920) p.32.
68. Admiralty to Press Bureau, 6th July 1916,P.R.O. HO 139/39.
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effect reflected badly on senior commanders). Rear Adzn.iral W.H.
Henderson, editor of the Review was told that it had been suppressed
because of the danger of copies falling into enemy hands, an explanation
considered by Henderson to be 'frivolous, unwarranted, invalid and
unworthy'in view of the Review's exclusive circulation to senior
couuianders and politicians.69
(Although the War Office was more tolerant of press criticism, it was
not entirely averse to censoring, suppressing or punishing a journal
which carried items critical of the competence of senior comanders.
The Liberal journal, The Nation believed that the German tactical
surprise in retiring behind the Hinderiburg line in March 1 917 had
found the British army and its ccmnanders 'wanting'. The War Office,
with Lloyd George's active support, ininediately imposed an export
ban on The Nation for six months° More predictably, a series of
articles by H.G. Wells which on his own admission dealt with 'the
defects of our military caste, its neglect of mechanism due to sheer
ignorance and hostility to elementary science, its waste of men...its
illiteracy, its facesaving...' 71
 was stopped byColonelHutton-Wilson
at G.H.Q. despite a plea on Wells behalf by the Press Bureau.72)
But what aroused the gravest misgivings by the press both at home and
abroad about Admiralty censorship was the Admiralty decision (for which
Jellicoe was again largely responsible) to suppress news of the
sinking of the battleship 'Audacious' in December 1914, stories and
photographs of which appeared in all the world's newspapers except
the British. The 'Audacious' was sunk off the coast of Ireland on the
26th of October 1914 by a German mine. In his memoirs,Asquith describes
how 'after heated discussion in the Cabinet, we resolved not to make
public the loss at the moment' and that he had assented only on the
grounds that Ci) no lives were.lost and (ii) the military and political
69. Rear Admiral Henderson to Sir Graham Greene, 27th May 1915, Henderson
Papers, Hen 10/1 ,Henderson Papers ,National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.
70. P.R.O. Cab 23/2 w.c. 119/24.
71. Wells to Press Bureau, U/I) December 1917, P.R.O. 139/16/A636/Part/2/23.
72. Swettenhani told Hutton Wilson on 12th January 1918 that in the Bureau's
opinion 'Mr. Wells comands a very large audience arid we think it would
be a mistake to annoy him unless it must be done in the public
interest', ibid.
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situation is such that to advertise at this moment (with Turkey on
the brink of a possible declaration of war on the Allied side) a
great calamity might have very bad results' 	 The Press were informed
by Buckmaster on the 28th of October 1914 that 'a battleship had been
lost' and that 'the iniidiate knowledge of this loss might so
seriously affect our foreign relations that the Press are earnestly
requested to treat this information as strictly confidential and make
no reference by comment or otherwise to this loss...
Admiral Jellicoe, in his book Grand Fleet recalled that his was the
principal voice urging that the loss be kept a secret for as long as
possible. He believed that the Grand Fleet, under his coninand in
1914, was considerably weakened at the time of the 'Audacious' sinking
and that 'as a general policy it was desirable to conceal from the
enemy any serious loss of which he would otherwise have no immediate
knowledge...' 75 This last was a perfect suiranary of Admiralty press
policy throughout the war but all credibility for maintaining such
a silence over the 'Audacious' was lost when American newspapeis
broke the story in mid-December 1914 publishing photographs of the
sinking vessel taken by passengers on a passing liner, the 'Olympic'.
As Captain, later Admiral Sir Henry Richmond, then Assistant Director
of Operations at the Admiralty recorded in a diary punctuated with
vehement criticism of his superior officers '... they (the Germans)
must know (about the 'Audacious) as the Mierican papers already have
accounts from passengers on the 'Olympic' who saw it' •76
Lord Staniforclham, Private Secretary to King George V, wrote to St. Loe
Strachey, editor of The Spectator on the 17th of December 1914 enclosing
photographs taken from the American papers with the comment : 'I cannot
understand how the Government continues to affect silence regarding that
catastrophe'?7 Neither could the British press, which according to
73. Earl of Oxford and Asquith, Memoirs and Reflections (London, Cassell &
Co. Ltd, 1928),P.47.
74. D 109, 4th December 1914, P.R.O. ID 139/20/A756.
75. Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, The Grand Fleet, 1914-16 (London, Cassell &
Co. Ltd, 1919),pp..J52/3.
76. The Diaries of Sir Henry Richmond, 25th November 1914, Ric 1/10,
National ritime Musein, Greenwich.
77. Stamfordhani to St. Loe Strachey, 12th December 1914, S/13/15/16.
strachey Papers, House of Lords Record Office.
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Northcliffe, objected most strongly 'to being dragged into a
conspiracy of silence' 78 over the affair. The Daily News counnented
that 'rumours of an event of very great interest to the British public
have been circulating for a long time now in this country. Very full
accounts of the event in question have now been given in the Swedish,
the Dutch, the American and finally the German papers. There is
scarcely an important public in the . world . . .which has not now received
a full report of the alleged occurence, except the one which is most
directly affected by it' (30th November 1914). The Times pointed out
that 'the principle purpose of the censorship as we understand it, is
to prevent publication of news which will be of service to the enemy.
If the enemy knows the news, the publication in this country cannot
be of service to them. Yet our office is littered with German newspapers
containing news we are all forbidden to publish...we understand and
appreciate the reasons which made reticence in such a case desirable
for a limited period. But for how long does the Government propose
to continue the farce of concealing facts from the British alone?'
(1st December 1914).
churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, was all set to end 'the
farce' and confirm the sinking to the House of Commons when, on leaving
the Admiralty building he was, according to Brownrigg, 'cajoled,
and threatened and brow-beaten' by the First Sea Lord, Lord Fisher, and
'allowed himself to be turned away from his intended course and he
remained silent on this point'. 79 Successive First Lords did the same,
acting under the guidance of their Service chiefs who appear to have
genuinely believed that the Germans would think the American stories
a decoy and remain in doubt about the whereabouts of the 'Audacious'.
In January 1915 the Edinburgh Review followed by the Daily Chronicle
did in fact reveal the full story but the other papers continued to
observe the officially inspired silence. Despite this and repeated
references to the subject in Parliament, the Board of Admiralty refused
to officially confirm the sinking which even in Brownrigg's view was a
mistake which 'cost us the confidence of the public both here and abroad
and gave the Germans a useful bit of propaganda to use against us'.8°
78. Northcliffe to Lord l4irray of Elibank, 1st December 1914, Northcliffe
MSS, Dep. 4890, British Library.
79. Brownrigg, op. cit. (1920) p.32.
80. ibid.
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Perhaps the most outstanding example of press censorshi.p undertaken
to fulfill Buckmaster' s second obj ective-to prevent the publication
of news 'likely to cause needless alarm or distress among the civil
opul' 81 was the attempt made to control the reporting of air
raids. At first there were no restrictions but as the raids increased
so too did the instructions and D Notices (18 between 1915 and 1918)
reflecting official uneasiness about public morale. At first there
was some argnnent between the War Office and the Admiralty as to which
department was responsible for issuing air raid instructions but in
April 1915, Sir Graham Greene of the Admiralty agreed that all matters
about 'visits of enemy aircraft' would be dealt with by the Admiralty.
An instruction had been given to the censors, by the War Office, in
January 1915 that nothing was to be published about a raid unless
there had been an official report and no stories were to be passed which
'were likely to cause panic'. 82 But reports of raids and of panic in
areas such as the East End continued to appear in the papers and
Buckmaster wrote to Greene on 23rd April 1915 informing hint that 'this
office is inundated with complaints nd inquiries' about the official
press policy on air raids'. 83
 D 206 of 5th May 1915 sought to clarify
the situation by reiterating that no unofficial reports were to be
published before the official account of a raid and that no mention was
to be made of the route of enemy aircraft or the amount of damage
inflicted.
But the War Office complained that despite D 206, a raid on Southend
had been fully reported in the London evening papers before any
official report had been issued and which could prove of great value
to the Germans in planning a major raid on London. Thus D 217 was
issued on 1st June 1915 prohibiting the publication of any report of
an air raid other than the official announcement. On 2nd February 1916
D 217 was withdrawn, to be replaced by D 352, a fifteen point
instruction which continued the prohibition on all unofficial reports,
but added the important clause that 'no account is to be published
until it has been submitted to and passed by the press Bureau' 84
81. Notice to all officers of the Press Bureau op.cit.
82. P.R.O. FID 139/20/A784/Part 1.
83. ibid.
84. P.R.O. FU 139/44
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On top of the additional work this involved for editors and censors,
they were requested by D 597 of 19th September 1917 that 'nothing
should be mentioned about casualties to sailors and soldiers in
Air Raids' 85 and on 28th of September 1917 that 'In consequence of
representations from the Commissioner of Police, the Press are very
urgently requested to refrain from publishing further articles which
add to the feeling of apprehension which is already prevalent specially
amongst the poorest and mast ignorant classes of the people of London' 86
With the sama aim of preventing 'panic and distress to the population',
censors were instructed to stop anything which smacked of 'sensationalism'
and editors were requested to observe 'the strictest moderation...
in regard to posters and headlines, in view of cultivating a correct
sense of proportion in regard to the events of the war' •87 For the same
reasons, censors were told to stop any reports of explosions or cases
of T.N.T. poisoning at munitions factories and to eliminate any references
to the outbreak of epidemics CD 215, 29th May 1915)8 Believing that
it might cause 'distress' to respectable families whose daughters had
entered the nursing profession, the War Office ordered the Bureau to stop
all 'pictures of European nurses attending wounded native soldiers'.89
In 1916, the entire Hearst network of newspapers were prohibited from
using the British cables system owing to Hearst's persistent re-writing
of copy from his London correspondent which, the Bureau argued, was
causing panic and distress when such stories were picked up and repeated
by British and neutral newspapers. On the 2nd of June 1916 at the
tiii of Jutland, Hearst's New York American ran a story that the
Germans had sunk fourteen British battleships which led the Daily Mail
to accuse the Admiralty of a cover-up. 90 But it was Hearst's Chicago
Examiner re-write of a brief massage from Tewson, Hearst's man in
London, blowing up the story of a Zepjiin raid into a full page account
of 'London in Flames' a capital 'in ruins' which led to the Hearst
suspension - a ban which remained in force until April. 1918.91
85. P.R.O. ID 139/45.
86. ibid.
87. P.R.O. Fl) 139/19.
88. P R.O. Fl) 139/43.
89. ibid., 8th June 1915.
90	 P.R.O. HO 139/28/A1057/Part 1 & 2.
91. Ibid., The Germans sank 3 battle cruisers, 8 destroyers and 3
cruisers, (Taylor, op. cit., (1963) p.143.
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Finally to Buckmaster 's third objective in carrying out the censorship,
that it should prevent the publication of news objectionable on
political grounds, news for example affecting 'the susceptibilities of
the Allied Countries'. 92 To judge from Press Bureau files, this last
point was taken very seriously by all the Bureau' s Directors through-
out the war. lVhen the Belgian High Coinnand complained that a story
in the Daily Mail on the 5th of January 1915 alleging that a Belgian
railway official had been shot for betraying secrets to the Germans
was 'grossly inaccurate' and insulting to Belgian honour, Swettenham
wrote to Thomas Marlowe, editor of the Mail reminding him that '... it
is a serious matter when our Allies find it necessary to make a complaint
of this kind' . The Daily Mail published an apology. An article written
in September 1917 by Colonel A.M. Murray for publication in the Sunday
Pictorial which was critical of the former French Commander-in-Chief,
General Nivelle, was censored on Swettenham's authority because as
Swettenham told the War Office, 'it seems to me very mischievous
to allow our Press to criticise an Allied General or late Commander-in-
Chief because it would be resented by his nationals and might lead to
similar criticisms of our High Command by an Ally.
In an instruction to censors on the 15th of October 1914 Buckmaster
revealed just how im.ich importance the authorities attached to the question
of Allied opinion : '.. . tieat the outward cables to America with a
very light hand. Let German news go through unless it contains grave
abuse of our Allies. Do not mind abuse of ourselves. Treat information
as to alleged fighting more generously than you would for Hcrie publication.'95
Buckmaster expanded on the thinking behind such a policy in a letter to
Richard Lumsden, a British diplomat in Chile in April 1915 'We
cari to the conclusion that.. . the right course was to let the German
messages through, relying on the fact that their statements would in
the end be shown to be false and the result could only be that their news
would be discredited... (but). . .we do not permit them to publish
untruthful statements about our Allies as that might lead to misunder-
92. 'Notice to all Officers of the Press Bureau', op. cit.
93. Swettenham to Marlowe, 19th January 1915, P.R.O. 1-K) 139/6/A169/18.
94. Swettenham to Colonel Cockerill, War Office, 28th September 1917,
P.R.O.H0139/24/940/1 7.
95. Buckmaster to Major Little, Military nsor, Press ffureau -
P.R.O. 1-K) 139/13/A488/
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standings between ourselves and them... ,96 It was a somewiat
patronizing attitude and one which infuriated American correspondents
in London who were aware that their copy was censored along similar
lines. But it revealed a shrewd appreciation of the likely effect of
extravagant German statements on United States opinion which never
seriously threatened the influence of the British press.
So sensitive were the censorship authorities to Allied opinion that
when Constables submitted a book about the Russian Revolution in
July 191 7 they were advised against publication on the grounds
of the boo1<s ml ch us' pro-Czarist views which might upset the
new regime. 97 And requests from Allied Governments for items to
be censored were treated with equal seriousness. When the French
Admiralty requested press silence over German submarine attacks in
the Nice/Marseilles area censors were instructed on the 13th of
February 1917 that 'No sinkings of Neutral or Allied Shipping other
than the British are to be published in our Press'.98
The policy adopted by the censorship authorities towards copy which
was critical of foreign or Allied governments was well dscribed by
Sir Edward Cook when Belgian politicians raised objections to criticisms
made about them by the L' Ind(pendence Belge which was published in
Britain. Cook told the Foreign Office that if the editor was to be
treated like an English journalist criticising the English Government
'his matter would be seldom interfered with', but if he was to be
treated as an English journalist criticising the Government of a
friendly or Allied Power 'in that case the exercise of the censorship,
in accordance with the Defence of the Realm Regulations would be much
more strict'. 99 Cook added the provision, which we should bear
constantly in mind in assessing the power of the censorship that 'this
office has no power to compel any person to submit matter for
censorship'
96. Buckmaster to Lumsden, 22nd April 1915, P.R.O. I-K) 139/7/A248/Part 1/8.
97. Foreign Office to Press Bureau, 7th August 1917, P.R.O. I-K) 139/34/
A1490/Part 1/3.
98. Admiralty to Press Bureau, P.R.O. I-K) 139/271A1036/Part 3/153.
99. Cook to Foreign Office, 4th May 1915, P.R.O. I-U139/16/A644/8.
100. ibid., Sir Edward Grey advised the Bureau to treat articles, if
submitted, by L'Indpendence Beige asif written by English journalists
critical of an Allied government.
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It was a policy which included within its compass neutral states and
countries of the Empire. Great care for example was taken not to
offend American neutrality by too strong an advocacy of American
participation in the War for as a Foreign Office memorandum to editors
observed in February 1916 : 'It is understood that Americans prefer to
do their own criticisms of the President and the Administration (Wilson
was seeking re-election at the time) and the Administration will
correspondingly resent outside criticisms' 10 The Foreign Office
stopped publication of a book by Alistair Harris (voluntarily submitted
for censorship) which had alledged an unhelpful attitude on the part
of United States consuls towards British P.O.W. 's. 102 Norman Angell,
the well known journalist and pacifist submitted an article about
American participation in the war for publication in the American
magazine New Republic in March 1917. It was stopped by the Bureau
without reference to the Foreign Office, on the grounds that it would
offend American opinion in suggesting that in the light of American
loans and supplies to the Allies, America was already a participant
on the Allied side
Mien it came to Imperial considerations, the effect of the war on Indian
nationalism was a prime concern of the censoTship authorities. Reuters
telegrams reporting disturbances and house arrests in Calcutta were
suppressed in September 1914 on the orders of Lord Crewe, Secretary
of State for India. Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy conplained to Kitchener
in November 1914 that military press bulletins which expressed surprise
at the good behaviour of Indian troops in France were, not surprisingly
causing deep resentment on the Subcontinent. The Congress newspaper,
India was told to submit all copy about the war to the military censors
at the Bureau following an article it published in February 1916 which
called for Indians to have an equal chance of coninissions as 'English
gentlemen'. In November 1916 Professor Charles ()nan, the distinguished
101. Foreign Office Memorandum, 1916, P.R.O. I-K) 139/39.
102. P.R.O. HO 139/3/A142WPart 1.
103. P.R.O. I-U 139/27JA1036/Part/51 .Censors had been instructed that
'no adverse criticism of America with regard to the loan should
be passed without referenc&, ibid.
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historian, at that time responsible for the supervision of the Press
Bureau's book censorship advised the publishers of a book by Lajot
Raj not to go ahead with publication on the grounds that it was 'a
seditious book (which) revels in the abuse of the indian Goverrunent'.04
Also of concern, in the light of the 'enormous number of Moslem subjects
of the Crown' was the way in which the press treated Turkey. Editors
were reminded by the Press Bureau in February 1916 that 'nothing should
be published of a nature to throw contempt on the Sultan of Turkey, who
is still regarded as the Khalif by millions of British subjects nor
yet to disparage needlessly the Turkish people'. When The Graphic
ignored this advice by publishing on the 7th of April 1916 a stridently
anti-Turkish cartoon, its export sales to the Middle East were banned
on the grounds that the cartoon 'illustrated the triumph of the
Cross over the Crescent (a mosque depicting Turkey was shown being
hurled from Asia) and thereby introduces the idea of the "Holy War" '.
A similar concern was expressed by the Foreign Office in 1917 over
Arab opinion which it was feared might be offended by exuberant
expressions of that racial prejudice so coninonly found in government
and press circles of the time. Arthur Hirshel of .the Foreign Office
told Swettenham on the 15th of March 1917 that Sir Stanley Maude,
Coumnder-in-Chief in Mesopotamia would be publishing an important
proclamation in Baghdad about Arab aspirations and 'It is therefore
more than usually desirable to keep out of the newspapers any
disparaging renrks about the Arabs - their cut-throat habits, looting
of Baghdad and all that kind of thing... 1105
As for Buckmaster's news 'objectionable on political groimds'l official
press censorship is political in that it serves the principal objectives
of government and those in executive authority, which in the period
1914-18 were to wage successful war. Although the Bureau consistently
104. The examples cited in this and the following paragraph are all
to be found in P.R.O. 139/33.
105. P.R.O. HO 139/27/A1036/Part 4/249.
106. 'Notice to all Officers of the Press&ireau', op. cit.
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claimed a non-political role in that it remained independent of
any party influence and in no way interfered directly with expression
of opinion, the authorities through the censorship did act on behalf
of the establishment and orthodox Service interests against the
political opponents of the war, anti-conscriptionists, pacifists
and socialists. A splendid example of this was the way in which the
censorship system was used to promote the views of the military
authorities over the issue of conscription. The anti-conscriptionist
Nation heralded the result of the Derby voluntary enlistment scheme as
a great victory in 'the battle of freedom...the people have won it,
even The Times (pro-conscriptionist) hardly contests their victory,
the country will emerge from the war with its capital institutions
intact' (3oth October 1915). Brade of the War Office speedily reacted
by issuing through the Bureau a Private Notice to leading editors
describing The Nations claims as Tabsolutely inaccurate and misleading...
Lord Derby trusts that editors will refrain from repeating the statements
of The Nation.'107
 Most newspapers in this particular instance had
taken an opposite view to that of the The Nation without any urging
from Brade.
Over pacifism there were problems for the authorities in that there
were few specifically pacifist newspapers and the Bureau publicly espoused
a policy of free speech and opinion. But it lost no opportunity in
promoting an anti-pacifist line by warning censors and editors, to
beware of any 'speculations about peace terms (which) are often of
enemy origin' 108
 and of advising printers who submitted pacifist leaflets
or books against publication. When for example in March 1918 the
Botoiph Printing Company submitted Harold Begbie' s book about the
appalling prison conditions being endured by conscientious objectors, they
were told by the Bureau that ' it was not advisable in the National [iiterest
to publish the book (and) in our opinion it might make the publisher liable
to prosecution under D.O.R.A.'. 109 Such clear hints of possibleprosecution
107. Private and Confidential Notice to the Press, 30th October 1915,
P.R.O.HO 139/21 1 A798/Part 4/73.
108. P.R.O. HO 139/36/A1614.
109. Press Bureau to Botoiph Printers, 6th March 1918,ibid.
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or in sane cases the threat to confiscate printing plant appear
to have frightened off the few printers who submitted such copy
but they gave authors like Begbie the excuse to describe the censorship
as '.. . a tyranny that shuffles and protests innocence' 110 -
accusation which will be examined in more detail in Chapter V.
Action against socialist-inspired labour unrest was more direct.
Requests for the censorship of news or rumours of industrial disputes,
strikes or lock-outs were frequently received by the Bureau, principally
fran the Ministry of Munitions. William Beveridge, Permanent Secretary
of the Ministry told the Bureau on the 16th of October 1915 that 'The
Minister (Lloyd George) regards it as of importance that as little
publicity as possible should be given (to the possibility of) a strike of
somawhat serious nature affecting the shipbuilding and engineering trade(whichj
may break out upon the clyde'
	
The Bureau duly obliged with D 285
that same day requesting the press to make no reference, direct or
indirect to the possibility of trouble on the Clyde : 'The Directors...
feel sure that the press will, in the national interest, do all that
is possible to avoid giving publicity to reports on the subject'.112
When workers at the Elswick engineering works on the Tyne voted to down
tools in Deceither 1915 Beveridge requested the Bureau 'to stop publication
of a telegram sent by the Newcastle correspondent of the Weekly lMspatch
which had outlined the workers' demands') 13 Censors were instructed on
the 23rd of March 1917 'to stop all references...to the strike at Barrow
...the position is decidedly bad'. 114 And so the instructions continued
until, as we shall discuss again in the following chapter, censorship
of industrial disputes was discontinued in 1918.
110. Begbie to Cook 20th December 1918, P.R.O. I-K) 139/36/A1614.
111. Beveridge to Press Bureau, 16th October 1915, P.R.O. I-K) 139/44.
112. ibid. An examination of the press for the period suggests that the
D Notice was observed but a strike duly occurred the following week
which was reported.
113. Beveridge to Press Bureau, 6th December 1915, P.R.O. 1K) 139/27/
Al 036/Part 1 /77.
114. F Mitchell, Press Bureau Secretary, Instruction to Censors,
P.R.O. HO 139/27/A1036/Part 4/255.
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We shall return to discuss the implications of the censorship against
socialist and pacifist organizations in Chapter V but it is worth
noting at this juncture that it was not only left wing minority
journals which suffered for their political views at the hands of
the censor or civil authorities and again with the active encouragement
of fellow journalists. In December 1915 Christobel Pankhurst's
violently j ingo paper Britannia published a War Office memorandum
written by Brigadier General Howel (which appears to have been
shown to certain editors) 115 arguing that a German success against
Serbia might work to the strategic advantage of the Allies. Britannia
besotted with the cause of Serbia, dubbed Howel, along with Sir Edward
Grey the Foreign Secretary as a pro-German and called for his
dismissal. E.R. Robbins wrote to the Bureau asking : 'ought such
scandalous statements be allowed'? and J.S.R. Phillips, editor of
the Yorkshire Post wondered 'if any prosecuting authority has
the courage of a louse that might enable it to prosecute Miss
Christobel Pankhurst and the publishers of Britannia...' H.A. Gwynne
editor of the M)rning Post thought '.. . that woman really ought to
be put in jail'! 16 No prosecution ensued in this case because as
Swettenhain told Gwynne, the D.P.P. 'fear to give advertisement'7
to Pankhurst's utterances. But later that month, Britannia's premises
were raided and the journal reduced from fourteen pages to one
typewritten sheet.
The supreme irony in all this is that nuich later in the war in February
191 8 Gwynne was writing to the Bureau complaining that '....some of
your excisions seem to be verging on the political' 8 (over the
censorship of articles by Repington critical of Lloyd George's alleged
interference with the military conduct of the war) and Gwynne and
Pep ington certainly regarded their prosecution later that same month
115. Gwynne wrote to Swettenham that '...I was allowed to see a copy
of it at one time' but as a 'responsible' journalist of course
nothing appeared about it in his paper. Gwynne to Swetterihain,
14th December 1915, P.R.O. ID 139/23/A9llIPart2I9.
116. Robbins to Press Bureau, 13th December 1915, Phillips to Press
Bureau, 13th December 1915, Gwynne to Press Bureau, 14th December
1915, ibid.
117. Swettenham to Gwynne, 16th December 1915, ibid.
118. Gwynne to Swettenhani, 28th February 1918 ' P.R.O. H0139/12/A458/
Part 1/6b.
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for publishing details of the Inter-Allied Reserve Scheme as politically
inspired by the Prime Minister. Gwynne was to return to the charge in
tvy 1918 over the rejection by the Bureau (on War Office instructions)
of an article defending General Maurice (who had been dismissed from
the army over his criticisms of Lloyd George in the press) which,wrote
Gwynne, 'seems to give indications of political censorship, for which
the Press Bureau has been happily free')9
The Russian Revolution and more especially the Bolshevik take-over
frightened the authorities almost as much as the threat of a German
victory and the censorship of messages to and from Russia after
March 1917 was perhaps the most overtly political role played by the
Bureau during and after the war. In the early days of the Revolution,
telegrams of support from British organizations such as the Workers and
Soldiers Councils in Leeds and Newcastle were passed on Foreign Office
authority on the grounds that 'the Workers and Soldiers Council was
then the controlling power in Russia and it was felt that there was
a risk of alienating them if we interfered with their friends'
telegrams'. 120
 By June 1917 with Kerensky more firmly in control this
policy was reversed and all cables to and from London supporting Bolshevik
policies such as the calls for an immediate peace were heavily censored1.21
There was one notable exception to this rule. The Foreign Office were
convinced that Arthur Ransome, (of children 's book fame) Petrograd
correspondent of the Daily News had become 'thoroughly converted' to
the Bolshevik cause. When the Daily News transferred him to Stockholm
the Foreign Office suggested to the Bureau that his messages be
examined but allowed to go through as he would remain a useful source
of intelligence. The Bureau was told by Stephen Gaselee of the Foreign
Office to 'go on looking closely at the messages he sends cutting out
what is actually harmful but still I hope leaving enough for him to
119. Gwynne to Press Bureau, 15th May 1918, P.R.O. I-K) 139/13/A523/Part3/43.
120. Foreign Office Minute, 18th August 1918,P.R.O. I-K) 139/27/A1036/
Part 4/248.
121. The Foreign Office considered that 'nearly all' the Russian press
correspondents in London were by August 1918 sending 'mischievous
messages' which were to be stopped. ibid.
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go on sending messages and his paper keep him where he is'.122
By November 1917 with the Bolsheviks in power Swettenhain was
writing to Hankey, Secretary to the War Cabinets expressing his
concern about messages fiorn Russia (which he had stopped) which
'are propaganda in the interests of an iiwnediate peace or a separate
Russian peace which if published here will be used by the I.L.P. or
the U.D.C. or similar pacifists...in these messages the Allies are
referred to almost as though they are the enemies' •123 To Carson,
propaganda overlord at the time, Swettenham was more direct : 'There
appears to be only one way to deal with it (Bolshevik propaganda)
and that is to authorise us to pass, stop or censor all such messages
at our discretion, without regard to existing instructions that
cablegrams dealing with foreign affairs are to be passed to the
addressees uncensored'. 124 Carson read Swettenham's letter to the
War Cabinet on the 29th of November 1917 where it was agreed that the
Press Bureau should censor Bolshevik propaganda. Henceforth the Bureau
stopped such messages as Stalin's'Appeal to the Moslem World' in
December 1917 which urged a world-wide revolt against Imperial oppression
(considered by the India Office to be 'potentially mischievous in the
highest degree') 125 and all messages calling for an immediate peace
such as Trotsky's from Brest Litovsk in December 1917.
122. Gaselee to Press Bureau. 19th August 1918, P.R.O. H0139/35/
1584/Part 1/1.
Like his dispatches beforhe Bolshevik takeover, Ransome's messages
from Stockholm were not so much pro-Bolshevik as fairly accurate
assessments of the real situation in Russia rather than what the
Foreign Office and Allied statesmen would have liked it to be. In
reporting attempted 'officers plots' and 'Peasant Risings Against
the Bolsheviks' his coment was : 'I am inclined to think it will
be more difficult than the plotters imagine to get even momentarily
support among the masses' (Daily News, 2oth August 1918).
123. Swettenham to Hankey, 25th November 1918, ibid.
124. Swettenhain to Carson, u/d, cited by Carson, War Cabinet meeting, 29th
November 1917. P.R.O. Cab 23/4,w.c.268/8.
125. Sir T. Holderness to Press Bureau, 7th December 1918, P.R.O. HO 139/
35/1584/Part 1/1.
This message however was shown to the editor of The Daily Telegraph
as his newspaper 'is so public spirited and high principled',
Cook, Press Bureau Minute, 7th December 1917, ibid.
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In this chapter we have examined the fundamental objectives of the
press censorship, the difficulties of staff and departmental liaison
faced by the Bureau in carrying out those objectives and we have looked
at the major areas in which the censorship operated. Some of the
censorship decisions were readily understood and accepted by the
press, usually those which contained clear tactical information such
as news of troop movements or prospective operations. But strong
objections were made (to which we shall be returning in Chapter VI)
to decisions such as the ban on soldiers letters and regimental
names which in most cases were manifestations of over anxious
officialdom but which were viewed by the press as attempts to disguise
failures and lincompetence.
There was ambiguity in the manner in which press material was stamped
'Passed for Publication'which also upset editors. As far as the Bureau
was concerned such a stamp on an item did not necessarily imply
official approval and editors were constantly being reminded that it
was still up to them to exercise their judgemeht 'in the national interest'.
Herbert Samuel,Hoine Secretary in 1916, sunnnarised this policy at a time
when the number of pacifist leaflets submitted to the Bureau by wary
printers was on the increase: 'The function of a censorship is to prohibit
that which must not be published and which will be the subject of
proceedings if it is published; but not to give anything in the nature
of an endorsement to every-thing else however objectionable it may be' , 1 26
But this was a policy which infuriated editors who regarded it as
bureaucratic cowardice, backing away from clear cut decisions and leaving
many items in a grey area where publication might expose editors and
proprietors to possible prosecution under D.O.R.A. MienGwynneof the
Morning Post submitted an article about the sinking of the rmidab'
in January 1915 (and by inference very critical of Admiralty procedures
which it was argued had also led to the loss of Craddock's squadron in
the South Atlantic and three cruisers in the North Sea) ,the Bureau was
126. Samuel to Sir Edward Troup, Permanent Secretary, Home Office,
30th October 1916, P.R.O. I-K) 139/23/A911/23.
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told by Brownrigg that '. . .Admiralty opinion is that harm will be done
by its publication' but because there was no military reason why it
could not be published 'it is therefore for the Editor of the Newspaper
in question to use his discretion' 127 As a good patriot when told
of Brownrigg' s opinion Gwynne took the hint and dropped the article
but under strong protest : 'The situation. . . is that a Department which
is indirectly criticized advises that the criticism should be dropped
because it considers it would be harmful' and further avoids responsibility
for its actions by putting the onus to publish on to the Morning Post
'when it should have been borne by the Press Bureau' •128
But it would be misleading to infer from the cases which have been
discussed in this chapter that the censorship was some kind of highly
efficient sieve through which all news for public consumption was care-
fully sifted before release. Certainly all incoming and outgoing press
cablegrams were censored and as the Press Bureau figures for 1916 show,
the censorship of these did comprise a IflajorpartQf the Bureau's work But
telegraphic news formed only part of the contents of British newspapers
which were made up of a vast range of home news, leaders and feature
articles, censorship of which was purely voluntary. Indeed as we have
seen, many of the cases in which the Bureau became involved were only
brought to its attention by either voluntary submission or press attention.
In the following two chapters we shall examine the effectiveness and
power of the censorship and find out just how much control the authorities
had over the press. We shall see that such power and influence lay
not so much in the ability to suppress items or threaten prosecutions
(although such actions were not lightly received by the press) but far
more as we have caught glimpses of in this chapter, by the manipulation
of press coverage and opinion through the D Notice system which was
effectively the backbone of the entire censorship operation.
127. Brownrigg to Press Bureau, 12th January 1915, P.R.O. I-I) 139/
13/A523/Part 314.




'It is difficult to point to a single useful result or a single
beneficial effect upon public opinion which the war censorship has
attained. W. MacDonald, The Nation, 13th September 1917.
In 1915 Sir Stanley Buckmaster, Director of the Press Bureau,told the
Admiralty that he believed 'the Censorship has been of great use to
the Government in the conduct of the War.. .' . In their memorandum
on the censorship submitted to the War Cabinet in 1917 Buckmaster's
successors, Swetterihain and Cook declared that 'we have been very
careful to prevent the publication of information useful to the enemy'
As we have seen much of the work of the Bureau was geared to this
objective but how much valuable information, if any, did the Central
Powers glean from the British press despite the operation of the
Censorship?
From the moment that a total and voluntary press silence was observed
over the embarkation of the British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.) to
France in August 1914, newspapers and periodicals cooperated with the
Service Departments, through the Bureau, to prevent the publication
of troop movements and other information that could have been of use
to the enemy. The achievement of moving an entire expeditionary
force to France without a word in the press, resulting in a major
strategic surprise for the enemy, must be counted as a singular success
for such a voluntary press censorship system.
But at various times, items did appear in the press, usually pieces which
had not been submitted for censorship (mainly in the provincial press
which submitted far less material than Fleet Street papers) which
the Service departments considered could be or had been of use to
the enemy. Following a visit by Swetteham and Cook to G.H.Q. in September
1915 when they discussed censorship matters with Colonel Warburton Davies
1. Buckmaster to Sir Graham Greene, 22nd January 1915, P.R.0.
1-10 139/11/A411/Part 2.
2. 1 The Official Press Bureau', op. cit.
- 101 -
(the officer currently responsible for the operation of field censorship)
the Bureau published a lengthy D Notice (D 279) on the 29th of September
1915 aimed at reminding the press 'of the assistance which may be given
to the enemy by indiscreet letters, articles or pictures in our
papers '3 The Notice recognised that the press were anxious to prevent
assistance being given to the enemy but 'harm may sometimes be done
by inadvertence because the bearing of seemingly insignificant information
is not always appreciated' . Because German Intelligence scrutinized
the British press, nothing should be published which, while seeming
innocuous to an editor, might provide certain and prompt confirmation
of rumours or information learnt from elsewhere'.5
Clearly a number of items listed as examples of things not to mention
such as a too detailed account of a soldier's career in an obituary or
too nuch information in a casualty list were the sorts of information
looked for by British Military Intelligence in German papers. But
some of the 'indiscretions' listed were examples taken from items
which had appeared in the British press which G.H.Q. believed had been
of operational use to the enemy. Details had been given of units,
regiments and place names in descriptive narratives of incidents and in
particular 'the position of Artillery Observation Stations have
sometimes been disclosed in the Press with the sequel that the stations
have been shelled, lives lost and the places could no longer be used'.6
This was a direct reference to an article by Repington published in
The Times on the 18th of May 1915 under the title 'Great Night Attack'
in which he described how he had got 'an excellent view from La Couture
(an observation station) of the German position which we attacked...
3. P.R.O. HO 139/43.
4. ibid.
5. Brade of the War Office was very critical of this four page booklet :
'it is quite impossible for an editor to guarantee that these precepts
shall be observed. . .Editorial offices are not manned by highly trained
officials nor is there time in the conditions in which papers are
produced and in the stress imposed by keen coninercial competition
to read through with cicse attention to all the considerations advanced
by the Bureau'. War Office Minute, 1/10/15. P.R.O. uK) 32/4893.
6. D 279, 29th September 1915, P.R.O. 1K) 139/43.
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When the observation station itself was attacked a week later, Haig
sent a stiff note to the War Office blaming Repington and recommending
that 'no: newspaper correspondent be allowed to come so close to the
front during active operations' . (The article had got through
The Times without being censored because, as Swettenham complained to
Brade, 'several times telegrams have been received from Repington
with a note from Maclionough8
 saying "No objection to publication"
It was inevitable that before the establishment of accredited war
correspondents at G.H. Q
.
, whose despatches were censored both there
and sometimes at the Press Bureau, accounts of incidents by roving
correspondents in Belgium or France or items picked up from the
neutral press, contained information which the Services considered
useful to the enemy but which slipped through the Press Bureau's
cable censorship. In December 1914 Buckmaster issued a short list
of these for the enlightenment of his censors under the title 'Sins
Already Coniiiitted', items such as letters in The Times suggesting
the presence of typhoid in the Belgian army which were 'untrue and
encouraging to the enemy' and a story of the fall of shells at
Lanipernisse which had killed 130 men and 'which showed the Germans
how easy and efficacious their night firing was (which) they have
since	 1? Maj or General CaIlwell in his memeirs refers to
'lapses on the part of overworked arid weary (censors) poring over
sheaves of proof-slips late at night' which led to 'Nearly all
our newspapers publishing a Reuters message which stated the exact
strength of the 3rd Belgian Division when it got back by sea to
Ostend - not a very important piece of information but one that
obviously ought not to have been allowed to appear. At a later date
a journal in reporting His Majesty's visit to troops, contrived
to acquaint all who it might concern that the 28th Division made up
from regimental battalions brought from overseas, was about to cross
the Channel'.11
7. Cited in R. Blake (ed.) The Private Papers of Sir Douglas Haig
1914-19 (London, Eyre & Sr o	 'ii) ?• 3.
8. Director of Military Intelligence and a close friend of Repington.
9. Swettenhain to Brade, 17th May 1915, P.R.O. I-k) 139/5/Al27/Part 2/30.
10. Press Bureau Minute, 10th December 1914, P.R.O. HO 139/11.
11. Callwell, op. cit. ,(1920), pp. 322-3.
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Although items like these did slip through, it is clear from War
Office and Press Bureau files that no information was learnt by the
German or other enemy forces from the British press which proved of
vital tactical significance. When the metropolitan papers, through
the N.P.A., complained in 1915 that the Bureau was neglecting
to censor the provincial press, Admiral Flail was requested to make a
thorough examination of the contents of provincial newspapers. On
two separate occasions in 1915 the Liverpool Daily Post had published
an account of the supposed capture of a 'super' German U Boat, a
story that had been passed by mistake by a naval censor at the Press
Bureau; Hall discovered that the Birmingham Daily Mail on 3rd November
had run a story about the allegedly poor equipment of the French
Territorials and that on 6th November the Edinburgh Evening News
gave details of recruitment figures which had been prohibited by the
Bureau. But Hall's principal conclusion was that he had found 'very
little of an objectionable nature'. 12 As Asquith, by no means an
admirer of the press, coninented in the House of Comons on the 11th
of March 1918 : 'On the whole the Press has discharged its duty
during the war with patriotism. It has never, in any conspicuous or
important instances, given away confidential information to the service
of the enemy...13
In all this we are constantly reminded that the censorship was in part
voluntary, that when it came to preventing a nrniour about a naval
engagement in the North Sea appearing in a Scottish paper or the story
of a damaged ship arriving at Chatham or a wounded soldier' s story
appearing in a Welsh paper, the censorship authorities at the Press
Bureau had little executive control. Censorship was in many instances
in the hands of editors who, as we shall see in Chapter VI,were themselves
no mean censors. But would the appearance of such stories in obscure
provincial journals result in the enemy learning valuable information?
It is extremely unlikely that copies of the Merthyr Gazette or the
Epworth Bells would reach Berlin but government departments, without
providing any evidence, argued doggedly throughout the war that '...
the enemy. . . profit by indiscretions in our Press.. .publication therein
is one of the chief sources of his information' 14
12. Hall to Press Bureau, 13th November 1915, P.R.O. HO 139,'10/12.
13. House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, 11th March 1918, Col. 116.
14. 'Press Bureau Official Instructions', May 1916, P.R.O. Cab 21/93.
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British officials appear to have had in their mind the image of an
almighty German Intelligence Department which spent its time and
energy raking over thousands of British newspapers for any item
which might assist them in winning the war. Writing to Riddell on
11th June 1915 the Press Bureau explained that mention of fires at
a Ministry of Minitions factory or 'even to report strikes or of
lock-outs' was forbidden because such events 'might seriously interfere
with production (which) will give the enemy if he counts as he will
do the time it will take us to supply all our wants and give assistance
to our Allies' 15 - the official view seeming to be that the enemy was
a devilishly clever foe capable of turning such reported accidents
and disputes to his advantage. And this was a frame of mind which by
1918 had clearly infected some journalists. H.O. Hartley, editor of
the Woolwich Herald wrote to the Bureau on 21st February 1918 complaining
that two of his rivals had published details of recent air raids which
Hartley argued '...must provide the enemy with the clearest proof
that his bombs fell in the district enabling him the more easily to
recognize his whereabouts in future raids' •16 Hartley requested that
the Bureau issue a D Notice 'prohibiting reference to raids in all
papers of a local character'. 17 It is an indication of the cooperation
which the Bureau relied upon from editors, particularly of local
journals for the operation of the censorship that as Hartley pointed
out : for some time the editors of most of the papers in South East
London have agreed among themselves to suppress all references to
raids in their localities' , although 'one or two have stood out...
and in some cases I fear reports have been published which have never
been submitted' 18
When in 1917 Northcliffe objected to the stopping of a story about
British drifters being used as decoys to lure German U Boats - 'the
type of simple narrative that is being "killed off" as we say by
15. P.R.O. }) 139/27/A1036/Part 1/80.




your people'. 19 Carson,then First Lord of the Adniiralty,replied that
'...the First Sea Lord and the War Staff regard it as vital that the
doings of these "decoys' should be as secret as possible...the details
.would be of immense value to the coninanders of enemy submarines
and would give them an insight into our methods'. 2° But an unsuccessful
encounter with just one such decoy would have been enough insight for
German naval intelligence without any recourse to'simple narratives'in the
Daily Mail.This belief that German intelligence could pick up and use such
stories reflects the then British obsession with the alleged superiority
of Teutonic efficiency. Ironically Lundendorff in his memoirs has
little good to say about the German Intelligence and official
German press services which he considered far inferior to the British.21
What the Germans did learn and use in their propaganda and take into
account in their strategic considerations which t'he Press Bureau was
unable to prevent, was press comment and criticism of the way the
war was being conducted by the Service departments and successive
British governments. A Foreign Office document, prepared in 1915 for
Cabinet circulation, 22 listed a number of cases of German newspapers,
quoting strident criticisms which had appeared In British newspapers,
particularly The Times and Daily Mail. From such comments, the German
Government learnt of British shell shortages in 1915, of the growing
public concern about the Dardanelles campaign in the sumner of 1915,
of the military concern over manpower and shipping losses and they must
surely have been heartened to find out how many British journalists
seemed to think British governments tended to be made up of 'Incompetent
Bunglers' (Daily Mail 16th March 1915).
19. Northcliffe to Carson, 5th May 1917, Northcliffe MSS, Volume V
Carson: British Library.
20. Carson to Northcliffe, 7th March 1917, ibid.
21. General Ludendorff, My War Memories, 191 4 1918, Vol 1 (London,
Hutchi.nson & Co.Ltd. 1928) pp.361-378.
22. Foreign Office Minute, 1/11/1915, P.R.O. HO 139/30/A1180/1.
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The Foreign Office document showed how German newspapers had for example
made use of a scornful attack which the Daily Mail had made upon a
speech by Kitchener in September 1 915. Kitchener had declared that
he believed that Germany was nearing the end of her resources and that
Turkey had become demoralized. The Deustche Tageszeituig of the 22nd
of September 1915 carefully repeated the Daily Ma's comment that
Kitchener's remarks had cane at a time when Germany had just taken Vilna
and when American press correspondents had recently reported Turkey
to be in good spirits •23
On 26th March 1917 the German wireless broadcast what Lord Derby
described to the War Cabinet as 'long extracts from The Nation in which
British strategy was compared unfavourably with that of the German and
the strategic situation for the British painted in very gloomy colours'.
The War Office imposed an export ban on The Nation on 29th March after
consultation with Lloyd George on the grounds as Lord Derby explained
to the Cabinet, that circulation of dangerous literature in this country
might be tolerated because 'the character of the writer and that of
the paper in which the literature appeared were known and might where
necessary be discounted'. 24 But the official argument went on, abroad
this distinction would not be made by foreign governments who might
believe that The Nation 'spoke for the whole of British Liberalism'.25
It was a weak argument to justify such action for in the same period
the Frankfurter Zeitung cited both The Times and the ?nchester
Guardian as evidence that the German retreat (behind the Hindenburg
line) had caused grave anxiety in Britain and the Wolff agency had
used both the Daily Telegraph charges that the Board of Trade were
disguising the shipping losses and the New Statesman 's leader arguing
that if the shipping losses continued then a peace might soon have to
be concluded.
23. Foreign Office Minute, op. cit.




What the German press clearly relished were British press attacks on
the censorhip itself. The Frankfurter Zeitung of 7th July 1915
delighted in quoting the Daily Mail's assessment of the effect of the
censorship as having : 'Chlofonned the nation' •26 The Klnische
Zeitung quoted at length The'riines attack upon the censorship of
an article by John Buchan which had contained a tribute to German bravery
(but which also contained, according to the War Office, a detailed
account of the battle of Loos which the military censors considered
would be of assistance to the enemy).
When The Times described Britain as a place where 'discontent is now
prevtlnt not only in certain classes but in all classes of
society and what is read in newspapers is only a faint reflection of
it. It covers diplomacy, the strategy, and the general conduct of
the war' (15th October 1915) and when later on in the war, leader comments
bitterly attacked Admiralty policy over shipping losses or army
policy on the Sonime and. at Passchendaele, were such comments 'injurious
to the Naval and Military Operations of the British Empire'7Certainly
the Foreign Office believed so and cited J.A. Spender, editor of the
Westminster Gazette's comment that 'there ought to be some way of
preventing the export of home-made libels' 28 but as the War Office
realised the British press was too powerful and useful to silence and
that such comments were in no way representative of the daily presentation
of the war in the British press. What use was made of such comments
in assessing Allied capabilities and morale was in any case more than
dissipated by the strident blare of German propaganda which alienated
rather than influenced neutral opinion.
The most effective and most sinister area of the Bureau's activities was its
manipulation of what went in or what was left out of the press through the
operation of the D Notice system - a method of control which could only
have been accomplished through the active cooperation of most editors
and proprietors.
26. Foreign Office Minute, 1/11/1915. op.cit.
27. 'Notice to All Officers of the Press Bureau', op. cit.
28. J.A. Spender, speech to the 1.0 .J., 10th November 1915,
P.R.O. HO 139/30/A1180/1.
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During the first months of the Bureau's existence, the leading
metropolitan editors made frequent briefing visits to Smith and
later to Buckmaster. This procedure became too unwieldly and quickly
excited the jealously of leading provincial editors like C.P. Scott
of the Manchester Guardian who felt not only personally affronted at
being excluded, but also that their Fleet Street rivals were stealing
a march on them for the latest news. Thus the D Notice (so called
to differentiate them from the Bureau's less private and confidential
'B'-'C' general information series) which already existed in embryo
was quickly expanded into a full-scale series,advising and instructing
the Press as to what could or could not be published'. 29 647 were
issued during the war and a further 56 until April 1919 when the
Bureau was closed, embracing every aspect of the war effort - military,
naval, air raids, food shortage, foreign policy, industrial disputes,
even the weather and as a War Office memorandum noted at the end of
the war, they were 'loyally observed (by) the great mass of newspapers'3°
Most were sent as 'requests' to the press, a small number as 'instructions'
which it was made clear could lead to possible prosecution if ignored.
Booklets, four in all, known as 'Blue Books' were sent to editors
containing 'the instructions which really matter' 31 together with the
latest revisions.
With the creation of the Bureau and an increasing involvement by the
N.P.A. in defending newspaper interests, the Joint Comittee tended to
meet rarely as the war progressed. But its secretary,E.A. Robbins,
was also General Manager of the Press Association, and as he had already
had experience of issuing the rParker' telegrams in the pre-war days
he agreed to distribute the D Notices via the P.A. system. Lists of
the editors who received the Notices or circulars were drawn up and
periodically revised by Robbins in conjunction with the Directors of
29. 'The Official Press Bureau', op. cit.
30. 'Military Press Control', Part 1, 1918, P.R.O. W) 32/9304, p.9.
31. 'The Official Press Bureau', op. cit.
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the Press Bureau. By the end of the war, Bobbins was keeping three
such lists for distribution. Fleet Street and major provincial
newspapers and periodicals received all the D Notices while 1400
smaller provincial papers received occasional notices and the less
confidential circulars.
Only a select number of Fleet Street and provincial newspapers and
periodicals, those on what Robbins called the '40 List', received in
addition to the I) Notices, most confidential and occasionally secret
Notices considered by the authorities unsuitable for general release
and to be used purely for background information. Newspapers and
periodicals considered by the Bureau (and sometimes by Bobbins on
his own initiative) to have been uncooperative or negligent in the
observation or care of the Notices were occasionally removed from the
lists. In 1915 thirty five provincial papers were thus removed and
in April 1917 Massinghaiu editor of the Liberal weekly, The Nation
was removed from the '40 List' for having returned his copy 0± the
1917 Blue Book of instructions with the comment that he was 'quite
capable of conducting The Nation without instructions from the
32Bureau'.
Left to a press organization, the distribution of the D Notices was
certainly the most efficient aspect of the Bureau's work. It is also
an indication of the close relationship which developed between
important sections of the press and the censorship authorities that
such an important task was left to a press man to organize and
administer. There were upsets. As late in the war as February 1918
the Bureau as mortified to discover that twelve leading socialist
papers were in receipt of all D Notices (although as Bobbins
observed, in his professional judgement no great harm had befallen the
nation as a result) . The Bureau occasionally complained that Notices
went astray or worse fell into the hands of politicians critical of
the Bureau and Swettenham, in particular, tended to lash out at Bobbins
over such incidents.
32. Massingham to Press Bureau, 2nd April 1917, P.R.O. liD 139/19/
A724/Part &/7.
33. Bobbins to Press Bureau, 12th February 1918. ibid.
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An amusing and for Robbins extremely annoying incident along these
lines occurred in December 1916 • Several Notices had been wrongly
addressed and returned to the Bureau. Instead of talking the matter
over with Robb ins, Swettenham sent a letter stating that 'in
consequence of the regrettable blunders which have recently been
made...we are compelled to consider whether it may not be in the
public interest that we should now perform this duty ourselves.. .which
you have performed so long and so satisfactorily' 4 At this stage an
evil genie went to work and the letter arrived not at the Press Association
but at Printing House Square addressed to a Mr. G.Robbins. Dawson,
editor of The Times (and by no means an admirer of the Bureau) in
returning the letter could not resist the conuient that 'the regrettable
blunders. .do not seem confined to the work of Mr Robbins.. .your
letter was addressed to Mr. G. Robbins instead of to Mr E. Robbins
of the Press Association who may well doubt in the circumstances whether
he can safely relinquish the duty 'which he has performed so long and
so satisfactorily" 	 Robbins, upset that his professional efficiency
had been questioned in such a public manner, was only .ameliorated after
an abject apology from Swettenhain. But with the aid of an addressograph
provided by the Bureau, he continued to distribute the Notices for
the remainder of the war. Swettenham's letter has about it that fractious
and pompous tone which occasionally characterised the Bureau' s relations
with the press, explaining nuch of the hostility which the Bureau provoked
from even the most cooperative of journalists such as Robbins and
Sir George Riddell.
As a series the Notices are a miniature documentary of the four year war
period presenting a fascinating insight into the fears and prejudices
of those in authority, vividly reflecting their almost obsessive concern
with how the war should be reported by the press.At first the Notices
contain a haphazard selection of topics - background information
about the cable censorship (D 26, 8th September 1914), care to be
taken over the reporting of alleged Gennan atrocities (D 42, 28th
September 1914), and restrictions on the reporting of the weather
34. Swettenham to Robbins, 16th December 1916, P.R.O. Fl) 139/19/A724/Part6Il
35. Dawson to Swettenham, 18th December 1916, ibid.
Swettepham's response to Dawson's action is an indication of the coolness
which e.xisted between the Bureau and The Times : 'we hold a strong
opinion that it is inexcusable that a third person when returning
such a letter should make coninants on its contents.' Swettenhain to
Dawson, 21st December 1917, ibid.
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(D 80, 21st October 1914). churchill, when First Lord of the
Admiralty behaved as if he had discovered a new toy, ordering D
Notices prohibiting reports of his movements each time he set off on
one of his trips away from the Admiralty (eight Notices between
September and October 1914), a practice which can only have reinforced
the groundswell of press opposition to his unorthodox antics as First
36Lord.
We have discussed in Chapter III the Notices which concerned the military
and naval aspects of the war - troop movements, operational details, air
raids, shipping losses which were in effect straight forward instructions
about what not to publish, a working guide to both censors and editors.
Editors may well have objected to or resented these restrictions on
stories about the exploits of local regiments and heroes but they
generally obeyed them, either from a fear of possible prosecution or
more often it appears, from a sense of patriotic duty. As Major General
Caliwell states in his memoirs ; 'Newspapers almost always fell in
readily with the wishes of the military authorities'. 37 Only one
aspect of the war news proved of long term difficulty for the authorities
to control through the operation of the D Notices - news about air
raids.
The raids naturally brought the war to the nation's doorstep and
successive D Notices calling for silence or restraint ran too much
against the journalistic grain for nny editors to bear. We saw in
the last chapter how the Notices about the raids increased in severity
between 1915 and 1917, when t) 217 of June 1915 (prohibiting reports of
raids until an official announcement) was ignored, particularly by
East End papers. 38 Colonel de Wattevt1lé of the War Office called
together leading editors in September 1917 for what can only be
36. P.R.O. II) 139/43.
37. Caliwell op. cit, (1920) p. 327.
38. In May 1915 the Jewish chronicle was prosecuted for spreading
reports likely to cause disaffection (Reg 27) and the editor
fined £5 - hardly a devastating blow even at 1915 prices and
the reports of raids and damage sustained went on unabated.
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described as a sound dressing down. He told them that the raids
'are calculated to touch us on the raw', that the Germans were able
to learn from reading English newspapers precisely where their bombs
had dropped and with what damage (although no evidence was produced
to support this statement) 39 and he went on 'the question is whether
the Press are going to supplement what the Germans know by giving
them missing details. . . If you think you should earn your living at
the cost of further deaths and further raids, all I can say is that
you are a scandalous lot 40
But a significant number of editors remained unmoved by such blunt
admonitions. D 352 of February 1916 was aimed to curb these by forcing
all newspapers to submit stories about air raids to the Press Bureau
before publication. But it was impossible for provincial editors to
ignore raids when they occured. in their locality, particularly if they
coincided with weekly deadlines with the result that local papers in
the South East continued throughout the war to run 'alarming headlines,
long reports of damage, harrowing tales of inquests, stories of crowds
seeking shelter in the tubes.. . and of refugees flooding the country-
side' which as D 601 of the 26th of October 1917 went on 'are much to
be deprecated' 1
Notices like D 352 or D 601 were straightforward prohibitions or
requests but many Notices were little more than subtle forms of
propaganda and news manipulation, what George Orwell was later to
describe as a '...kind of veiled censorship...though there is no
definite prohibition, no clear statement that this nu.ist or must not
be printed...official policy is never flouted' (Tribune, 7th July 1944).
On the 12th of September 1914 the Bureau issued D 34 which referred to
a 'feeling in Russia' that the British people did not appreciate the
39. 'By carefully perusing descriptive articles and reports in the
British Press' argued D 601 of 26th October 1917, 'the enemy's
intelligence service must be able to judge the effect of each
individual bomb dropped on London'. P.R.O. I-f) 139/45.
40. Press Bureau Memorandum, 5th September 1917, P.R.O. HO 139/
20/A781/Part 5/54.
41. P.R.O. HO 139/45.
- 113 -
great exertions being made by Russia on behalf of the Alliance :
'The British Press can render a great service to the Alliance by
taking every opportunity of recognizing the brilliant devotion with
which Russia is discharging her particular obligations to the joint
plan of campaign... ,42 The Foreign Office were concerned about the
effect Russia's defeat at Tannenbrg might have on public opinion
particularly in the Liberal Press which had already expressed unease
at having an 'Au'tocracy' for an ally. Following this 'suggestion',
a number of Fleet Street papers began to 'render...service' with
photographs and potted biographies of Russian generals (Daily Mirror
15th September,Daily Sketch, 17th September 1914), an increased
coverage of news and coimnent on the Eastern front in the Daily Telegraph
and The Star and encouraging assessments by military writers like
Repington that the news from Russia 'shows that all goes well in the
East. . . Russia has gained a complete victory at Ravaruska...' (The Times
15th September 1914.)Repington continued to 'write up' the Russian effort
throughout the remaining months of 1914 with constant references to Russian
'numerical superiority' (The Times, 7th December 1914) and of his great trust that
'alth.igh the Russians find it hard to exploit their undoubted and large
numerical preponderance, it is only a question of time for them to smether
the Germans and club them to death'. (The Times ,9th December 1914.)
• On .30th October 1914 the Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, issued a
memorandum to the press, through the Bureau, drawing attention to
the dangers of 'certain lines'
	 currently taken by newspapers which in
the opinion of the Foreign Office caused harm in neutral countries. For
example, that Germany was obtaining coal from Scandinavia, that Holland
would be a useless ally and that Russia was slow to advance. Grey
went on to advise the press to avoid any mention that the allies were
in for a long war 'this tends to give the impression in France of a
typically leisurely British attitude' and in a plea which has manifest
itself many times since, he urged the press to refrain from saying
anything which suggested that Britain had saved France from defeat.
42. P.R.O. I-L 139/39.
43. ibid.
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Grey's memorandum met with a generous response. Sir Edward Russell,
editor of the Liverpool Daily Post replied that 'so far' as I ani
concerned such hints are welcome. One cannot but perceive how awkwardly
indiscreet expression of press opinion complicates the work of the Foreign
Office at such a time' . 	 And a leader in the Liverpool Daily Post
on the 4th of November 1914 could have been written in the Foreign
Office so close in tone was it to the officially requested attitude
towards France ; 'The spirit of France in this war has won the homage
of the civilized world and our national impulses and conduct have been
the highest and best when they have most closely emulated those of
our Allies'.
When the Bureau sent a further memoranclurri to the press on the advice
of Grey in November 1915 advising them. on 'the avoidance. . . of strong
expressions of opinion. . . of a nature opposed to the sentiments or
opinions of the Allies. . . in particular with regard to France where
our Press is naturally highly valued and widely quoted' 	 he
received a letter from Emsley Carr editor of The News of the World
stating that 'I feel I am expressing the views of all journalists when
I say that we shall always welcome letters such as that which you
have written to me, keeping as it does, principles before us to which
we might inadvertently not give sufficient prominence' 46 - written
presumably in a prostrate position.
The Quarterly Review responded tQ the Foreign Office advice with a long
article condemning newspapers which had published stories embarrassing
to the Allies or potentially friendly neutrals (like the stories of
a British offer of Cyprus in return for Greek participation in the
war on the Allied side) - a point reinforced with words which must
have brought satisfaction to the authors of the official memorandum...
'it is not what Gennany thinks that matters but what effect certain news
will have on our Allies and on neutrals. Our diplomacy has a most
thankless task which is scarcely appreciated by the nation'. (January 1916).
44.	 P.R.O. lID 139/39.
45. ibid.
46. Carrto Press Bureau, 18th November 1915, ibid.
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Official 'advice' was occasionally given to individual editors. When
The Passing Show requested to be placed on Robbins's I) Notice distribution
list the editor Comyns Beaumont was told that as his journal was read
in France 'the duty of maintaining a favourable atmosphere among
neutral countries and friendly relations with the Allied Powers is too
obvious to need emphasis'. 47Towhich Beaumont reassuringly replied that
'...our commonts and more especially our cartoons should be guided by
a correct attitude towards the Allies'. 48 A week or so later The
Passing Show published a full page cartoon of a German U Boat with its
conning tower drawn as a skeleton entitled 'Kultur'. A picture of
'Uncle Sam' was hovering in the background above the caption : 'That's
their idea of a new statue of liberty is it? I reckon it won't do on
this side of the herring pond, anyway' (20th May 1916). On the 15th
of July, a cartoon appeared or. the front page depicting the Kaiser
as a weather vane blown in all directions by the four principal allies
and on the 2nd of September, again on the front page King Ferdinand
of Bulgaria was pictured being simultaneously kicked on the nose and
butted on his posterior by a Roumanian goat - all subtle stuff
presumably inspired by a 'correct attitude' towards the Allies and
neutrals.
When the editors objected to such 'advice' they tended to do so by
letter to the Bureau rather than through the columns of their newspapers.
When the Bureau requested the press to ignore a speech made by the
jingo novelist William le Quec in August 1915 which had alleged the
presence of 'Germans' in official places (a reference to the distinguished
Foreign Office official, Sir Eyre Crowe), Palmer, the editor of The
Globe wrote to the Bureau stating that 'I find it very difficult to
do so. . .The Globe is strongly of the opinion that officials in the
Government with direct German relationships ought not to be employed
at this time. Hire is the case (Crowe) of a German mother and German
wife and yet I am asked...to suppress these most material facts'.49
47. Press Bureau to Beaumont, 3rd May 1916, P.R.O. HO 139/19/A724/Part4/50.
48. Beaumont to Press Bureau, 5th May 1916, ibid.
49. Palmer to Press Bureau, 12th August 1915, P.R.O. HO 139/5/A97/14.
- 116 -
And suppress he did along with other Fleet Street papers. Although
Riddell (chief proprietor of The News of the World ) objected strongly
to Press Bureau 'advice' not to publish photogrp.phs of Glasgow
strike leaders, he again did so by letter and . no criticism appeared in
his newspaper . (He told the Bureau that photographs of 'Socialists
should help to put people off them' to which Cook replied that 'I
defer to your judgement on the question of whether the publication
of one's protrait in The News of the World is an advertisement or
a deterrent').5°
Protection of influential individuals was not confined to the British
Foreign Office. A Notice was sent to all editors at the time of
Rasputin's death in January 1917 by Swetterthain of the Press Bureau,
stating that 'The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs feels sure that
Editors will appreciate the importance of avoiding, in any coninents
they may publish on the past career of Rasputin, any reference to the
highest personage in Russia', 5 ' a consideration carefully observed
in all the obituaries.
The ferocious hostility exhibited by many newspapers during the war
towards pacifists and those calling for peace negotiations is perhaps
not surprising when official notices like D 256 of 10th of July 1915
reminded the press that '...suggestions of separate peace terms
are often made in enemy quarters; the repetition or discussion of
such suggestions in the British press is generally undesirable'.52
The 'Rule Book' of instructions to editors reminded them of Asquith's
words in the House of Coninons on the 1st of March 1915 that 'Those who
talk of peace, however excellent their intentions, are, in my- judgement,
victims, I will not say of wanton, but of grievous self-deception.
It is like the twittering of sparrows amid the stress and tumult of
a tempest which is shaking the foundations of the world . The time
to talk peace is when the great tasks, for which we and our Allies
embarked on this long and stormy voyage, are within sight of accomplishment
50. Riddell to Cook, 5th April 1916, Cook to Riddell, 6th April 1916,
P.R.O. ID 139/10/31.
51. 3rd January 1917, P.R.O. HO 139/39.
52. P.R.O. Fl) 139/43.
53. P.R.O. I-U 139/19/A724/Part4/50.
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Later that month, E.R. Robbins was writing to the Bureau about the
proposed resolutions to be debated at the forthcoming I .L.P. Conference
at Norwich : 'considerable harm might be done', he wrote to Buckmaster,
'by the dissemination of such views during the progress of the War'.
Should he distribute such pacifist opinions through the P.A. in the
light of Press Bureau instructions? The P.A.should 'use its own
discretion as to what is desirable in the national interest' he was
told and so confident was the Bureau that Robbins would do so, that
he was also instructed that there was 'no need to submit (the items)
for censorship' .
When leading pacifists like C.H. Norman attempted to put across their
case in articles for the national press they were frustrated by a
Notice like D 245 which stated that 'The Directors of the Press Bureau
feel sure that it is only necessary to put the Press on their guard
to make it impossible for Mr.Norman to succeed in his design......
publication of such views in this country could only embarrass the
Government, cause anxiety to our Allies, give satisfaction to our
enemies and danger to the national cause'. 55 Norman's article
arguing that Britain was as guilty as Germany in not seeking a
negotiated peace and that the War should be Stopped was duly ignored
apart from an oblique reference in a Daily Express leader warning
its readers against 'Plotters.. .an irresponsible but highly organised
faction' . (Wth July 1915).
As we have noted in the previous chapter, the Ministry of Munitions
issued Notices advising editors on how to write up if at all,
industrial accidents, disputes or strikes at munitions factories.
Similarly the Board of Trade advised editors to observe the greatest
54. Robbins to Press Bureau, 30th rch 1915, Press Bureau to Robbins,
31st ?v rch 1915, P.R.O. HO 139/23/A911/Part 1/1.
55. D 245, 9th July 1915, P.R.O. I-K) 139/23/A911/Part 1/1. It had been
a journalist, Francis Stopworth, editor of The World who had first
brought the authorities's attention to Norman's article in a
letter to the D.P.P. 'Ought not Justice. .restrain him?', Stopworth
to D.P.P. 5th July 1915, (copy), ibid.
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care in reporting strikes or lock-outs. D 273 of the 16th
of September 1915 advised the press 'especially in South
Wales, both in the public interest and for their own protection
(to) refrain from seeking interviews with or giving publicity
to the views of leaders in strikes or lock-out movements'.56
Here, as in the case of pacifist views, the D Notice is serving
to reinforce and give official sanction to an attitude already
taken up by most newspapers and their readers. 57
 A reading of
papers like the South Wales Echo and the Western Mail at any
period of the war reveal a latent hostility towards the miners
and their organizations which needed only a notice like D 273
to blossom into a fulsome vilification of all strikes as anti-
patriotic and 'deserving of the most severe penalties' (Western
Mail, 25th September 19:15).
But it was not until late 1917 that the strength of this anti-
socialist bias of the press appears to have dawned on the officials
of the Ministry of init ions and that such bias could be used 'in
the national interest'. Sir Edward Cook wrote a memorandum to
the censors on the 15th of January 1918 informing them that a Mr.
Caird of the Ministry of tmitions had visited the Bureau and
'expressed opinion that it was desirable not to discourage the
Press from publishing notices about strikes, the view of the
Ministry now being that publicity is more likely to do good than
1iarm' •58 However, as late in the war as October 1918 the Board
of Trade continued to request 'theJ'ress. .to make no reference
to strikes at colleries in the Anthracite District of South
59Wales'.
56. P.R.O. HO 139/43.
57. 'Might I suggest a decoration for the South Wales miners',
wrote one reader to the Morning Post, 'viz, an Iron Cross,
if the Kaiser has not already bestowed it?' (5th July 1915).
58. Cook memorandum P.R.O. HO 139/25/A985/Part 4/75.
59. 22nd October 1918, P.R.O. HO 139/27/A1036/Part 7/50.
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The Press Bureau was well aware of the role played by the D Notices
and the degree of cooperation forthcoming from the press in their
operation. As Swettenhain told Hankey, Secretary to the War Cabinet
on 20th January 1918 : 'our experience is that the Press are always
ready to act in the national interest when a request is made to them
with authority' 6O A vivid example of this was press reaction to
War Office requests made in 1916 about the campaign in Mesopotaimia.
The Times for example had been very critical of the conduct of the
campaign, centred as it had become around the se.ge by the Turks
of a British force under General Townshend at Kut-al-Amara. But
a series of D Notices issued in April 1916, when it became clear
to the War Office that Townshenthqould be forced to surrender,
effectively eliminated mention of the sege 'in the newspapers.
Its surrender on 1st May 1916 was reported in The Times in one
brief paragraph and the War Office 'suggestion' that 'any controv-ersi.al
matter or recrimination on the conduct of the campaign should be
postponed for some considerable time owing to the bad effect they
have on neutrals and on our allies' 61 was dutifully observed.
'We see no advantage in elaborate comment on the reverse at Kut'
declared The Spectator (6th May 1916). A straightforward request
from a major department of state was thus acted upon by editors
without a munnur. However reluctantly and with whatever ethical
misgivings, they went along with it 'in the national interest'.
There were occasions when the authorities overplayed their hand and
caused this manipulative practice to become the subject of public
debate but these were rare. 1' qhen Asquith's Coalition Government
introduced Regulation 27 (a) imposing press silence on the reporting
of secret sessions of Parliament, Daiziel, proprietor of Reynolds
News- and M. P. 	 for Brixton, objected in the House of Commons
to such a high handed approach at a time when 'the Press has been
60. P.R.O. I-I) 139/9/A368/Part 1.
61. War Office Memorandum to the Press, 27th April 1916.
P.R.O. I-fl 139/40.
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loyal and partiotic...and scarcely any request that the Government
has made has ever been refused. Such requests are made daily
as my Right Hon. Friend (Herbert Samuel, Liberal Home Secretary)
knows. Every week an urgent and important request is made on
behalf of the Government that papers should not coimnent on this
and that they should avoid discussion of that' 2 Referring to
the Irish rebellion in Th.iblin, currently occupying the Government's
attention, Dalziel went on : 'Although it has been denied in this
House, it is true that only last week the Press of London were asked
not to comment on the Irish situation and after that restriction
was withdrawn they were asked not to publish any facts without the
approval of my Right Hon. Friend (Samuel)'- 63 which goes far to
explain the muted and patriotic coverage of the Irish troubles by
Fleet Street papers.
A more sustained and damaging attack upon the D Notice system was
made, again by politicians rather than journalists, in 1917 when
the Press Bureau issued on 16th February 1917 a memorandum, clearly
emanating from the War Office, which argued that it was becoming
clear that Germany would make a big push for victory in 1917 and
that the Allies must be prepared for a long struggle. The role
suggested for the press was 'not to give the impression that
ultiiiate victory depends upon the result of operations during the
coming sumner' but in order to obtain 'a complete victory'
rather than 'an inconclusive peace' the press should assist in
preparing the nation 'for a prolongation of the war through next
winter' 64
This somewhat crude attempt at manipulating editorial comment was
too much for some editors to stomach. The notice was leaked,
prominent members of the Union for Democratic Control made speeches
62. House of Coimwms Debates, 5th Series, 8th May 1916, Col. 381.
63. ibid.
64. P.R.O. FJ 139/23/ASh/Part 3/31.
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attacking what they regarded as a serious encroachment upon the
freedom of the press and the matter of D Notices was again raised
in the House of Commons. Laurence Ginnell, the Irish Nationalist
member for North Meath wanted to know by whose authority the Notices
were issued65
 and Mr (.ithwaite, M.P. for Hanley unsuccessfully
demanded that all copies of D Notices be placed in the House of Commons
Library. 66
 But it was Dillon, Irish Nationalist leader who made the
sharpest attack complaining on 27th March 1971 that '...the practice
of issuing long statements of precautions and instructions.
directing the Press what view they are to cultivate in the minds of
the public...has now become a regular and consistent practice.
Long documents are sent out asserting that it is extremely desirable
that certain views should be discouraged and others encouraged and this
brings the Press down to the level of the reptile Press which used
to be controlled by Prince Bisinarck' •67
There were few editors prepared to classify themselves as 'reptiles'
in support of Dillon's criticisms and fewer still prepared to
acknowledge even the existence of such Notices. One of the few was
Massinghain, editor of The Nation but it was not until 1917 that he
openly expressed his disgust with a system which in his view sought
'to establish a super-editorship of the Press, so as to meuld its
will and intelligence into agreement with the official pattern'. (The
Nation, 14th April 1917). M:,st editors, while remaining consistently
critical of the Bureau and the censorship in public, cooperated with
the Bureau in private and observed most its instructions
and requests. While The Manchester Guardian frequently
abused the Bureau in its leader columns as being an
undemocratic and 'Prussian-like' institution, its editor.
C.P. Scott, wrote to the Bureau in 1916 urging a greater restriction
on the number of newspapers receiving the D Notices on the grounds
that some newspapers were 'irresponsible' in observing confidential
•	 •	 68	 •information. Another vociferous critic of the Bureau s alleged
65. House of Coimns Debates, 5th Series, 5th March 1917, Cols. 27-8.
66. House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, 23rd. April 1917, Col. 2034.
67. House of Coniins Debates, 5th Series, 27th rch 1917, Col.297.
68. C.P. Scott to Sir Edward Cook, 9th April 1916, P.R.O. I-K) 139/
18/A718/Part 1/23.
- 122 -
unfairness and dictatorial methods, H.A. Gwynne, editor of the
Morning Post wrote to Cook on the 10th of April 1916 that '...while
you should continue to send instructions to people in whom you
have full trust (i.e. H.A. Gwynne) you should send to the other
papers mere orders, telling them to do this or not to do that' •69
Censorship, like self sacrifice, is always good for someone else.
Constantly voicing its objections when the censorship affected
what it regarded as its members' critical or conunercial interests,
the N.P.A. nevertheless circularised its members with notices urging
strict observation of the Bureau's notices and frequently it drew
the Bureau's attention to newspapers that it considered were ignoring
instructions or behaving in what its secretary Sir George Riddell regarded
as an unpatriotic manner. 7° Like Scott and Gwynne, the N.P.A. members'
calls for more information and facts about the war in the name of
democracy were compromised by a resolution like that of 19th January
1916 calling on the Bureau 'in the interests of secrecy (to
observe) greater caution. . . in drafting and transmitting their
ins tnrct ions' 71
Far from criticizing the D Notices, those who received them clearly
wished to remain members of 'the club' and those journals which
had not at first been included on Robbins's lists ,far from attacking
the system as undemocratic or manipulative, were for ever pleading
with the Bureau to join. In requesting to be sent the Notices,
Fred. W. Dimbleby, proprietor of The Richmond and Twickenham Times
told the Bureau on 19th July 1915 that he had seen 'flagrant breaches
of the rules, (D.O.R.A. Regulations) committed, of course, through
ignorance of the official desires...the only safe way is to give all
newspapers a guiding hand. We are all anxious to give loyal
assistance...' 72 The editor of Town Topics in making his plea to
be added to the list, assured the Bureau on 13th of October 1916
that 'We have no desire to print anything which would be in the
slightest way embarrassing to the authorities'.73
69. Gwynne to Cook, 10th April 1916, P.R.O. HO 139/18/A7l8IPartlt23.
70. On the 15th of October 1915 Riddell sent the Bureau a list of
newspapers in the Glasgow area which he considered were in
breach of the D Notice instructions. P.R.O. Fl) 139/10/12.
71. ibid.
72. P.R.O. Il) 139/19/A724/Part 1/12.
73. P.R.O. HO 139/19/A724/Part 4/6.
- 123 -
Public vilification of the censorship and private cooperation and
observation of its instructions are an indication of how far the
ethical standards of the journalistic profession plunged during
the war. There were journalists prepared to go much further in
their degree of cooperation with the authorities. Ellis T. Powell,
editor of the Financial News wrote to Cook on 11th February 1916
pointing out that 'it has often occurred to me that some very useful
press work could be done by the occasional publication of misleading
information in the newspapers' . 	 Powell's idea was that false
information contained in such items as market reports would be
picked up by German spies or read in Germany and he urged the formation
of a 'small and secret' 75 government committee to supervise the
insertions. Swettenham replied that 'this office (Press Bureau) has
always held that we have hitherto neglected (such) a valuable weapon
against the enemy' . and on 21st March 1916 he asked Powell to place
an article in the Financial News emphasising the weakness of the
German financial situation and drawing special attention to the
steady decline in the value of the mark 'in the hope of influencing
them (neutral countries) not to subscribe to the German loan should
they have any intention'
Powell duly published such an article and as Cook told the Foreign
Office on 28th March 1916 '(Powell) now inserts nearly every day some
article attacking German credit'. 78 This cooperative state of affairs
continued until October 1916 when Powell, perhaps bored with the
tedium of writing articles on German finance, published a piece for
neutral consumption alleging that an integral part of any peace
settlement imposed by a victorious Germany would include the 'resettle-
ment of one million of the best and healthiest (feinales)...on human
stud farms in Germany there to breed new populations with German officers
and public officials as promiscuous fathers' (Financial Nei,s, 7th
October 1916).
74.	 P.R.O. ID 139/29/A1067/6.
75. ibid.
76. Swettenham to Powell, 18th February 1916, ibid.
77. ibid.
78. Cook to H.H. ?vbntgomery, Foreign Office, 28th March 1916, ibid.
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Swettenham was told by Powell that he had no written source for such
allegations which was as Swettenham told him on 20th October 1916
'very unfortunate'79 as German propaganda was using the piece as a
typical example of scurrilous and false British news reporting.
Powell's excesses appeared to have discouraged the Bureau from
making wider use of what the Directors, in their menrandum to the
War Cabinet in 1917 considered to be the eagerness of 'many influential
editors...to give assistance, by hint and speculations (which) might
have been of great value in misleading the enemy' •80 it was nt until
the Second World War under the more subtle guidance of philosophers
like Richard Crossman that such crude methods were refined to make
Britain the master practitioner in the vile art of black propaganda.
Writing about American press censorship during the Second World War,
Robert E. Summers describes how 'the success of the present (1942)
censorship program depends largely upon the cooperation exhibited
by newspapers and radio stations. If they refuse to cooperate with
...the office of the Censor even the most stringent regulations would
be little more than useless'. 8
 This was essentially the case with
British press censorship during the First World War. The cornerstone
of the British system was the private and confidential D Notices
which most editors took seriously and which appear to have been an
efficient method of home propaganda and press control, guiding and
shaping both the content and presentation of the war news. The full
and iinediate impact of defeats and setbacks like the loss of the
'Audacious', the merchant shipping losses or the fall of Kut-al-Ainara
were to some extent neutralized by bland or soothing reports inspired
by official 'requests' which it can be argued 'lulled the country into
a passive confidence in the military authorities'.82
79. Swettenham to Powell, P.R.O. FU139/29/A1067/6.
80. 'The Official Press Bureau', op. cit., p.8. Sir Edward Cook in his
book on the war-time press censorship makes it clear that not all
journalists were prepared to bend their ethical standards to suit
the times. Cook recalls how he suggested to an 'important military
writer (probably Repington) that he should put in false information
.as his articles were read by (German) Intelligence Divisions
but he said "to coninit myself to predictions which turned out to,
be wrong would be to do inj-ury to my paper and to my reputation'!'
Cook, op. cit., p.102.
81. Summers, op. cit.,(1942) p.151.





But as we have observed not all editors and journalists were as
'cooperative' as Fred. W. Dimbleby and Ellis T. Powell and the
instructions and requests issued through the Bureau were by no
means universally obeyed, especially in the provinces. The Press
Bureau, particularly during Buckmaster's period as Director, sought
to bring recalcitrants to heel by making the flouting of a Press
Bureau Notice a breach of the D.O.R.A. Regulations - in other words
the Bureau sought more power as a censorship authority. The story
of how it went about this, bringing it as it did into headlong
collision with the Service departments and sections of the press and
Parliament and which inevitably left the Bureau with the reputation
as a repressive institution will be the subject of Chapter V.
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HAVFER V
A Free Press in Chains?
.the British Press was completely muzzled by a rigorous government
censorship...' Richard S. Lainbert, Propaganda (London, Nelson & Co.,
1938) P. 26.
One of the most persistent myths about the First World War press
censorship in Britain has been that it was '....severe, impossibly
sever& 1
 and that it was so 'rigorous (that it) forbade all military
new. 2
 Repington, military correspondent of The Times for most of
the war, began it all with repeated allegations in his memoirs
published in 1920 that 'a Censorship is the master of the Press which
is practically powerless' 3
 - a totally false impression of the
relationship between the press and the censorship authorities.
Although the law affecting the press appeared severe it was in the
main leniently administered, so much so that the Press Bureau, frustrated
by the departments' reluctance to act against newspapers which failed
to observe the D Notices, sought to make the instructions legally
binding. But the Bureau's attempts (there were several) to gain more
power and independence were soundly rebuffed by the War Office anxious
both to retain the goodwill and cooperation of the press in the voluntary
censorship scheme and wary of taking on a powerful Parliamentary lobby
ever ready to rally to the cause of press freedom. Far from 'mastering'
the press, the censorship in no way interfered with the right of
newspapers to express their opinions and criticisms of the conduct of
the war nor did it prevent journalists, Repington in particular, from
publishing their scoops. Towards the end of the war the disparity of
treatment between the large circulation newspapers and the socialist
and pacifist press became sharply pronounced but the minority press was
never crushed into silence while some of the socialist newspapers
enjoyed unofficial ministerial protection.
1. Michael Wynn Jones, A Newspaper History of the World (London, David &
Charles, 1974) p.78.
2. A.J.P. Taylor, The First World War, An Illustrated History, (London,
Penguin Books, 1966) p.56.
3. Lt. Colonel charles Court Repington, The First World War, Vol•11
(London, Constable & Co. Ltd,1920) p.68.
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As we have seen in chapter II (p.39 ) the bedrock of law upon
which the censorship operated was the Defence of the Realm Acts
(D.O.R.A.) of August and November, 1914 together with their attendant
regulations. Under these the competent military authorities (C.M.A's)
could on their own authority bring a newspaper or journalist before a
court martial if it was considered that a breach of the regulations
had occurred or was about to occur. In practise it seems that
C.M.A! s were instructed to consult the Service departments before
proceeding and. from the earliest months of the war the Service
cepartments took a generally lenient interpretation of the D.O.R.A.
Regulations. 4 As MKenna, when Home Secretary, said in November
1914, although the Regulations had been in existence for three months
'there has not been a single court martial under it...the power is
there but it has never been exercised'.5
As far as the Regulations and the Press Bureau were concerned, press
censorship remained an essentially voluntary undertaking. The
Bureau had no legal status and its instructions were not binding on
the press. As Buckmaster wrote to H.A. Gwynne,editor of the Morning Post
'..... I do not think there is any power for me to compel newspapers
to submit their matter here but if a newspaper did not . . .and a breach
of the regulations occurred there would be no defence whatever to
proceedings that might be instituted against it' He went on to
outline a defence often used by the Bureau throughout the war, that
far from being a repressive ogre intent on mastering the press
'this office exists for the purpose of affording theni protection
against the results of disobedience...to the Regulations'.7
4. Harry Lawson, later Lord Burnharn, Managing Proprietor of the
Daily Telegraph and a member of the Joint Coninittee referred
in a Commons debate to 'an undertaking. . . given by the War
Office that no prosecutions.. .before a Court-Martial should
be undertaken except with the assent of those in high authority
who were able to judge the gravity of the offence' .Hc,use of
Comnons Debates, 5th Series, 24th February 1915, Col. 300.
5. House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, 23rd November 1914, Col. 915.
6. Buckinaster to Gwynne, 27th October 1914, P.R.O. FX) 139/14/A531/Part 1.
7. ibid.
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The Press Bureau was not a Government Department and its legal and
administrative position was situated like Mhamed's tomb, in a
place by itself. It was, in the words of an internal memorandum
prepared for Buckmaster in November 1914 'a delegate or agent
for the other Government departments (Admiralty and War Office)'.8
The Bureau had not been established by Act of Parliament and it had
no one in Parliament or Government solely responsible for defending
its interests. Because of this confused status, its spokesmen either
claimed far more authority and power for it than it possessed either
by law or in practice or they denied that it had any at all.
Depending on the political needs of the moment Smith, Buckrnaster,
and Home Secretaries - McKenna, Simon, Samuel and Cave - all made
statements which either suggested that the censorship was a powerful
force which would be used ruthlessly against the enemies of the state
or that the Bureau was a mere cypher of the Service and other
Government Departments. At one moment Buc1naster referring to Press
attacks on Lord Hald.ane was suggesting that the Bureau would suppress
all forms of political criticism, 9 at another that 'It is they (the
Service departments) and not I who decide...' 	 As Mr Lynch the
Nationalist M.P. for West Clare pointed out, when Buckmaster was
describing how important the Press Bureau's work was 'in an office
not known or sanctioned or approved by Parliament 'he seemed to have
exercised great powers of distinction' but in defence of the Bureau's
actual record 'he seems to recede into an almost mythical character'
It was the same behind the scenes. IVhile claiming to editors that
the Bureau existed for their protection, Buckmaster and his succcssors
sought every opportunity to prosecute newspapers guilty of breathes
of the Regulations in an attempt to increase the Bureau's power and
authority over the press.
8. nxranduin on the constitutional aspects of the Press Bureau, by
R.P.H. Hills, 9th November 1914. P.R.O. I-K) 139/17/A682/Part 1.
9. House of Lords Debates, 5th Series, 3rd November 1915, Col 157.
10. House of Coniixrns Debates, 5th Series, 8th February, 1915, Col 351.
11. ibid., Col. 378.
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A major test of any authority is how much power it has to impose its
wishes upon those subject to it. In the case of the Press Bureau,
it could not independently institute proceedings against newspapers.
It could only recommend such action to the Service departments and
Home Office and it was this divided authority which was administratively
the major stumbling block to any easy imposition of a repressive
censorship policy. For example Buckmaster considered that an item
in the South Wales Daily News about troop movements on the 12th of
Feburary 1915 was in clear breach of Regulation 18 and Press Bureau
instructions about the mentioning of the names of regiments and he
urged the War Office to prosecute. When A.P. Higham, editor of the
Caithria Daily Leader who had first brought the matter to the attention
of the Bureau in that spirit of comradeship so common amongst rival
newspapers, lQrote to Buckmaster on 11th March asking what progress
the case was making and 'whether your conununications are intended to be'
taken seriously or whether we are all at liberty to regard them as a
mere amusement on the part of the officers of your department'
Buckmaster was forced to seek a decision from the War Office. Brade
replied on 15th March that the War Office considered the South Wales Daily
News 'too insignificant'to launch aprosecutisin against and Buckmaster
was obliged to agree that it was now 'too late to take isolated action
against the South Wales Daily News' 13 He was left to use the only
weapon in his armoury, the threatening letter, telling the editor of
the South Wale Daily News that 'I trust you will abide in future by
the instructions.., if not the military authorities will act'.14
Early that same month, Buckmaster sent six cases to Sir Graham Greene,
Permanent Secretary of the Admiralty, involving breaches of the
Pegulations concerning cross channel ferries and urging upon Greene
the need of speed if prosecutions were to be launched. Greene replied
on 22nd March. that the Admiralty saw no reason to prosecute in five
of the cases and in the sixth, although the Director of Public
Prosecutions believed there was a case, the proprietor of the paper,
12. P.R.O. F!) 139/14/A568/3. The case had been sent to the War Office
on 13th February.
13. ibid. Buckmaster to Brade, 16th March 1915.
14. ibid.
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Lord Mntagu of Beaieu had been of assistance to the Director of
the Air Department at the Admiralty and therefore 'it was finally
agreed the D.P.P. should write a letterto hiiiI..' 	 Buckmaster
told Brade over a similar delay involving a possible prosecution
of The Times :'Delay beyond a few days will, in my opinion, prejudice
and probably ruin aList any case'.16
To a lawyer of Buckmaster's calibre this situation was both frustrating
and demeaning and in early 1915 he made strenuous efforts to get it
changed. Buckmaster sought power for the Bureau to institute proceedings
against newspapers on its own authority particularly in those cases
where as we have seen, delays and Service department reluctance let
the newspapers off the hook. As he wrote to &Kenna, the Home Secretary,
seeking his support, 'It is, I assure you, no personal feeling but it
is our united and confirmed conviction that we cannot protect our troops
as we wish to protect them unless we have the power to punish as well
as to threaten the press'.17
It was Brade of the War Office, far more in tune with press attitudes
than most of his Whitehall colleagues including those at the Press
Bureau, who firmly squashed this idea. Writing to Sir Edward Troup,
Permanent Secretary at the Home Office,Brade stated bluntly that
Buckmaster's plan 'seems to me quite unworkable. I have discussed it
with one or two press friends 18 and they would not tolerate for a
moment being placed in a position of a man who knows that, though
the military have aquitted him, he may be subject to a prosecution
started by someone else...Buckmaster has it at the back of his head
that the reasons why we have not prosecuted have been either that we
15. Greene to Buckmaster, 22nd March 1915, P.R.O. I-D139/22/A872/1S
16. Buckmaster to Brade, 16th March 1915 P.R.O. I-)) 139/5/Al27.
17. Buckmaster to MKenna, 28th February 1915. P.R.O. ) 139/21/A798/
Part 1/16.
18. Brade was in regular personal contact with Riddell of the N.P.A. and
with editors like R.D. Blumenfeld of the Daily Express , and his
future proprietor, Max Beaverbrook. When Blumenfeld wrote to him
complaining of an officious letter he had received from the Bureau,
Braile made his low opinion of the Bureau plain enough; 'I am afraid
the Press Bureau misunderstand their functions. This is of course
between ourselves'. Brade to Blumenfeld 6th December 1914 .Bluinenfeld
Papers, PB .16, House of Lords Record Office. Beaverbrook said of Brade:
'He was my friend ..a good companion and. much sought after in political
circles' . Lord Beaverbrook Men and Power (London,Collins & Co.,
1956) p.44.
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are afraid of the offender or that we are not sufficiently blood
thirsty. I am quite certain that if the thing were handed over
to him, there would speedily be a mutiny and the Press Bureau
would be closed'. 19
 Brade made clear that 'the Admiralty are
strongly opposed to the change' 2° and with such formidable opposition
it is therefore not surprising to discover the somewhat forlorn
note at the end of this file : 'This draft made no progress'
Buckmaster's claim to the title of protector of the press against
the ravages of martial law ring a little hollow after this story.
But this was not to be the end of the Press Bureau's attempts to get
more power or Brade's successful efforts at frustrating theni. In
the Autumn of 1915, the Bureau obtained the Home Secretary, Sir John
Simon's support for a draft change in the egulations whidh would,
in effect, have given the Bureau departmental status. Newspapers
regularly complained to the Bureau about other newspapers who
were not observing the D Notices and under the draft proposals,
disobedience of the instructions would become an offence in itself.
'What we want', wrote Swettenhamn to Sinon, 'is instant prosecution.
One successful case would have a very good effect' •22 Brade opposed
this proposal again arguing that the Bureau appeared to be obsessed
with its own status and the need to obtain convictions whereas as
he wrote to Swettenham on 23rd of October '...the real obstacle
is irremovable. It arises from a genuine mistake or at the most
carelessness and somewhere or other in the chain of authorities
through which the charge has to pass before conviction is secured
you are bound to find someone who will admit that consideration and
refuse to play up to a penal result' •23 News of the Bureau' s plans
was leaked to Riddellof the N.P.A 4and with the prospect of a press
19. Brade to Troup, 11th March 1915. P.R.O. 1J 45/11007/271672/33.
20. ibid.
21. ibid.
22. Swettenham to Simon, 12th November 1915, P.R.O. ID 139/17/A682/Partl/6.
23. Brade to Swettenham, P.R.O. ND 32/4893.
24. Swettenham appears to have believed that Brade was responsible for
this (Letter to Brade, 28th October 1915, ibid) although Brade denied
it on the margin of Swettenhamn's letter.
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and Parliamentary row, they were abandoned. In the words of
Major General Callwell, D.M.O. : 'Parliament will not like to
give such powers unless the need can be imade out very clearly'.25
Brade had been particularly shocked to discover from Buckmaster,
now Lord Chancellor that 'it had been the intention to issue the
new Regulation making it an offence to disobey Press Bureau
instructions and giving the Press Bureau power to prosecute without
any reference to the Press - in fact to impose it upon theni'26
which, as Brade told General M.irray at the time Chief of the Imperial
General Staff, was not the way to handle the press : 'the policy
we have pursued with the Press is one of persuasion and looking to
the general results I believe that that policy has paid...whenever
we have omitted to take the newspaper interests with us beforehand
any protests they have subsequently made have been effective' •27 The
War Office under Brade's influence tended to show far more appreciation
of press attitudes and problems than did the Admiralty or indeed the
Press Bureau and on the rare occasions when it acted against a newspaper
it far preferred the imposition of an export ban on circulation than
dragging a paper through the courts.
But the Press Bureau continued throughout the war to seek ways of
punishing the few newspapers who blatantly ignored an instruction. When
The Star on 28th of May 1917 revealed that Balfour, Foreign Secretary,
was in Canada, despite a I) Notice (D564) of 25th May 1917 requesting
the press to maintain silence on his movements, the Press Bureau
threatened to withdraw its news service from it. What upset the Bureau
in particular was that not only had The Star ignored its instructions
but it had openly boasted that it had done so in the interests of
free speech. ('What the penalty will be we shudder to contemplate,'
The Star, 28th May 1917). The N.P.A. concerned at what it recognised
25. Caliwell to Mn-ray, C.I.G.S., U/I), P.R.O. WO 32/4893.
26. Brade minute to Mirray, C. I. G. S., 22nd October 1915, ibid.
27. Brade to Mn-ray, 1st October 1915, ibid.
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as a major threat to any newspaper's competitiveness if deprived
of the official news bulletins, immediately lodged an effective
protest in defence, as Riddell wrote to Sir Edward Cook, of the
'right of the Press to comment upon and criticize prohibitions
which may from time to time be used by the authorities. It is, of
coirse impossible to exercise that right without referring
inferentially to the D Notice which it is desired to impugn'28
(not that many newspapers appear to have had any such desire).
The threat to The Star was withdrawn. Fa€ed with the powerful
opposition of the N.P.A. which in many areas of press activity
cooperated fully with the Bureau and with the prospect of a press
campaign on the issue looming on the horizon the Bureau had been
forced to abandon this attempt at imposing by administrative order
the authority for its instructions which they lacked in law.
There were other administrative problems which in effect limited
the scope for repressive measures against the press which have been
touched on above. When the Bureau and other Government departments
sent cases to the Service departments with the recomendation to
prosecute, these were regularly sent on to the Law Officers of
the Crown for consideration. After usually lengthy deliberation,
the officers tended to advise that while a prosecution might succeed
in court, the attendant publicity thus incurred defeated the principal
purpose.SirAErnley Blackwell, a senior official at the Home Office
neatly summarised this view when explaining to the Foreign Office
the reasons why no act.on had been taken against The Bradford Pioneer
for an article on 17th November 1916 considered by the Foreign Office
to be both pacifist and pro-German :29 '..prosecutions... would have
to be numerous if a policy of repression was once decided upon (and)
28. Riddell to Cook, 31st May 1917, P.R.O. I-D139/6/A190/29.
29. The Foreign Office had kept a file of what the Assistant Under
Secretary of State, Lord Newton described as 'highly objectionable
and pernicious' material published in the Labour Loader which he
sent on to Home Office with Sir Edward Grey's coninents that 'he
(Grey) considers these articles to be unpatriotic and harmful to
this country' although he is 'doubtful whether they afford
sufficiently definit ground for suppression or prosecution
of the paper'. Newton to the Home Office, 28th November 1916.
P.R.O. II) 45/10786/297549/50. Grey had sought the Home Secretary,
Herbert Samuels's opinion as to the viability of prosecution.
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would do mere harm than good. They would have the effect of
advertising the speeches and publications which are now, for the
mest part left in obscurity : they would probably not succeed
in preventing the repetition of the offences and they would be
likely to give rise to an agitation damaging to our cause in
Iinierica and elsewhere based upon the charge that His Majesty's
Government was using the power of the executive to prevent freedom
of speech and to conceal important facts from the nation'.30
The Law Officers were also in touch with the opinion of magistrates
likely to hear such cases who inclined to take the view that news-
papers were in the main patriotic and that prosecutions against
them represented bureaucratic pettiness. The Daily Mirror on
8th January 1917 published a particularly grotesque photograph
of blind students at St. Dunstans being taught with the aid of
a skeleton with a caption underneath : 'Twelve menths ago this
skeleton was a living German'. The story proved to be false but
was picked up and used by the German press and German propaganda.
Despite a printed apology in the Daily Mirror the Press Bureau
sought a prosecution. The Director of Public Prosections sent the
papers to the Attorney General who after consultation with the Clerk
to the magistrates at the Guildhall, believed that no prosecution
would be possible. 31 There was also in many cases the problem of
bringing officers back from France and other theatres of war to
testify that a particular item had been of use tà the enemy as
Buckmaster pointed out to the House of Commens in February igis32
(and which was a factor in the decision not to seize the printing
plant of the vbrning Post in February 1918 as we shall discuss
later in this chapter).
Administratively then there were great difficulties in any attempt to
adopt a repressive press policy. There were even greater difficulties
30. Sir Ernley Blackwell to Foreign Office, 7th December 1917
P.R.O. HO. 45/10786/297549/50.
31. P.R.O. 1-10. 139/13/A503/25.
32. House of Coninrns Debates, 5th Series. 8th February 1915,Col. 355.
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in meeting the howl of Parliamentary and press opposition when-
ever such action took place - an oppositi on often disparate and
inconsistent. Ithen the Liberal Government, in November 1914
included a clause in the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act
which sought 'to prevent the spread of reports likely to cause
disaffection or alarm...' 33 it was the Unionist M.P. Lord Hugh
Cecil who led the opposition to what Cecil described as these
'extremely wide powers (which) 'practically enable the Government
to suppress any reports of any kind of which they disapprove'.34
IVhat of the word 'alarm'? asked Cecil. 'Someone might report a
reverse or misfortune and from the mere fact that it was likely to
cause alarm would be liable to be brought before a court martial...
such regulations might be used to keep the people in the dark im-
necessarily as to the events of the war (and) nothing would be
mere disastrous to the morale of the people of this country' .
The Government accepted an amendment proposed by Cecil which made
it an offence to spread 'false reports' and thus greatly narrowed
the scope 0± offences, much to the benefit of the press. Under
this November Consolidation Act all offences were to be tried by
Court Martial36 and the death penalty was to be extended to all
offenders, not just enemy subjects. This major extension of
executive power met with substantial opposition in the House of
Lords particularly from eminent Law Lords such as the Earl of Halsbury
who saw the measure as 'the sweeping away of generations of personal
liberty'. 37 As a result of persistent pressure from the House of
Lords, the Government introduced an amendment to the November Bill
in February, 1915 which gave a choice to anyone charged under the D.O.R.A.
Regulations of a trial by Court Martial or trial by jury.38
Several newspapers were suppressed during the war for alleged breaches
of the regulations but the row which quickly ensued in Parliament
and in the country ensured that their disappearance from the news-
stands was of very short duration. The Globe, a small
33. Public General Statutes, 4 & 5 Geo 5 Cc).
34. House of Conirns Debates, 23rd November 1914, Col. 910.
35. ibid.
36. Public General Statutes, 4 & 5 Geo 5.
37. House of Lords Debates, 5th Series, 27th November 1914, Col. 207.
38. Public General Statutes, 5 Geo 5.
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and virulently jingo,anti-Liberal newspaper upset Asquith and Lloyd
George's plans for removing Kitchener by spreading the runour that
Kitchener had resigned and that Haldane was about to take his place
at the War Office, a story it continued to run despite Press Bureau
protests and public denials39 . It was at a time when right wing jingo
attacks in papers like The Globe, John Bull and the Northcliffe's
Daily Mail and Evening News had reached their zenith and Asquith,
having already made I forthright attack on this section of the press
in a speech at the Mansion House and now frustrated in his plans to
keep Kitchener in the East, ordered action. A hastily gathered
conference at the Home Office on 6th November 1915 of the senior Law
Officers under Simon's chairmanship, faced with the failure of the
courts either to convict in press cases or to impose heavy sentences
in the case of conviction, decided on a new tactic against The Globe -
suppression of the newspaper by use of Regulation 51 which authorised
the raiding of The Globe's premises in the Strand and the seizure of
its plant and machinery.40
The Unionist press greeted the event with indifference but Liberal
journals expressed the utmost satisfaction, viewing it as the finest
thing that could have happened to The Globe and expressing disappointment
that the government had not acted sooner. 'The Government', wrote the
Daily News on 8th November 1915, 'has been extraordinarily tolerant of
the outrageous attacks with which it has been assailed by a little
knot of London papers. The effect of the tolerance has been to convince
the offenders that they were immune from any kind of punishment. . . the
39. D 304 of 4th November 1915 had 'urgently requested' the press,
'to refrain from any Feference to the movements of Lord Kitchener
until further notice, P.R.O. HO 45/303412/2. Despite a Press
Bureau statement on the 5th of November that 'there is no truth
in the statement that Lord ICitchenerhas resigned' (ibid), The Globe
persisted with the story on the 6th of November with the headlines
'The truth about Lord Kitchener/...His Resignation Tendered' with
placards directed at the core of their concern : 'Lord/Haldane?/
God Forbid'.
40. P.R.O. HO 45/303412/3.
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illusion had been dispelled...one may hope that ...it is an indication
that the Government intend to tolerate no longer the form of journalism
which under pretext of a clameur for strong government goes far to
make any government impossible...'.
But there were few plaudits for the action in the House of Comons where
the Government was accused of having acted unfairly against The Globe
when other newspapers, particularly those owned by Lord Northcliffe, had
run much the same story but had not been touched. 41 'The Government',
said Mr. Hogge,Liberal M.P. for Edinburgh East, 'is afraid to apply its
powers impartially'. 42 Other M.P.'s like Mr. Pringle,Liberal (North
West Lanarkshire) went to the heart of the matter and. accused the
Government of having suppressed The Globe not because of its statement
that Kitchener was about to retire but because 'it was advocating his
pennanent retention.'43 The Government were forced to concede an
emergency debate on the issue on the 11th of November 1915 in which
Asquith's defence that to have allowed The Globe to go on repeating
the story would have done 'the greatest injury to this country in the
eyes of the world' 44 and Sijion' s lame defence that the Evening News
which had carried the same story had not been suppressed because it
had reported the story 'in a future form' 45 f'ound little support in
the Commons and within a week, after a suitably abject public apology
from the proprietors, The Globe was back on Fleet Street albeit with
a new editor, but as rabidly jingo and bitter in its attacks upon
'the policitians' as before.
41. Northcliffe' a Evening News told its readers on the 6th of November
that 'we are in a position to state that despite all official denials,
the public may take it for granted that Lord Kitchener will not
return to the War Office'.
42. House of Coimnons Debates, 5th Series, 8th November 1915,Col.1398
43. ibid., Col. 1406.
44. House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, 11th November 1915, Col. 1403.
45. ibid., Col. 1421.
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Industrial trouble on Clydeside quickly
brought Lloyd George (described by Forward on 1st January 1916 as
'the best paid M.initions worker in Britain') to Glasgow over the
christmas of 1915 to address a series of meetings in an attempt to
pacify the situation and in particular to persuade the unions to
suspend pre-war union regulations and accept the principle of dilution
of labour. The Vanguard caine out firmly against such a proposal
'We warn the workers that Lloyd George is coming to the Clyde to
hoodwink them into accepting the introduction of unskilled men and
women; that this means weakening the unions and their ultimate
paralysis' (1St January 1916). This together with Forward's account
of the failure, on christmas Day 1915 of the Welsh wizard's charm
and rhetoric to win over a hostile audience of Glasgow engineers was
too much for Lloyd George's ego to bear. Swift action was taken
and machinery was seized from the Civic Press which printed both
papers on the grounds that both were spreading false stories likely
to cause disaffection in breach of Regulation 27.
Again it was persistent Parliamentary and political pressure upon the
Government rather than agitation in the press, which forced a debate in
the Conurions on the action and the eventual reappearance of the newspapers.
Lloyd George defended the suppressions with that blend of fact, fiction
and demagogy that characterised so many of his Parliamentary performances.
Forward,so he argued, had for months past transgressed the Regulations
by sneering at the monarchy and by describing the war as a capitalist
war thus discouraging recruiting. Thumping the patriotic dnim for all
it was worth ,Lloyd George advised his critics 'instead of championing
those who by their action are doing their best to champion the King's
enemies, they should help to sweep away hindrances to the victory of
our national lanI' •46 Conveniently ignoring the charge that once again
small newspapers were acted against whereas large circulation papers
like Northcliffe's Weekly Dispatch could go on publishing bitter attacks
upon the competency of Lord Kitchener, Lloyd George could not resist a
46. House of Coninons Debates, 5th Series, 10th January 1916, Col. 1415.
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a neat thrust at the inconsistency of newspapers like Forward
which objected most strongly to the executive action brought
against them but who had declared at the time of The Globe's
suppression : 'We weep no tears for the fall of The Globe. We
47laugh at the fiery slosh penned about freedom of the Press...'
Continuous Parliamentary pressure, particularly from Labour members
led by George Barnes, led to the return of the printing machinery at
the beginning of February 1916, the editor of Forward having, after
an interview with Lloyd George, signed an undertaking not to prejudice
military interests or the safety of the country which the editor
found 'an easy condition. . . as we had never so offended before'
(Forward, 5th February 1916). IVhile it was not indifferent to the
treatment it had received - 'we now know the power of the Executive
under D.O.R.A. ,(Forward, 5th February 1916) - it was by no means cowed
into submission as future editions were to prove. Its first editorial
after the suppression contained a vigorous attack on Lloyd George's
version of the recent events.
The intervention of Barnes in this case foreshadowed the role played
by Arthur Henderson in preventing,albeit with the utmost reluctance, the
prosecution of the Labour Leader and The Tribunal in January 1917. The
Home Office, still smarting from the failure to achieve a conviction
against the Labour Leader in Salford in 1915, had continued to monitor
its contents and that of The Tribunal. By January 1917 they had collected
a file of fifteen extracts which were considered to be clear breaches
of Regulation 27 and Lloyd George as Prime Minister was asked to
authorize action against the two papers. 48Lloyd George instantly
recognizing the political implications within the labour movement of
such an action asked Henderson, the first member of the Labour Party
to reach Cabinet rank, for his opinion.
47. Cited by Lloyd George ,House of ConiiKrns Debates ,Sth Series ,1O January 191
48. Articles which the Home Office considered 'endangered' the 	 Col.1413.
successful prosecution of the war included an attack on secret
diplomacy (16th November 1916), a description of Fenner Brockway's
court martial as a conscientious objector, an attack on The Times
by E.D. lvbrel for helping to'to envenom European relations'
(28th November 1916) and an attack on Arthur Henderson for a speech
which the Leader considered to be 'kite flying' for industrial
conscription (7th December 1916). P.R.O. FD45/10786/297549/51a.
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Henderson replied that while he accepted 'without hesitation' their
serious nature he doubted if their small cirtulation justified the
executive action proposed and he added more significantly : 'I
convinced that were proceedings instituted the position of the
Labour members of the Government would be rendered intolerable' .
particularly as at that moment he was about to attend a Labour
conference at Manchester to defend the inclusion of the three Labour
members in Lloyd George's national government. 'All argument' he went
on, 'would be futile if, as would be the case, the attention of the
conference were directed to the proceedings we had instituted against
the papers'.5°
Lloyd George took the point and anxious to retain the support of the
majority of the Labour movement he for once became protector rather
than a prosecutor of the press writing to Sir George Cave the Home
Secretary that the proceedings against the two papers be abandoned
'As you know the Labour Members of the Ministry have a very difficult
corner to turn in the course of the next fortnight... I am reluctant
to add to the difficulties of Mr. Henderson and his friends who have
so loyally fought these extreme men. ,51 As we shall see later in this
chapter when discussing the censorship of leaflets, these 'extreme mext
while benefiting from Lloyd George's protection for the publication
of their newspapers were not so fortunate so far as leaflets were
concerned which were regularly seized and destroyed. Nor did Lloyd
George's protective mantle provide adequate shelter for the smaller,
less influential pacifist and minority papers such as The Call and
the Workers Dreadnought which were subject to regular harrassment and
suppression during the latter stages of the war.
Regulations 27(a) introduced on 22nd of April 1916 prohibited reports
of the proceedings at secret sessions of Parliament and the unauthorized
publication of Cabinet proceedings or documents 52- all part of Asquith's
49. Henderson to LloydGeorge, 13th January 1917, P.R.O. FKJ. 45/10786/
297549/51 a.
50. ibid.
51. Lloyd George to Sir George Cave, 15th January 1917,ibid.
52. Public General Statutes, 5 Geo 6.
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elaborate attempts to conceal the deep divisions within the Liberal
Party over the issue of conscription. Strong pressure from newspaper
organizations, from leading provincial newspaper proprietors in
particular and powerful Parliamentary pressure forced an undertaking
from Herbert Samuel, the Home Secretary, that the initially repressive
interpretation of the Regulation by chief constables would discontinue
and that the Regulation would be administered leniently. The Press
Bureau, for ever seeking to inaxiimize its limited powers,had added a
proviso to D 385 informing newspapers of the new Regulation, which
stated that 'no speculation as to what took place or was said at the
secret session of Parliament may be published', 53 and this considerably
narrowed the options open to the press on how to cover this novel
Parliamentary procedure.
The Home Office sent to all chief constables on 24th April 1916 a
circular informing them of the new Regulation and of the forthcoming
secret session on the 25th of April. The circular stressed how
important it was that no report or description of the sittings other
than the official conununique'should be published and went on to tell
them that 'the Secretary of State will be glad if you will examine early on
Wednesday morning (26th April)any newspaper published in your district
and if any newspaper contains any reports or description of the
Secret Sitting which is clearly a contravention you should take steps
in accordance with Regulation Si for the seizure of all copies of
the paper and also of the printers' plant...' 54As Sir Henry Daiziel,
proprietorofi Reynolds News complained in the House of Comnons
with a newspaperman's unfailing talent for exaggeration
'within a few hours of the Regulation being issued a police constable
called on every editor in London and throughout the country, asked to
see the editor personally on behalf of the Government, warned him and
read to him the Regulation, hoped he would realize the seriousness of
it and explained that if any reference was made to the Cabinet, the
paper would ininediately be suppressed, plant seized and the editor
himself in all probability would be arrested'. To which Samuel rejoined:
'It's the first I know about it'.55
53. P.R.O. I-Ky 45/10815/314696/1.
54. ibid.
55. House of Coninons Debates, 5th Series, 8th May 1916, Col. 377.
- 142 -
Samuel' s comment represented later Home Office views that chief
constables had acted with excessive vigour and had ordered such
visits to newspaper offices before the papers had been published
which 'they had clearly no powers to do... ' 56The Press Bureau
Notice, coupled with the visit of a policeman to newspaper offices,
a new and alarming precedent, put the fear of God into many editors
especially in the provinces which tended to have less to do with
the Press Bureau and government departments than their Fleet Street
contemporaries. The influential editor and proprietor of the
Liverpool Daily Post and Mercury Sir Edward 1issell wrote to
Balfour the Foreign Secretary complaining of 'this new prerogative
of the police...a most drastic innovation and one quite at variance
from what everyone would desire to be the practice of the British
Government' .
A resolution of the N.P.A. delivered to Sanu.iel personally by Riddell
had made clear that the principal anxiety of the press was 'the
terms of the second paragraph of Regulation 27 (about the reporting
of Cabinet meetings) and to request the Home Secretary to take steps
to make such amendments as will prevent the possibility of unjust and
arbitrary action on the part of the military and police authorities.'58
Although Daiziel's House of Commons motion requesting the government
to amend the Regulation along the lines outlined by the N.P.A. was
rejected and the Regulation remained in force for the duration of
the war, Saxiu.iel did promise that the Government and the Home Office
administration would be against 'any action with regard to the Press
which would suppress the criticism of Ministers. .(and that) the
new Regulation ...will certainly not be harshly or oppressively
administered'. 59 The range and intensity of political intrigue and
details of Cabinet meetings published in the press subsequent to
the proclamation of the Regulation, particularly towards the end of
1916 at the time of Asquith's departure from office bear testimony to
Samuel's undertaking and to the combined power of Parliament and the
56. Home Office minute, Troup to Samuel, 26th June 1916, P.R.O. H045/
10815 ,op.cit.
57. Sir Edward Russell to A.J. Balfour, 20th June 1916, ibid.
58. N.P.A. Resolution, 28th April 1916, ibid.
59. House of Commons Debates, th Series, 8th May 1916, Cols. 422-3•
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press to effectively oppose any executive action which sought to
constrain the right of the press to report and coninent on politics
or the war. But the inage of policemen visiting newspaper offices
lingered on.
Perhaps the finest example of the power of this Parliament/Press
lobby to fight off attempts at repressive action against the press
was the manner in which medifications were forced on the Lloyd George
Government's leaflet censorship in November and December 1917. Alarmed
by the growth of pacifist literature in leaflet form which, although
technically subject to the D.O.R.A. Regulations were rarely submitted
to the Bureau for censorship, Sir George Cave for the Home Office
obtained War Cabinet approval for an amendment CC) to Regulation 27, which
made it unlawful for any person to publish a leaflet dealing with
the continuance of the war or the conclusion of peace unless the
contents had been approved by the Press Bureau and the name and
address of the author and printer were printed on each copy.6°
Although this amendment did not directly affect newspapers many of
them regarded the proposals as the thin edge of the wedge of restrictions
which could easily be imposed on the press unless a stand was made against
them.
'Considerable doubt 'was expressed at the War Cabinet about the
'efficacy and desirability' of the Press Bureau taking on such a job
which could well lead to 'an aiinest unanimous outcry' in the press.61
This duly occurred on 16th November 1917 following Cave's announcement
and continued daily in the press and in Parliament until Cave agreed
to medifications to Regulation 27 (c) on 10th December. The Star
described the Regulation as a form of 'British Tsardoin : to insist
on censorship beforehand is to introduce the worst vices of the
60. The Home Office suspected that one reason for the increase in
this literature was the financial support given to pacifist
organizations by businessmen anxious to renew trade with the
Central Powers. Home Office merandum, 19th October 1917,
P.R.O. Cab 23/4 W.C. 253/1.
61. War Cabinet minute, 15th November 1917. Cab 23/4 W.C.274/17.
Brade as usual, in touch with press opinion, told Ri.ddell that
he expected 'strong opposition' from the newspapers. G.A.Riddell
op. cit.,(1933) p. 290.
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Russian Tsardoin and it will not be long before it is extended to
leading articles in newspapers' (16th November 1917). The doubts
expressed at the War Cabinet about what in effect was a considerable
extension of Press Bureau power was more forcibly voiced by the
Liverpool Daily Post and Mercury which said on 28th November 1917
that the new Regulation '...makes any fool employed by the Press
Bureau a judge above the law'.
The London correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, (L.T. Hobhouse)
saw it as 'the first step towards the censorship of opinion and the
logical extension of it is a censorship of opinion in the press...'
a view re-inforced in the main leader column : 'if they (the government)
are allowed to have their way, the turn of the platform and newspaper
will come next'. (16th November 1917). These sentiments were backed
by the Liberal and Labour press which argued. like Philip Snowden
in the Labour Leader that 'it is but one small step further to the
application of a similar censorship to the newspapers'. The
Labour press, in the light of the virulently anti-pacifist line taken
by Northcliffe's papers, saw his influence behind the War Cabinet
decision : 'we are mere than ever bound, gagged and blindfolded'
declared The Herald 'at the chariot wheels of the few politicians who
at any moment may happen to be, by the good graces of Lord Northcliffe,
in power' (5th December 1917). 'There is' ,wrote the diarist of the
Westminster Gazette, 'a widespread feeling that the Government have
gone too far' (28th November 1917).
But not far or soon enough for right wing Unionist papers like the
Merning Post which considered, under a leader column headed 'The Pacifist
Poison', that 'too late rather than too soon the Government have decided
to stand up to these (pacifist) mischief-makers'. The Merning Post
reminded its readers that Liberal newspapers like the Daily News and
Westminster Gazette who 'look upon the Home Secretary as little better
than Hindenburg or Von Tirpitz' were not so long ago,when a Liberal
Government was in power, 'clamouring to use the most drastic powers
against anyone who ventured to suggest that all was not right with the
conduct of the war' (14th December 1917). The Glasgow Herald whose
London correspondent in a fine piece of 'objective' reporting on the
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Liberal parliamentary campaign to get the Regulation withdrawn
considered that 'Liberty has degeneratedto unbridled licence and the
country's war efforts are hindered by the circulation of pernicious
'literature' from pacifist and pro-German sources. It is time to stop
this campaign'. (27th November 1917).
The Liberal and socialist press agitation was backed by direct action
both in and out of Parliament. A delegation of trade union and Labour
Party representatives saw Sir George Cave on the 5th of December led
by Ramsay MDonald and expressed to him the fears of the organized
labour movement that the new Regulation could easily be used against
'trade union activities and tae things we are issuing from week to
week and day to day' 62 Cave was reminded, like Lloyd George had been
in 1916 that the trade unions 'have been doing valuable service , the
country and that anything that causes them concern is worth the serious
consideration of the Members of the Government' 63 Pushed by the
strong campaign in the Liberal press and by a House of Coniinons resolution
signed by forty five Liberal M.P.'s which stated that the new Regulation,
by introducing compulsion into censorship regulations for the first
time, was : 'contrary to British liberty and unnecessary for national
defence and security' ,64 Herbert Samuel, on behalf of the former Liberal
Cabinet, wrote to Cave urging him to remove the words 'submitted to
and passed by' the Press Bureau in the new Regulation. 'These' , Samuel
argued, 'oust the jurisdiction of the Court and for the first time
confer upon the Executive powers of censorship in political matters
which cannot be questioned at law' •65
It appears clear from the War Cabinet file that this letter in conjunction
with the visit from a representative of the Labour Party and trade unions
convinced Cave of the need to modify the Regulation and on the 7th of
December he received Cabinet approval for a modification whereby publication
of a leaflet was no longer dependent on approval by the Press Bureau.66
62. Home Office memorandun of Trade Union and Labour Party delegation




66. P.R.O. War Cab 23/4, 15th November 1917.
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Nevertheless all the leaflets had still to be submitted to the
Bureau at least seventy two hours before publication. If the
Bureau felt that a leaflet contravened the Regulations, then
action could be taken to prevent its publication but with 'the
ultimate decision resting with the courts' 7The modification offered no
practical respite to pacifist organizations who wished to publish
leaflets considered by the authorities to be 'mischievous' (leaflets
for example advocating a negotiated peace). But the furore caused
by the introduction of Regulation 27 (c) left the Government in
no doubt that any extension of such repressive powers against the
newspaper press was not viable. The somewhat ludicrous situation
now arose, as Philip Snowden pointed out in the House of Commons,
where a journalist could write a piece for a newspaper without
having to submit it for censorship but would be forced to do so
if it was to appear in leaflet form. 68 Lord Lansdowne's letter
urging a negotiated peace upon the Government was published in the
press but stopped by the Bureau when submitted for publication
as a leaflet.
Several features of what up to now has been referred to as the 'Pres/
Parliament' lobby are worth noting at this stage. It tended to be
the same group of M.P.'s and. peers who raised press matters in
Parliament - in the Commons, Sir Henry Dalziei (Unionist, Brixton),
Harry Lawson, later Lord Burnham (Unionist, Mile End), William
Pringle (Liberal, N.W. Lanarkshire), James Hogge (Liberal, Edinburgh
East), Robert Outhwaite (Liberal, Hanley), Sir Arthur Markham (Unionist,
Mansfield), Laurence Ginnell (Irish Nationalist, N.W. Meath), Tim
Healey (Irish Nationalist, N.E. Cork), Philip Snowden (I.L.P.,Blackburn),
67. Sir George Cave, House of Conmns Debates, 5th Series, lath
December 1917, Col. 857.
68. House of Coimixns Debates, 5th Series, 12th December 1917, Col.1294-5.
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Ramsay MacD.onald (I .L. P., Leicester), Sir George Toulmin (Liberal,
Bury) and in the Lords well known figures like Viscounts Mimer,
Bryce and Selborne - all of whom had strong and direct links
with the newspaper press, either as proprietors or journalists
or in some cases, as both. There was no organizational ties between
them nor could any group which had anxrngst its membership both the
Hon. Harry Lawson, managing proprietor of the Daily Telegraph and
Ramsay MacDonald, a director of the Labour Leader and a regular
feature 'writer for the socialist Forward have much politically in
comn but as an unofficial and spontaneous pressure group, they
collectively ensured that the issue of press control and censorship
was a constant Parliamentary topic.69
Some voices carriedmore political weight than others - Dalziel,
proprietor of the Pall Mall Gazette, Reynolds-' News arid the
Evening Standard, and a close confidant of Lloyd George's was
instrumental in ensuring that Regulation 27 (a) dealing with the
reporting of cabinet meetings would be interpreted leniently. Lawson
proprietor of the Daily Telegraph was in close touch with Unionist
opinion and as a member with Sir George Toulmin of the. Joint Couin.ittee,
was in regular negotiation with the Press Bureau and Service
departments. The hand of Lawson can be discerned behind the War
Office instruction to local military authorities in 1914, that
all serious cases involving press breaches of the regulations be
referred to the Service departments for decision. 7° Other voices,
like those of Hogge, Pringle and Healey spoke so frequently on
press issues that their contributions were listened to with less
than rapt attention but the cumulative effect of the group's constant
vigilance was to foil any attempt made by the authorities t introduce
repressive legislation aimed directly at the newspaper press.
69. Sir William Sutherland suggested that Lloyd George should use
the energies of this loosely knit group for recruiting and
munitions campaigns 'instead of leaving them idle and disgruntled
on the watch for any mistake', Sutherland to Lloyd George,
10th June 1915, Lloyd George Papers, D 18118/2.House of Lords
Record Office.
70. Brade morandum to C.M.A.'s,December 1914, P.R.O. ID 139/25/
A993/0.
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The various controversies we have so far recorded underline the
fact that most sections of the newspaper press during the war
retained freedom of opinion and the right to criticize 'which its
representatives had demanded and obtained in the pre-war
negotiations. Despite his ambiguous and provocative public
statenients, 71
 Buckinaster in private fought against any form of
political pressure to silence newspaper opinion. Churchill had
demanded action against the vbrning Post for its bitter criticism
of his handling of the Antwerp evacuation in October 1914. Buckmaster
firmly refused. While he was more than anxious to see that the
D.O.R.A. Regulatioriswere observed by the press and offenders
duly punished 'in my opinion,' •he wrote to Churchill, 'the Press
Bureau has no legal authority entitling it to suppress criticism
excepting as far as such criticism may involve the disclosure of
military or naval operations...To stifle criticism of the
government or ministers. . . is not. . .within the provinces of this
office and ought not to be allowed'.72
Despite Buckmaster having stated publicly that the censorship
was to operate against information likely to depress, comnent
and criticism in leader columns and feature articles, which were
never submitted to the Bureau for censorship, regularly did this
throughout the war. The vicious attacks by the right wing
newspapers upon Haldane for allegedly having gravely weakened
the army before the war, the Northcliffe papers' attacks upon
Kitchener and upon Asquith for policies of 'Wait and Lose', the
later attacks by Lovat Fraser in the Daily Mail in 1918 upon
the High Command and the widespread criticism of the Admiralty
71. In several Parliamentary statements of Press Bureau policy,
Buckmaster, who like Smith had an unerring ability jo antagoniz
the ue'of ConhTKrns, stated that he would stop any statement
that suggested to people that their affairs were not in good
hands(House of Coim-kns Debates-,Sth Series, 12th November 1914
Col. 129). On 8th February 1915 he said that he saw his job
as stopping anything which might unduly depress the British
people (Col. 350-1) and in the House of Lords on the 3rd of
November 1915 he gave a very strong impression that criticism of
Government Ministers was very shortly to be 'curtailed' (Col.157).
72.	 Buckmaster to Churchill, 11th October 1914, P.R.O. FK) 139/
5/A48/1.
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over the shipping losses in 1917 - all of these could certainly
be construed as depressing connnents upon the British prospects
of victory and of possible use to the enemy. But there were no
prosecutions. Indeed, Sir John Simon, when Home Secretary,
boasted about how amazed the Austrian press was at the freedom
allowed to newspapers in war-time Britain 73 and Herbert Samuel,
who succeeded Simon, reganied it as 'vital that there should be
freedom for the organs of public opinion to criticize the conduct
and administrationofMinisters...' 74 Editors like H.A. Gwynne of
the MDrning Post regarded it as their constitutional duty to
express criticism of the conduct of the war. As he told Buckmaster
at the time of Churchill's involvement in the Antwerp expedition:
'...what course is a newspaper editor to take when he sees things
going absolutely wrong?...in this or any other criticism I may
from time to time publish I shall be guided only by what I consider
to be the needs of the nation. . .
But this freedom had its constraints. The dispensation granted
most newspapers to say what they likewas not absolute. Newspapers
were free to criticize the political and strategic prosecution of
the war, often in the most blistering of ternis but they were not
so free to speak out or agitate against the country's participation
in the war itself. Socialist newspapers like Forward, The Herald or
the Labour Leader were opposed to the war but they were scrupulous
in their avoidance of open opposition or in making statements that
could be construed as discouraging recruitiuent,nuch to the annoyance
of Home Office and Press Bureau officials anxious to trap them.
73. House of Coninons Debates, 5th Series, 2nd March 1915, Col. 758.
74. House of Comnons Debates, 5th Series, 8th May 1916, Col. 422.
75. Gwynne to Buckmaster, 13th October 1915, P.R.O. 139/5/A48/1.
This passionate declaration of journalistic ethics was as shallow
as it was pompous. Like other editors such as Blumenfield of the
Daily Express, Strachey of the Spectator, Leo Maxse of the National
Review and proprietors like Northcliffe - all rabidly patriotic -
Gwynne could never unierstand that Haldane, pacifists or even
those opposed to National Service could also have 'a sense of
responsibility...to the...needs of the nation' ibid.
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Irish Republican newspapers and pacifist newspapers, by virtue
of their political convictions, were not so careful and were not
so fortunate. They were not included under the mantle of liberty
boasted of by successive I-bme Secretaries and were subject to
spasmedic harrassment from the authorities particularly during the
later stages of the war. Nor had they any powerful Parliamentary
or press friends to defend their right to free expression of opinion.
Not only were many newspapers indifferent to the treatment meted
out to them but the harrassnient was conducted with the active
support and encouragement of the majority of metropolitan and
provincial newspapers. 'We love liberty', said the Daily Mirror
on 16th November 1917, 'but freedom to help the enemy is not the
sort we appreciate' - a view representative of the majority of news-
papers towards the pacifist press.
When four Irish Republican newspapers 6were suppressed in December
1914 few newspapers bothered to report the event and oF those that did
mest supported the repressive action. In the same edition as a leader
bitterly condemning the Press Bureau for its inefficiency, unfairness
and lack of judgement, the Irish Times welcomed the suppression of
the seditious 'rags' (7th December 1914) and cited the London Times
which had declared that 'The Government are to be congratulated on
their response,tardy enough though it has been 'in suppressing news-
papers' which it argued had been financially supported by 'German!
American allies'. Even Forward which had close links with James
Connolly, editor of the Irish Worker, one of the suppressed newspapers,
while arguing that 'forcible closing of the Press or any section of
it (however disagreeable its opinions may be to any ruling authority)
is a grave and serious matter for the national welfare...' was equivocal
in its belief in the right of absolute free speech 'Writing frankly
we find it impossible to condemn the Government for its act ion.s in
regard to some of these (Irish) periodicals'. (Forward 12th December 1914).
76. The Irish Worker, the Irish Vo1untee Sein Fein, and Irish Freedom
all of which had in varying degrees strongly opposed recruitment
of Irishmen to fight in the British army.
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In Parliament, it was the frequent complaint of Irish Nationalist
M.P.'s like Tim Healey, Beaverbrook's friend, and Laurence Ginnell
that while M. P. 's such as Hogge and Pringle were active in the
defence of press freedom in England, they remained indifferent to
the fate of the minority Irish press: 'It was well said', quipped
Healey in the House of ConmKrns on 11th November 1915 'that a fire
in the Strand is of more importance than a burning mountain in
china but surely Irelandis part of the British Empire'. 77 He was
pointing to the fury being expressed in the Conunons over the suppression
of The Globe and the prosecution in camera, albeit unsuccessfully,
of the Labour Leader in Salford which was being described by Sir
William Byles, Liberal M.P. for Salford as the first attacks on
the liberty of the press when 'within the last twelve months the
Government have seized and suppressed, body and bones, type and
printing presses, without word of protest from either Scotland
(both Hogge and Pringle sat for Scottish constituencies) or from
Salford' 78
Under the direction of Sir George Cave, Home Secretary in the Lloyd
George Government, the Ibme Office in early 1917 engaged a Q.C.,
Mr, Ellis Griffith, Liberal M.P. for Anglesey and later Sir Arthur
Bocikin Q.C. to monitor a list of sixteen socialist/pacifist journals.79
If, in their opinion, matter published in these journals transgressed
the Regulations the case was sent to the Director of Public
Prosecutions for consideration. As we have already noted the D.P.P's
office tended to take the view that these cases involving small
circulation minority papers, were in the words of one counsel at the
D.P. P. 's office Guy Stephenson ,'not worth powder and shot' 80 . But
senior Home Office officials encouraged by Cave were not prepared
to leave matters at that and their practice became in such cases, to
inform the local police who raided the premises of the organization' s
printers, seized copies of the offending journal or leaflet and
77. House of Connons Debates,Sth Series, 11th November 1915, Col. 1428.
78. ibid.
79. P.R.O. HO 45/10786/297549/52.
80. Stephenson to Home Office, 25th October 1917, P.R.O. HO 45/11099/
280126/43.
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usually threatened to confiscate the printer' s machinery unless
he agreed either to cease publication of the journal for the
duration of the war or to submit copy before printing to the Press
Bureau. By careful editorship and through Lloyd George's political
protection, the Labour Leader and The Herald were spared this
ignominious treatment but socialist arid pacifist papers like the
Workers Dreadnought, The Call and the Tribunal were often forced to
cease publication for a brief interval until they were able to find
new arid mere tolerant printers, not an easy task in the xenophobic
days of late 1917 and early 1918.
A letter in the MDrning Post on the 27th of August 1917 drew the Home
Office's attention to a cartoon in the 25th August edition of the
Workers Dreadnought which showed Christ marched off by a soldier to
a place where the Bishop of London, who had recently preached a sermen
in favour of the war, was sat by a gun. The case was sent by Sir
Ernley Blackwell of the Home office to Sir Charles Matthews the Director
of Public Prosecutions who replied on the 30th of August that he
felt 'the cartoon is in the grossest taste but apart from the view
I entertain that any prosecution of Miss Sylvia Parikhurst and the
Workers Dreadnought would be a waste of time and meney I fail to
see how the Defence of the Realm Regulations have been broken by the
publication of this repugnant cartoon'. 81 Despite this advice and
the information from Scotland Yard that most of the offending issue
would have been distributed anyway,Sir George Cave minuted : ' I
think it is better to seize the surplus copies forwhat it is worth'.82
Ninety eight copies were seized and destroyed on the 1st of September
1917.
Police raided the National Labour Press, printers of the Workers Dreadnought
on 4th of October 1917 in an attempt to seize the current issue of the
Dreadnought which contained an article by G.D.H. Cole about health
hazards to women working in munitions factories. The issue had already
been distributed so the police seized and destroyed the 6th of October
81. Matthews to Home Office, P.R.O. 11) 45/11009/280126/20. Influenced
by the revolutionary events in Russia, Sylvia Parikhurst had changed
the title of the Dreadnought from Women's to Workers in July 1917.
82. Cave minute, 1St September 1917, ibid.
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edition and forced the printer to agree not to print any further
copies of the Dreadnought while the Defence of the Realm Regulations
were in operation or face the seizure of plant and equipment.
Although such harrassinent was disruptive it was not totally destructive
and minority journals, fired by deeply held convictions and low
overheads, were quickly back in circulation - the Dreadnought
was back in business on this occasion by the end of October printed
by a new and sympathetic printer.
!'bst newspapers remained either indifferent to the fate of these
minority papers or applauded and encouraged the police raids. The
Daily Exprespublished an article by C.B. Stanton Independent Labour M.P.
for Merthyr Tydfil on 6th January 1916 entitled 'The Enemy in our
Midst'which argued that George Lansbury, editor of The Herald should
be shot for having published a pacifist cartoon by Will Dyson.
Reporting gleefully of '7 Raids! in last 48 Hours' on printers of
pacifist newspapers on 16th November 1917, the Express welcomed the
Government's tougher policy against 'the pestilential and subterranean
influence' (of)'the pacifist plague'. When an export ban was placed
on the sales of The Nation for having had its criticisms of British
strategy broadcast on German wireless some sections of the press
heartily supported the administrative action taken against 'Mr.
Massingham's acrid and despairing utterances'(The Spectator, 21st
April 1917). Another right wing journal, the Saturday Review was
highly critical of the Parliamentary support that The Nation received,
especially it argued, from four ex-Cabinet Ministers (?vkiCenna,
Runciman, Churchill and Samuel) who had been involved in the suppression
of The Globe. 'They chattered trifles', mecked the Review on the
21st of April 1917 'about freedom of the Press, complained idiotically
that The Times and the Daily Mail had been quoted in Germany also
and had not been penalized. . .they posed as Miltons and were ready with
their Are-opagiticas but their arguments were about as trivial and
contemptible we have ever had from Cabinet Ministers'.
Philip Snowden and Rainsay MacDonald were violently attacked in the
jingo press for pointing to the disparity in treatment between pro-war
- 154 -
large circulation newspapers however impudently they violated the
Regulations and that meted out to the small circulation pacifist
press. 'How much longer', wrote Bottomley in John Bull for 24th
November 1917, 'are the Governnent going to hesitate before the
MacOonaldbacher and Snowdenstein gang are put against a wall and
shot?' The Sunday Pictorial could with impunity publish on 11th
November 1917 an article by Admiral W.H. Henderson headed Wanted -
A Naval War Staff containing a critical resume'of Admiralty war-
time policy which must certainly have made interesting reading in
Berlin while on the following Sunday it published an article by
Horatio Bottomley which called for a 'Dictatorship' to deal with
grave dangers to the national cause posed by 'pacifists, Bishops,
Humanitarians and all the rest'. The most blatant example of
such discrimination practised by the authorities between a large
circulation, pro-war newspaper and the small pacifist press occurred
in February 1918. D 621 of 4th February 1918 urgently requested
that it was 'of the utmost importance that no reference whatever'83
be made of the Inter-Allied Reserve Scheme which had been agreed
that month at Versailles. Repington who had recently left The Times
to join the ?vbrning Post learnt of the scheme from his military
sources and wrote a highly critical article which H.A. Gwynne
submitted to the Press Bureau for censorship. This was returned 'not
to be published', an order which Gwynne decided to ignore by
publishing Repington's article on 11th February. In the article,
Repington attacked Lloyd George and other politicians for having
'exclusively occupied themselves in teaching soldiers how and where
to make war'. He said that the Prime Minister had 'practically
eliminated the General Staff in London from authority on the Western
Front and had deprived the Field Marshal Commander-in-Chief (Haig)
of one of his most indispensable means of action' by removing control
of the army's reserve to a committee of generals under General Foch
based at Versailles.
At a War Cabinet on 12th February 1918 which discussed the issue, Lloyd
George, stated that it was not the first time that Colonel Repington had
published information 'which was of the utmost value to the enemy' . 84The
83. P.R.O. FL 139/45.
84. P.R.O. Cab 23/5 W.C. 342/16.
86.
87.
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Director of Public Prosecutions informed the Cabinet that the most
effective ntethod in such cases was to seize the printing presses, which at
a Cabinet meeting later that day it was decided should be done 5 However
later that same evening (the 12th) Lloyd George revoked the decision
to seize the printing presses 'after an informal meeting with the
Home Secretary and certain legal and other objections had been
considered' 86 Instead individual prosecutions were brought against
Pepington and Gwynne who were each fined £100.
No such 'legal and other objectives' prevented the seizure of The
Vanguars printing presses that same month or the imprisonment of the
country's leading mathematician and philosopher, Bertrand Russell for
six months on the 9th of February 1918 for writing an article in
The Tribunal on the 3rd of January 1918 warning of the dangers posed
for British democracy by the presence of American armed forces in
Britain (It was alleged by the prosecution that Russell's article
was likely to prejudice His Majesty's Relations with the United States,
an ally and thus an offence against Regulation 27)87. it was the lone
voice of Ramsay MacDona1± who pointed to the anomaly: 'that if an article
(Repington's) one twentieth as malicious had. been published under
the name of Mr. Bertrand Russell the Government would not have hesitated
five minutes as to what its course of action should be...All I say
to the Government is this : if you are going to repress, repress
fairly; if you are going to prosecute, prosecute fairly; but do not
deal with Mr Bertrand Russell one way and with this military writer
(RpLngton) in another' 8.8 The Daily News was one of the few newspapers
to make the same point. 'We are not complaining of (Russell's
sentence) heavy as it was but only of the astonishing disparity between
it and the fines inflicted yesterday upon Col. Repington and the editor
of the Mrning Post...by the same magistrate' (12th February 1918).
85. The Solicitor General, Sir Gordon Hewart argued that 'in the event
of a prosecution not only would discussion of the subject dealt
with by the article be necessary but also one recalcitrant juryman
might render the prosecution null and void, - a neat suninary of the
reasons why the use of Regulation 51 had become more common. ibid.
IVhat appears to have been the deciding factor was a statement by
General MacDonough, Director of Military Intelligence (and a close
friend and very likely source of Repington's information) that in
the event of a prosecution 'he would find it very difficult to
state on oath in a court of law that information had been given
which was likely to be of any great use to the enemy', ibid.
P.R.O. FD 45/ 111012/314670/3.
88. House of Comons Debates, 5th Series, 12th February 1918, Cols. 39-40.
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MacDonald had earlier criticized the inconsistency, as he saw it,
of the censorship authorities for not prosecuting the Daily Mail
for publishing a story about the sinking of a hospital ship in the
Bristol channel which had been prohibited by the Press Bureau when,
as he told readers of his regular column in Forwardon the same
day as Sir George Cave was making excuses for leaving the Carmelite
Boss (Northcliffe) alone, his sleuths raided the office of
The Call over an article on the Russian Revolution.. . . .you see
it is not possible to take action against Alf of the Fifty Press
foghorns'. (26th January 1918) Macdonald shared with a host of
politicians and editors an insatiable desire to see Northcliffe in
the dock. Protests in the name of demecracy against the
prosecution or suppression of a newspaper were almest invariably
leavened with cries for similarly repressive action to be taken against
a Northcliffe owned paper or papers. 'Why not the Evening News
and the Sunday Dispatch as well?' was the Liberal press reaction
to the suppression of The Globe in early November 1915. 'Will
the Secretary of State for War (Lloyd George)...now consider the
desirability of dealing with The Times and Daily Mail?' asked
Mr. Dillon in the House of Conininis at the time of the suppression
of Forward in January 1916 . 89 When the Home Secretary, Sir John
Simen, criticized Northcliffe's Daily Mail for publishing a map
of the Balkans (allegedly of use to the enemy) during a Comnns
debate called specifically by Simen to rebuke Northcliffe,
Pringle, Daiziel and other M.P.'s were scornful, that no prosecution
had been brought against Northcliffe. 'Cowardice in the face of
Lord Northcliffe' charged Pringle9° an accusation levelled at
successive Home Secretaries during the war.
Reasons for this perpetual sniping at Northcliffe are not hard to
discover. His newspapers had done nuch to create a public prepared
and eager for war with Germany and he became obsessively coninitted
to its successful prosecution. He regarded the Press Bureau
89. House of Connns Debates, 5th Series, 4th January 1916. Col. 804.
90. House of Connims Debates, 5th Series, 30 November 1915, Col. 632.
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as inefficient and i.mnecessary and he made sure that his newspapers
were the least cooperative and mest critical of the censorship
operation. With s
	
courage and armed with the belief that
politicians believed his newspapers to be immensely powerful
he attacked national idols like Kitchener and the Admiralty for
inefficiency and lack of vision. His newspapers were not
prosecuted, apart from several minor scrapes, because along with the
criticisms, they carried a sustained propaganda in favour of
recruitment and national efficiency and they attacked all forms
of opposition to the war with such unremitting zeal that they were
believed to be too important to the war effort to alienate or
suppress. Once Northcliffe and Rothetmere had become personally
involved in government it became virtually impossible anyway for
any government to act against their newspapers as .Austen± Chamberlain
complained of in the House of Conmens on 11th March 1918 : 'The mere
fact that some of them (press proprietors) are Ministers will make
the discharge of his duties by my right Hon. Friend the Home Secretary
and the other Ministers concerned mere invidious and mere difficult' •91
By constantly criticizing and disparaging the Press Bureau,
Northcliffe's newspapers assisted in undermining its authority and
allaying its mere repressive inclinations - in effect providing a
shield for other newspapers to engage in similar criticisms without
undue fear of executive reprisals. Not that other newspapers saw
it in those terms blinded as many of them were by the jealousies of
the pre-war years.
Buckmaster certainly recognized the role played by the Northcliffe
newspapers. He became convinced that a successful prosecution against
The Times, the mest prestigious star in the Northcliffe galaxy,
91. House of Conmns Debates. 5th Series, 11th March 1918, Col. 78.
Northcliffe was appointed head of the British Mission to the
United States in 1917 and Director of Enemy Propaganda in
March 191 8. His brother Rotherinere was Secretary for Air in
1917/18 and Director of Propaganda to Neutral Countries from
March 1918.
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would be an immense boost to the authority and prestige of the
Bureau. The Press Bureau files during Smith and Buckmaster' s
periods as Directors reveal a vendetta-like situation existing
between the Bureau and Printing House Square with Buckntaster
persistently complaining to Brade and Graham Greene that 'nothing
is to be done to The Times for having 'deliberately broken what we
regard in this office as very important notices'. 92
 When The Times
was eventually prosecuted in June 1915 for having published a letter
allegedly criticizing the French war effort, the case was dismissed
by the magistrates. No other case was brought against The times
during the war which continued throughout to treat the Bureau with
magisterial contempt.
The Times case is one of a series we have discussed in this chapter
which discredits the idea put about by contemporary commentators,
notably Repington, that the press censorship during the war was
harsh and repressive. Repington's pieces were severely censored
but by his own editor, Geoffrey Dawson and only rarely by the Bureau.93
He was prosecuted but for revealing highly sensitive, secret
infniiation for which he was fined a mere £100. Despite the virtual
immunity of his papers from prosecution Northcliffe later put it
about that he and his editors lived for much of the war in constant
fear of arrest in the light of their challenge to the censorship
authorities. M. P. 's understandably concerned at individual and
isolated cases of press repression made speeches of great ihetoric;
92. Buckmaster to Greene, P.R.O. Ifl 139/5/A 127/Part2/23. The
'very important notices' were sailing times of Cross Channel
ferries. Dawson argued that these could be seen at any
railway station to which Buckmaster delivered the riposte
that 'station walls were not sent to Germany but copies of
The Tines were uslly seen by the German High Coninand'.
Buckmnaster to Dawson, 22nd March 1915, ibid.
93. Of 54 articles by Repington submitted by The Times to the Press
Bureau for censorship, 29 were passed 'without alteration, '20
were 'very slightly censored', 2 were 'heavily censored' and 2
'stopped altogether'. Press Bureau memorandum, P.R.O. I-I) 139/30/
A1180/1. As Dawson wrote to Haig on the 30th January 1918; 'I have
no doubt at all that. .his own position as a writer is du largely
to the fact that I . . refused so many of his articles.. . .the excisions
(of published articles) were very largely personalities which I
thought mistakes. .You yourself. .were one of his intended victims
for a large part of the war'. 'Dawson' The Times Att±jve.
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'I rubbed my eyes', said Sir William Byles at the time of the
suppression of The Globe and asked : 'Ani I in England or in
Deutschland?' 94 - which gave a totally faJse impression of the
power and range of the press censorship operation. Later
commentators have followed suit, portraying the censorship as
severely repressive and rigorously controlling the entire
operations of tie British press. One recent press historian has
suggested that 'l)iring the First World War...the censors so deprived
the population of news that defeatist rumours spread. The press
revolted. Voluntary censorship was gradually agreed upon...95
A more inaccurate description of the press censorship it would be
hard to discover.
The D.O.R.A. Regulations were severe and affected all sections of
society including the press but there was never any question of the
press being placed in a legal straight jacket under the inquisitorial
eye of a Prussian-like institution from which, after a noble
struggle, it emerged free. So far as most newspapers were
concerned the Regulations which supported the censorship were
leniently interpreted under a system which was voluntary and remained
so throughout the war. The war-time editor of the Labour Leader
when questioned as to the severity of the censorship found it hard to
recall that there had been a press censorship at all. 96 The Press
Bureau was set up hurriedly without clear legal authority or
administrative status. It could only recommend prosecutions to
government departments and a judiciary which were reluctant to
alienate a cooperative press. When repressive action was taken the
shouts of protest were loud and powerful enouh to ensure that
most newspapers were left alone to say what they liked about the
government and armed forces' conduct of the war. Except that is
for the small number of Irish Republican ,socialist and pacifist
94. I-buse of Commons Debates, 5th Series, 11th November 1915, Col. 1424.
95. C.J. Bertrand, The British Press : An Historical Survey (Paris,
O.C.D.L., 1969) p. 153.
96. Lord Fenner Brockway in conversation with the author, 1-buse of
Lords ,April 1978.
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newspapers whose harrassinent at the encouragement or complacent
silence of most other newspapers remains an ugly blemish on
the record of the British press.
Press reactions to the manner in which the Regulations were
interpreted matched those of the authorities in selectivity
and inconsistency. Liberal papers applauded the suppression
of right wing j ingo papers who in turn called for action against
the socialist and pacifist press and almest all were united in
demanding repressive measures against Northcliffe and his 'goghorns'.
Politicians concerned with press issues shifted their ground just
as swiftly. In the House of Lords in 1915 Mimer argued that
critics like The Globe were' the best friends of government...
the docile portion of the Press, with its eminent want of candour
in its efforts to defend the indefensible (the record f the
Asquith Government) is very often their worst enemy' .' But when as
Minister for War under fire from these 'best of friends' over the
Inter-Allied Reserve Scheme he was writing to Lloyd George that 'I
think the sooner we make a move (to suppress The Globe and other
press critics) the better. This kind of thing cannot be allowed
to go on' 98 As Leader of the Opposition Bonar Law was a champion
of free speech boldly defending the right of M.P's and newspapers
to criticize incompetence in government 'even though this does cause
a weakening of confidence in the Government that is carrying on the
War' .	 But as a government minister, he sang quite a different
tune defending the export ban on The Nation for example on the
grounds that '.. . any Government which deliberately allows views of that
kind (that British strategy was inferior to German) to be circulated
abroad would instantly deserve to be asked to resign and give place
to others'.10°
97. House of Lords Debates, 5th Series, 8th November 1915, Col. 193.
98. Mimer to Lloyd Geroge, 8th February 1918, Lloyd George apers,
F/38/3/10, House of Lords Record Office.
99. House of Coninens Debates, 5th Series, 23rd November 1914, Col. 919.
100. Rouse of Coninons Debates, 5th Series, 9th May 1917, Col. 1198.
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We have discussed the various authorities which intervened in the
operation of the press censorship and we have observed the limitations
which restrained them. We have seen that it is to take an exaggerated
view of the use made of the D.O.R.A. Regulations to describe the
censorship as 'irresponsible tyranny' (Daily News, 30th November 1917)
and that F.E. Smith, in replying to charges of harsh censorship
decisions was for once in tune with the situation when he told the
House of Conunons in 1916 : '...it is amazing not that so many cases
have been introduced in which error or excessive authority is alleged
but that so few cases have been cited in the course of this Debate'
Why was it then, if as has been argued here, most newspapers were
left unmolested by the law and most cooperated patriotically with the
Press Bureau instructions and requests, that the press censorship was
sopubliclyreviled in Parliament and in the press? The answer was,
as we shall discuss in Chapter VI that the press heartily disliked a
system which because of its hapharzard, voluntary nature detrcknentally
affected (or so they believed) their commercial competitiveness,
disrupted the flow of news and which was in the opinion of many
journalists so inefficiently conducted that many were provoked into
speculating like The Times '...that the work of censorship might better
have been left to the newspapers themselves...' (9th February 1915).
101. House of Comons Debates, 5th Series, 23rd March 1916,CoL. 447.





'My own experience is...the matter (censorship) had nv.ch better
be left to the conscience of the Press itself'. G.B. Shaw, The
Nation,2lst April 1917.
No other institution during the war came in for as much vilification
from the press as the Press Bureau and its administration of the
press censorship. There were several grievances. Firstly that
the Bureau did not function as that source of 'trustworthy information' 1
as promised by Churchill in August 1914, secondly that as a system
of censorship it was unfair and inefficient arid lastly given the
degree of self-censorship practised by most journalists that it
was unnecessary. Journalists came to regard the Bureau as an
affront to their professional skill and a dangerous impediment to
the vigorous prosecution of the war, a manifestation of the failure
of successive war-time governments to trust in the patriotic
common sense of the press. Why have an inefficient censorship which
did international harm to the reputation of the British government
it was argued, when journalists were proving quite capable of doing
the job far better themselves?
The supply of war news at the beginning of the war was in a hopeless
mess as we have seen in Chapters I and II. With the establishment
of the Bureau, newspapers hoped that matters would improve.
They didn't. Allied bulletins and official despatches during the
Autumn and Spring of 1914/15 issued through the Bureau, remained
vague arid optimistic and there were no war correspondents to add
a touch of realism to these official but highly obscure versions of
events. Thus it is not surprising that many newspapers, perceiving
it as their patriotic (and by no means unprofitable) duty, followed
suit with exaggerated headlines and misleading placards.
1. 1-buse of Comons Debates, 5th Series, 7th August 1914, Col. 2153-56.
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They could hardly be blamed when presented with official stories
of German rifle fire being 'poor while British rifle fire has
devastated every colinun of attack that has presented itself with
the result that our men have established a personal ascendancy over
the Germans...' (Official Press Bureau bulletin, 6th September 1914).
The News of the World wrote this up with the headlines : 'The Turn-
Tail Army/Terror Stricken Germans Cut/Down Like Chaff'. Official
euphoria following the Battle of the Marne affected even well
informed colilnentators like Repington of The Times who wrote on
14th September 1914 that 'The German troops are reported to be worn
out' and Gerinany'sposition to be 'unenviable' with supplies and
morale in a critical state. The blandness and official optimism
sprang from the top : 'The (British) cavalry', wrote Sir John French
in November 1914, 'do as they like with the enemy until they are
confronted with thrice their number. The German patrols simply fly
before our horsemen' (Official Despatch, The Times, November 20th
1914).
The appointment in October 1914 of Colonel E.W. Swinton as an official
'Eye Witness' had merely increased the supply of officially inspired
drivel emanating from France. He was so henined in by a triple
censorship (G.H.Q., Kitchener and the Press Bureau) and by his own
Service attitudes - 'naturally statements of wounded officers could
be accepted more literally than those of the rank and file' 2 - that
he could well have written his copy sitting in the comfort of his
London club. Swinton himself admitted that he relied on divisional
and daily intelligence reports rather than visit the front him-
self as when he did he 'got into trouble for reporting what I saw'
In the Spring of 1915, following the military setbacks at Neuve
Chapelle, influential sections of the press took alarm at these
persistently optimistic official accounts and presentations which
sharply contradicted the information many editors were receiving
2. Major General Sir Ernest Swinton, Eye Witness (London,
Fbdder & Stoughton, 1935) p. 77.
3. ibid. p.S7
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privately, either from former employees home from leave or from
their political and military sources. The Press Bureau was also
alarmed at the continual exaggerated press coverage which was
receiving press and Parliamentary attention. The Sunday Pictorial
for example heralded Neuve Chapelle as a victory for 'superior
strategy' and on 14th March featured a double page article by Horatio
Bottomley who interpreted the initial breakthrough of British
infantrymen (which was not followed up) as 'the beginning of the
end...June...will find hostilities suspended pending discussion
of the terms of peace'.
The Bureau characteristically bungled things by issuing a D Notice
CD 183) on 12th March 1915 which infuriated all sections of the
press by blaming the newspapers for 'false and exaggerated headlines'4
arid annoyed Churchill, . First Lord of the Admiralty, who took the
view that any attempt 'to discourage the Press as a whole from
taking a favourable view of the news which they receive from day to
day is greatly to be deprecated; if the contrary tendency is to be
developed, the difficulties for those responsible for the conduct
-	 of the war would be greatly increased' . 5The deep -' resentment over
the decision about war correspondents and the poor quality of news
bulletins quickly manifest itself in press reaction to this D Notice.
Sir George Riddell, Secretary of the N.P.A. wrote to Buckmaster
stating that 'whatever views they (the press) had given expression
to were founded upon information supplied by the Press Bureau'
The N.P.A. sent a resolution to the Bureau on 27th March 1915 pointing
out that '. . . if the people are being unduly soothed and elated, the
responsibility lies with the Government and not with the Press'
and that as for the news situation, the naval and military authorities
must not think only of the enemy but also of 'the coninercial and
industrial classes at home upon whom so much depends' .'
4. D 183 cited some glaring examples. Using as its authority a
telegram from the New York Tribune which stated that 'everything
possible is being done by the German Government to regulate the
use and further conservation of supplies', the Daily Fxpress
for example ran the headline : 'Germany on the Verge of Famine/
Fight for Food'. P.R.O. }D 139/22/A885/2.
5. Churchill to Buckmaster, 28th March 1915, ibid.
6. Riddell to Bucicmaster, 22nd March 1915, ibid.
7. N.P.A. Resolution, 27th March 1915, ibid.
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Buckmaster, recognizing that a serious credibility gap was
developing between official accounts of events and informed
press opinion, immediately wrote to Asquith informing him of the
N.P.A. resolution and of how pressmen had long felt aggrieved at
'the paucity of complete accounts of all Naval and Military
Operations whether they involved success or reverses to our arms'.8
He told Asquith that what had meved the press in particular was the
effect on the 'attitude of certain industrial classes (about) the
great losses we have incurred by the re-taking of the village of
Neuve Chaplle'. In other words, Buckmaster went on, the industrial
classes will notbe convinced of the need of great and sustained
efforts if they hear 'only continual reports of successes to our
arms'. 9
 Asquith agreed to meet representatives of the press at
Downing Street on the 1st of April 1915 where, according to the
Press Bureau account of the meeting, Harry Lawson, later Lord
Burnham, proprietor of the Daily Telegraph went to the heart of the
matter by telling Asquith that 'owing to the arrangements made with
the Government before the war was thought of, the Press expected to
be allowed to send correspondents to the front but that had not been
permitted. The Press therefore depended upon official information
and all of it (was) optimistic whether conveyed by the Government
or by the Naval or Military authorities'.10
In some respects the press wanted it both ways. They said, for
example, that they accepted the need for some form of censorship
in war-time but when an item was stopped, they almost invariably
howled. Similarly, they objected to optimistically written despatches
but they invariably wrote them up optimistically in their papers.
Northcliffe wrote to Asquith in November 1914 complaining of the
'apathy, ignorance and ridiculous optimism' of many newspapers and
8. Buckmaster to Asquith, 22nd March 1915,P.R.O. 139/22/A85/2.
9. ibid.
10. Press Bureau meranduin, April 1915, ibid.
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journals. 1 Yet on 6th March 1915 h-is Daily Mail ran a lead story
about the sinking of a U boat (U8) off the coast of Dover which
the Mail took as a sign that 'The German campaign is collapsing
not merely in ridicule but in disaster'. Two days later the
Mail was blaming official 'optimism' as the root cause of the
industrial troubles on the Clyde : 'The whole tendency of (official)
news of the war...is to minimise our difficulties, exaggerate the
enemy's failure and to encourage the notion that Germany is as good as
beaten...'. (8th March 1915). The Observer on l8thMarch 1915
complained of Sir John French giving 'an unduly optimistic impression
first' about the action at Neuve Chapelle and th,went on The Observer,
he 'darkens it afterwards. . .nothing could be mere mistaken and
injurious to public interest than the witholding of the mere disagreeable
part of the news...' But on 3rd October 1915 The Observer coninenting
on French's early pronouncements about the Battle of Loos ran the
headline : The Touch of Victory' followed by an article which
declared that 'The Allied guns here in the West have done mere to
pulverize the enemy's defences...they have shaken at last the
complacency of Berlin. . . there has been masterly preparations and
a glorious result' which French himself could hardly have bettered
for wishful thinking.
As a step towards improving the supply of news, it was agreed at the
Downing Street meeting in April that Riddell should see Kitchener,
Asquith and Churchill 'from time to time', for background briefings
which were to be distributed privately to proprietors and editors.
This caused so much resentment from those newspapers excluded from
the arrangement and the pressure for war correspondents became
so persistent, especially from the United States, that the system
was quickly abandoned and Kitchener agreed to allow five accredited
correspondents to go to France in May 1915. But as we shall see later
in this chapter, having war correspondents did little to stem the
flow of optimistic news emanating from the direction of G.H.Q.
although it went some way to satisfying the comercial demand for
exciting and professionally written war stories which sold newspapers.
11. Cited in Earl of Oxford and Asquith, op. cit. ,(1928), p. 234.
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The whole issue of the release of information became something of a
vicious circle. By delaying despatches the Services encouraged
the spread of ri.mx,urs and an unstable public opinion. Clurchill,
when at the Admiralty for example 'would hold on to a bit of bad
news for a time on the chance of getting a bit of good news to
publish as an offset' 12 . When newspapers objected to being treated
as '. . . adults with the minds of children' (Reynolds's Newspaper, 15th
April 1915) and the very latest news was released, for example
Balfour's interim report about the Battle of Jutland with its
emphasis on heavy British losses - a storm of protest ensued,
confirming in Service minds the volatile state of public opinion.
There were legitimate Service reasons why informat ion was not always
released to the Press Bureau - for example it was difficult for
the Admiralty on many occs ions to supply mere than a brief outline
at first of an engagement many thousands of miles away at sea.
Similarly G.H.Q. were reluctant to release imcomplete statements of
an action before all reports were at hand.
But then, as now, the Services and other government departments were
instinctively reluctant to release information; they preferred,
again like today, the inspired leak to an individual journalist
rather than use the mere official channels like the Bureau. Military
and naval experts like Arthur Pollen, Cornford Cope, Colonel A.M.
Murray and Rear Admiral Henderson in their analyses of the course
of the war tended to reveal a fairly accurate picture of the latest events
gleaned from their Service contacts. Repington, the military
correspondent of The Times for example, after a visit to the War
Office or to G.H.Q. in France, quite often published information which
had not been made available to the Bureau much to the Directors'
annoyance and fury of rival newspapers. At the April meeting, Asquith
like nost nodern Prime Ministers, ordered a stop to this fOrm of
unofficial leakage but to little avail. A circular issued on the 18th
of July 1916, reminding departments to supply all information for
12.	 Brownrigg, op. cit. ,(1920), p. 13.
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public release to the Press Bureau 'was for all practical purposes,
ignored' 13 . The Bureau argued quite convincingly to the departments
that it needed to be kept fully up to date in order both to do its
job as a censor and to keep at bay the horde of journalists who
were permanently stationed at the Bureau's premises but according
to Sir Frank Swettenham interviewed in 1939 '. . . the Service Depart-
ments fell far short of what was wanted in the way of conmtinicating
information to the Press Bureau • There was. .. a curious jealousy
and they could sometimes prevent publication by witholding Information' •14
A voluntary press censorship is bound to be unfair and any system
so dependent on the decisions of other departments is a]mest certain
to be inefficient. The newspaper press never fully came to terms
with these factors and the departments concerned never fully realised
the degree of annoyance such failures in the system evoked. A
voluntary system is endemically unfair in its operation because as we
have seen throughout this thesis, not all newspapers will submit the
same story and those that do and have stories stopped inevitably feel
aggrieved and at a conunercial disadvantage when they see the same
story blazoned across their rival's front page. In a voluntary
system there was no answer to this problem as E.T. Cook pointed out
to A.F.Hird of The Times following a complaint that The Times had
had a story about a submarine engagement stopped only to see it
prominently displayed in the following nrning's edition of the
lvbrning Post. Cook made the familiar observation that The Times
had submitted their proof but the Mrning Post had not and that
instances of this ldnd are very coniion and as the censorship is on
a voluntary basis, it is not easy to see how it is to be prevented'15
And it never was. In January 1918 the Daily Chronicle observed
somewhat sardonically : 'To send an article to the Press Bureau is
to invite a severity of treatment which can be escaped by the simple
process of not sending'.
13. 'The Official Press Bureau', op. cit.
14. Sir Frank Swettenham in interview with Admiral C .V. Usborne,
Director of Censorship Division, Ministry of Information, 22nd
December 1939, P.R.O. Cab. Prem 1/439.
15. Cook to Bird, 14th December 1915, P.R.O. 9J 139/15/A584/Part 2.
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There were other charges of unfairness touching the raw nerve of
coiiunercial rivalry which could have been avoided in a better nui
system. Riddell wrote to Swettenhain on 21st October 1915 complai.ning
about the publication of pacifist letters in the Glasgow Evening
Times which he considered a scandal. He went on to air a widely
shared grievance of the Fleet Street press that the Bureau lavished
more attention on them than on the provincial press. Ri.ddell found
it strange, he told Swettenham that 'no one makes a careful
examination of the papers which circulate amongst the working
classes to the extent of millions of copies per day...the system is
ridiculous. The censorship is geographical. A paper with a
20,000 circulation amongst the upper classes (i.e. Westminster Gazette)
is gone through most carefully. A paper with a 300,000 circulation
amongst the working classes in Glasgow is never looked at and has
probably never been heard of. Far too much attention is paid to
London' 16
The accusation was correct but misleading because Fleet Street papers
submitted far more copy to the Bureau than provincial papers knowing
that much of it could be collected by hand often within hours.
Provincial editors did of course submit items to the Bureau, - articles
rather than news items which, particularly if locally orientated,
tended to be published without reference to the Bureau. In this
respect the Fleet Street press was at a disadvantage and because
provincial censorship offices were never established, the issue
festered nicely in Fleet Street for the duration of the war. The
provincial newspapers themselves felt aggrieved when even lesser
fry than themselves evaded the censorship instructions. Comenting
on a detailed description of a Zepi .in raid which had appeared
in Ware Parish Magazine, the editor of the Hertfordshire rcury wrote
to the Bureau 'prompted...by a feeling of soreness that restrictions
placed upon us .. .which were loyally and conscientiously complied
with much to the mystification of our readers...should...be rendered
useless through others evading or ignoring them' •17•
16. Ri.ddell to Swettenhain, 21st October 1915, P.RIO, He 139/10/12.
17. Hertfordshire Mercury to Press Bureau, 3rd November 1915, P.R.O.
Iti 139/22/A894/7.
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The journal Land and Water complained bitterly to the Bureau on
20th September 1916 about the stopping of an article by Arthur
Pollen which alleged that serious design faults had contributed
to the sinking of three British battlecruisers at Jutland whereas
Pollen t s allegations	 had already been passed by the Bureau and
published in the Daily Mail and the Daily News. Brownrigg wrote
an unhelpful minute to the Bureau for reply to Land and Water stating
that it was always possible to stop re-publication of articles by
the same author on the grounds that it was preventing the repetition
of 'undesirable information'. 18
 The ease with which many of
Rep ington' s despatches and articles avoided normal censorship procedure
while Sir John French was Conunander-in-Chief was deeply resented by
conunercial rivals of The Times. Shortly after the publication of
Repington's despatch alleging grave shortages of high explosive
shells, Spender, editor of the Westminster Gazette wrote angrily to
the Bureau that Repington's article 'appears on the face of it to
contravene every principle which has been laid down for military
censorship. If it is true, it must beof value to the eneniy...if
a statement of this kind is allowed to one paper and not to others
Chow) can it be expected that the Press generally will regard the
Censorship as an impartial and even handed institution. . . fig
With a mere logical system, operated mere intelligently such charges
of unfairness could have been avoided. Less avoidable were the
inefficiencies of a system - delays to cablegrams and material
voluntarily submitted - caused by the perpetual referral of items
to the departments, all of which vitally affected a newspaper' s
conunercial competitiveness. Over delays there were spasmedic out-
bursts of annoyance, generally when it was discovered by an editor
that a rival had beaten him to a story. Blumenfeld of the Daily
Express complained to Buckmaster on 29th of September 1914 that a
telegram from Antwerp had been delayed for an hour thus missing
the early edition. Buckmaster renonstrated that one hour 'is not
18. Brownrigg to Press Bureau, 21st September 1916, P.R.O. FD.139/13/
A466/8.
19. Spender to Press Bureau, 15th May 1915, P.R.O. FK) 139/5/Al27/
Part 2/30.
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an excessive delay in an office in which many articles have to be
dealt with' 20 . In reply to this Blumenfeld revealed what had
really upset h.ijn : I had been told that it was because a Times
column proof had had "to be gone through" 21. Reuters complained on
30th January 1917 about a delay to a telegram from Cairo about
the Turkish occupation of Katia 'which has placed us in a
grave disadvantage in comparison with our competitors... meanwhile
the whole of this dispatch appeared in The Tunes'.22
Editors were remarkably tolerant over the issue of delayed cable-
grams and decisions (much to the amazement of the Directors of the
Press Bureau) considering the havoc they caused in meeting deadlines.
It was as if they had collectively and quite spontaneously resigned
themselves to the inevitable, allowing themselves only the ocassional
flash of annoyance or as in the case of Northcliffe's Weekly Dispatch
a sarcastic jibe : 'lVhat blunderers our Censors are! An article
submitted to them on Friday of last week was ' not passed for publication"
until Wednesday!.. (25th November 1917). The importance of time for
newspapers was never fully appreciated by the departments and not
by the Bureau at first as we have seen from Buckmaster's response
to Bluzmenfeld. It was difficult for example for the Bureau to get
decisions for editors after six in the evening because the departments
tended to keep normal office hours despite the war arid despite a
N.P.A. protest of January 1915 which pointed out that 'many editors
perform the nest important part of their duties between six p.m. and
2 a.m.' 23
 It was a failure to understand the technicalities of
20. Buckinaster to Blumenfeld, 5th October 1914. P.R,O. FK) 139/9/
A348/Part 1/5.
21. Blumenfeld to Buclanaster, 8th OCtober 1914, ibid.
22. Reuters to Press Bureau, P.R.O. Ii) 139/14/A572/Part 12/7.
23. N.P.A. to Press Bureau, 16th June 1915, P.R.O. I-I) 130/10/6. Such
complaints went on throughout the war. (i the 29th of March
1916, Ri.ddell complained that there were no naval censors on duty
the previous evening, a charge hotly denied by Sir Seyineur
Fortescue the Chief Naval Censor at the Bureau who regarded them as
tantamount to accusations of being absent without leave :
'We. . .are getting quite used to (such) attacks by the myrm.idons
of the press (which) . . are distinguished by an unerring disregard
for the truth' (the telegram in dispute had in fact been delayed
at the Admiralty), ibid.
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of producing newspapers which often infuriated editors. The
Bureau for instance did not appreciate - until it was pointed out
by 1ynolds's Newspaper on 11th April 1915 - that placing a '!'bnday
only' stamp on a press item put the Sunday press at a distinct
disadvantage.
Given the volume of work involved, it was difficult for the Bureau
to provide individual explanations for censorship decisions but
there is little evidence that any serious thought was given to
this aspect of its work until 1917. A leader in the Evening News for
28th September 1915 was representative of the views expressed in
many newspapers that 'The Press does not know in nine cases out of
ten why the publication of certain news is prohibited. Sometimes
the censor unbends sufficiently to inform the victims of his operation;
mere often his line of thought appears to be beyond human under-
standing...being an ingenious body, the Press could often 'defeat'
the Censor without any risk of being shot at dawn, but it doesn't
try because that is not the game. After all the people we want to
defeat are our enemies'. But it was not until Lloyd George's War
Cabinet wanted editors on their side over the stopping of the large
number of cablegrams from Russia containing Bolshevik propaganda,
that an arrangement was devised whereby editors could make weekly
visits to the Bureau to examine censored material.24
All the blunders and inconveniences could have been borne easier by
journalists if they had believed that the press censorship was
worthwhile in the national interest. But as early as the Autumn of
1914 there emerged a clear consensus in the press which regarded
the Bureau's activities as a menace to the war effort -s-belief
shared for example by both sides in the controversy over conscription.
Its very existence, it was argued, led to the impression both at
home and abroad that things were being covered up which in turn had
24. From 30th October 1917 each newspaper and news agency was
supplied with a list of stopped telegrams which could be
examined 'provided not less than seven and not more than fourteen
days' had elapsed but the contents were 'not to be disclosed or
used in any way whatever'. P.R.O. I-)139/27/Part 6/383.
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a detrimental effect on recruitment, home morale and neutral opinion.
A letter from the pro-conscriptionist Viscount Mimer in The Times
on 5th September 1914 and eagerly publicised in Northcliffe's
other London papers, was an early but significant barometer of the
way many journalists came to regard the censorship : 'there can
be no doubt that there is a daily increasing dissatisfaction at
the scantiness of news vouchsafed to the public and it is doing
ham'.
Led by Northcliffe 's papers, there was beginning in November and
December 1914 an aiimDst daily barrage of leaders associating the
failures of the censorship with the risk to recruiting and home
morale. 'Nore News Will BringIMre Recruits' headlined the Evening
News on 12th November 1914 followed by a leader which declared that
many public figures had been expressing 'general discontent with
the policy of secrecy which extends to the suppression of news
that would not be worth a brass farthing to the enemy but would
be of enormous value to the recruiting campaign. . .we report what all
our M.P.'s must know - that reform of the Censorship is the best
remedy for slack recruiting - stale official news, tedious reports
of trivialities, long intervals of silence arid total failure to
give the country the chronicle of its Army's magnificent work - these
bewilder and disgust the people. ' The Times argued on the 15th of
December 1914, that a 'grandmotherly system' of dealing with the
news attacked the good sense and virility of the nation undermining
its sense of purpose and by implication its recognition of the need
for conscription. On the other hand. the Liberal Daily News on 30th
November 1914 called for '. . .an understanding of national psychology'
in the operation of the censorship rather than a policy of timid
conceaiment which only did harm to the principle of voluntary enlistment.
A letter from Chas. Harrison, Chairman of the National Union of
Brewery Workers made much the same point, albeit more forcefully, on
the front page of the Evening News on 30th October 1915. Harrison
expressed his opposition to the idea of conscription but if it was
to be introduced 'the censorship will be to blame.. . the stupid
censorship will be responsible for the murder of many of our members.
And of course this applies with equal force to the members of other
trade unions'. The banning of soldiers letters from the front was seen as
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particularly harmful to the voluntary service scheme, the
reason for which being regarded by many newspapers as 'entirely
illusory'. (Peynolds's Newspaper, 16th October 1915).
As for the effect on foreign opinion, the New. Statesman, like
many newspapers, believed that the censorship 'has persistently
lowered our prestige abroad...'(23rd October 1915). The Times
regularly featured criticism of the British censorship which had been
made abroad particularly in the United States. After a few menths
of war, the paper's Washington correspondent sent a despatch
published on the 8th of October 1914 which in traditional Times mariner
sought to give the government some guidance ; 'One of the worst
features of the war', it declared, 'is the evil influence of a blind
censorship. England and France alike must know that if they desire
to promete and stimulate a belief in foreign lands of their combined
power, the suppression of information is a poor policy'. It was
advice which in the opinion of the Daily Mail the British government
steadfastly ignored to its cost. A leader on 10th October 1915
was certain that 'after fifteen menths of experience with censor-
ship, nothing has done nre to lower our reputation abroad for
honesty and good sense...' Having an official press censorship
certainly exposed the British government to the charge of keeping
back information from its own people and also, in view of London's
position at the centre of the world's telegraphic network, to the
charge that international telegrams for onward transmission,
particularly from Europe to the United States, were 'doctored'. The
New York Evening Post told its readers in October 1914 that the
British censorship 'is plainly controlled by a desire to conceal the
extent of German successes, to blacken the enemy's character as much
as possible and generally to win public opinion in the States by fair
means or foul'.
'Truth', said William Randolph Hearst in 1916, 'was long ago decided
by the British Press Bureau as its chief enemy' (New York Journal,
10th May 1916) and anti-British journalists like him took great delight
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in quoting British press attacks upon the Bureau. Following the
banning of Hearst' s newspaper syndicate from using the British
international cable via London on 10th October 1916,25 his New
York American ran a double column leader on 12th October 1916 which
devoted much of its space to extensive quotations from The Times.
Daily Mail, Daily News, and Pall Mall Gazette all sharply critical
of the Press Bureau's perfoniiance. 'Ask any Englishman', Northcliffe
was quoted 'what branch of Government deserves first prize fdr
incompetence, stupidity and unparalleledcapacity for making blunders
and he will unhesitantly name the Press Bureau. In a veritable army
of muddlers the British censor. . .has remained champion
Londoners know less of the war than New Yorkers....' (a characteristic
Northcliffe exaggeration).
By the 20th of November 1915 The Times had come to the conclusion
that the press censorship had beconie'incorrigibly inefficient'
and nost of Fleet Street and the provincial press would have
concurred. They had all experienced delays to telegrams, unfair
treatment, seen material passed which they said they would not have
published and they had all observed the growth of an institution
which none of them had expected would interfere so thoroughly
with the commercial running of their paper. But what rubbed salt into
all these wounds was what they regarded as the failure of the authorities
to recognize that from the outset of the war they had proved to be
quite capable, like all professional journalists, of censoring their
own material 'in the national interest'. The Irish Thnes1d earlier
made the point, that had those in authority, particularly at the
Press Bureau, 'been mere intimately acquainted with the working of the
Press ' they would have realised that 'competent editors would be
quite sure to use their discretion in such a way that nothing of
importance should be revealed to the enemy'. It pointed to a case
where ' the description of the tactics employed by the Indian troops in
conducting their attacks upon the enemy trenches would not have been
published, we believe, had the responsibility been left with the
newspaper editors' (7th December 1914).
25.	 P.R.O. HO 139/28/A1057/Part 1.
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On 9th February 1915 the London Times went to the heart of this press
grievance : 'In all essentials', said a leader a1imst certainly
written by Dawson the editor, 'the standard of censorship imposed
by newspapers themselves is infinitely higher than that of the
Press Bureau (and) there is much force in the view, which is
by no means confined to the Press, that the work of censorship might
better have been left to the newspapers themselves - with the
assistance of a strong Government coniniss ion completely furnished
with all the official news and plans for reference in doubtful
cases'. Sl. the Strachey made the same point in The Spectator later
that year : 'On the general principle of censorship we would simply
say that we doubt the efficacy in the majority of cases. It is a
very clumsy instrument. We are tempted to fancy sometimes that
we should be in no greater danger if there was no Press Censorship
at all' (13th November 1915). Lord lt,rley, himself
journalist, observed in the House of Lords on 3rd November 1915 that
he had 'never seen...an Administration in less need of a censored
Press...I have never seen a Government more tenderly handled' 26 and
Lord Curzon acknowledged on the 8th of November, that 'having invited
the Press to be the censors of the Press. . . looking back. . . this
is an appeal which we (the Government) have not addressed in vain' •27
What all these commentators were in effect acknowledging was the
degree of self-censorship observed by most newspapers during the
war.
Self-censorship is a constant ethical problem for journalists.
airing the First World War, editors and proprietors, recipients of
a perpetual flow of official 'guidance', faced daily not only the
problem of what to put in or leave out of their newspapers but also
the additional burden of how to interpret events 'in the national
interest'. It was a problem made more agonising for a proprietor
like Northcliffe, possessing a megalomanic belief in the power and
26. House of Lords Debates, 5th Series, 3rd November 1915,
Col. 128.
27. House of Lords Debates, 5th Series, 8th November 1915, Col.203.
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influence of his papers upon public opinion. As with other
aspectsress censorship, the issue had been raised well before
1914. In 1898, J.M.Maclean Unionist M.Pfor Cardiff and editor
proprietor of the Western Mail in a speech to the Institute of
Journalists about war correspondents expressed 'surprise
arid uneasiness that the Press in London. . . had not given the facts
about the present campaign in the North West frontier of India.
There had been, he would not say a good deal of suppression but a
great deal of silence about what had been going on.. • ,28
It was because the press had ex ercised such 'a great deal of silence'
over this and later campaigns in South Africa29 that proprietors
like Sir John Long, proprietor of the Dundee Advertiser were so
vehemently opposed to the proposed 1905 Press Bill for control of
the press in war-time. Such a Bill was unnecessary, argued Long
because '. . .the discreet and patriotic withholding of news if
exercised by a free press (is) a sphere where perfect freedom is
by experience proved to be for the public good' •30 There were
other journalists like Sidney Brooks who as we have seen in Chapter 1
did not believe that their fellow journalists were capable of the
kind of patriotic discretion which people like Sir John Long claimed
for them. According to Brooks 'Trusting to the "patriotism" or
'good feeling" (of the press)...is an inadequate safeguard, because
patriotism ..would have to be backed upby omniscience'(Pall Mall
Gazette, 27th July 1912). But Brooks was wrong about the voluntary
system which worked effectively and discreetly arid he was wrong
about the degree of self-imposed censorship which journalists were
capable of. From the nost prestigious to the nost lowly of the profession,
journalists at the outbreak of the war became ultra patriots often
28. Cited in the Fortnightly Review, April 1898.
29. The Cornhill Magazine in March 1915 referred to a request made
to the press during the Boer War to keep quiet about General
Robert' s plans for an advance on Blontfontein : 'and to our credit
for we really are quite a patriotic lot when we are not thinking
of how to go one better than our competitors - we did lie low
over the details of Robert's concentrations'.
30. Long, 'Open Letter to the Press', April 1906, P.R.O. Cab. 17/91.
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subordinating their professional judgeinents and interests to what
they regarded as the overriding interests of the state. As Dawson
wrote to F. E. Smith on 27th August 1914 : 'Let me point out to you...
that The Times and I do not doubt other newspapers have been daily
supplementing the work of the Press Bureau by censorship undertaken
on their own account. We are continuously receiving in±ormation
sometimes passed by tile Censor, which it is not in the national
interest to publish'.31
Dawson's claim to Smith was openly and frequently admitted in the
leader columns of his paper. In a leader of 4th November 1915 The Times
comnenting on a House of Lords debate about the censorship, argued
that 'the plain truth is that in the matter of giving information to
the enemy, the newspapers are far mere cautious than the Press Bureau
.we ourselves and we doubt not other newspapers act habitually as
our own censors...' Dawson was as good as his word. At the time of
writing that leader, he was busy with his blue pencil hacking away
for example at many of the pieces critical of the High Conunand sent
to him by Repington, The Times military correspondent.Repington frequently
complained to The Times office about editorial interference with his
articles. In a letter to Freeman (Dawson's deputy as night editor) on
9th October 1916 referring to an article on the 'War Situation', Repington
complained that' it has been described as "uncensored" yet parts of my
?S are omitted'. 32 A little later in the month Repington felt obliged
to circulate a secret internal menx,randum to the Times editorial
staff entitled 'The Real Situation' as 'I am prevented from expressing
my real opinion in The Times'. (The 'real situation', in Repington's
opinion was the continual political interference in the military conduct
of the war; he had earlier written an article attacking Lloyd George
for having 'forced Geddes upon Haig...', which Freeman had returned 	 33
unpublished because Freeman believed 'that its insertion was not desirable').
31. Dawson to Smith, P.R.O. I-I) 139/5/Al27/Part 2.
32. Repington to Freeman, 'Repington', MSS. The Times Archives.
33. Freeman to Repington, 11th October 1916, ibid. The Times, was anxious
at that moment to protect its favourite Minister, Lloyd George from
any adverse publicity or criticism. The appointment of a civilian,
Sir Eric Geddes with the acting rank of Major General to rim the
railways in France rankled very deeply with professional soldiers
like Repington.
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On the face of it, Dawson's open confession of self-censorship
appears to conflict with the views taken p.iblicly by his eployer,
Lord Northcliffe. The 'Napoleon of Fleet Street' portrayed himself
as the champion of a free press, the arch enemy of any form of
censorship and the bitter critic of those journals alleged to be
collaborating with the authorities in 'Hiding the Truth'. But
Northcliffe was only too anxious to place his sources at the
government' s disposal and to 'hide the truth' when he saw fit 'in
the national interest'. He told Lloyd George in 1916 that he had
not been very impressed by what he had seen at G.H.Q. while on a
visit there in September 1914 nor by what he described to Lloyd
George as '...the disgraceful waste of life at Loos'. 34 But
readers of his newspapers read nothing of these misgivings. The
war correspondents Keith Mirdoch and Ellis Ashmead Bartlett both
informed him of what they regarded as the appaling military situation
in the Dardanelles. Northcliffe arranged for them to see Lloyd
George but as he told Balfour he thought 'it wise not to discuss
the disastrous Dardanelles expedition in my newspapers'
In fairness to Northcliffe, because he was looked upon as the xxst
powerful and influential press proprietor of his day, people confided
scandals and revealed shortcomings to him which he genuinely
considered would, in many instances, have done grave damage to
military or naval operations, if published. He told Curzon in June
1915 of 'letters we are getting frcmi the front in regard to the
horrors that have taken place owing to the lack of explosives; there
are many revelations concerning shocking lack of preparations of
what are called Kitchener' s Armies at home. . . . there is a vast
34. Northcliffe to Lloyd George, 6th August 1916, Lloyd George Papers,
E/2/21/1. Heuse of Lords Record Office.
35. Pound and Hannsworth, op. cit. (1952) p. 484. His papers of course
published news items about the Gallipoli venture but these were
clearly kept to a minimum.
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shortage of rifles and practically no machine guns or arms for
practice...I do not publish this matter as it might be valuable
information for the Germans. •
Northcliffe instinctively disliked any form of censorship, official,
voluntary or self-imposed because it compromised his independence as
a journalist and often left him with a feeling of having been used.
As he told Churchill in 1912 when, at the start of the pre-war
voluntary scheme, he had held back news of a German Naval scheme
at the request of the British Ambassador in Berlin, : 'I do not
like doing this sort of thing and I consider an Ambassador takes a
great responsibility upon himself in making such a request. These
same Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers are the people who, while
they make use of the Press as a sort of doormat, are always talking
of its dangerous tendency etc. etc. etc.' 37 But he went on suppressing
material throughout the war as much on his own initiative as by
official request. Writing to Balfour on 11th July 1915 he referred to
having visited France the previous Easter where he had become aware 'of
certain scandals in connectionwith the Ioyal Naval Air Services.
The perpetual washing of dirty linen in public is not a grateful task
and I have carefully refrained from even hinting at what I know
in any of my papers, hoping against hope that improvements would be
ma1e' 38
Northcliffe did mere than mest public figures to foster an image of
the army and its General Staff as a super fighting machine, 'an
organization' as he told Lloyd George in 1916, which was 'well nigh
as perfect as it can be' 39 headed as the Daily Mail put it on 13th
October 1916 by 'two of the mest capable soldiers whom Britain has
produced for many years'. By February 1918 Northcliffe was holding
a far mere critical opinion of the perforinnce of the army and the
36. . Northcliffe to Balfour, 11th July 1915, Northcliffe MSS, Dep. 4908,
'Balfour', British Library. The drastic fall in the Daily Mail's
circulation figures following Northcliffe' s attack on Kitchener may
well have also had something to do with his decision.
37. Northcliffe to Churchill, 1st March 1912, 	 Northcliffe S,
Vol. IV. British Library.
38. Northcliffe to Balfour, 11th July 1915., ibid., Vol I. He was
referring to heavy losses incurred by the R.N.A.S. at Dunkirk.
39. Northcliffe to Lloyd George, 1st August 1916, ibid., Vol V.
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quality of its general staff. Writing to his neighbour Lord Rosebery
in February 1918 he considered that 'with the exception of a Division
under Sir ntague Harper and Pluniner's Army, our losses from sheer
ignorance on the part of those who issue orders are appaling...
our losses last year make up a shocking tale. I should not like
to say how many men were uselessly thrown away at Passchendaele and
Caznbrai. Unless you actually see the blunders as I have done, it is
incredible that they should have been committed. Is it believable
that sane men would send masses of metal weighing 30 tons into
the mud at Ypres. The tank experts warned the Connanders of what
would happen to those invaluable weapons of war if they persisted'.40
But apart from a few short, sharp outbursts by Lovat Fraser in the
Daily Mail critical of the High Command, Northcliffe's papers
continued throughout this period of the war to present the army as the
ultimate in military efficiency and to find a vast range of excuses
to account for the lack of success. On 9th January 1918 a news story
in the Daily Mail described Haig's account of military operations
for 1917 as containing 'a spirit of high confidence throughout'. A
leader headed 'Haig Pushes/And 1hy They Were Not/Decisive'
considered that the reason why Germany had not been crushed is the
fault 'not of the British staff (nor) the British generals but
factors over which they could excercise no control' - such as the
Russian Revolution, the French offensive not being 'the decisive
action' hoped for and 'last but not least the weather (which) was
uniformly hostile. Not Hinderiurg's Germans but rain deprived
us of a great victory at Arras. Not Ludendorff but the mud saved
the Germans at Ypres'.
Dawson in his letter to &nith in . Ajigust 1914 inferred that other members
of his profession were also in the habit of wielding the censor's
blue pencil on their own account and there is plenty of evidence to
support this assertion with several of Lloyd George's press friends
providing some vivid examples C.P. Scott, editor of the Manchester
40. Northcliffe to Rosebery, 12th February 1918, Northcliffe MSS.
Rosebery'Vol. II British Library.
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Guardian was a close confidant of Lloyd George and other senior
members of the war-time governments but he ass iduouly suppressed
much of the often controversial and head-line making news that caine
his way. He did this so thoroughly that his staff were often
incensed to discover that they had been scooped on stories that
Scott had been aware of for days. Over breakfast with Lloyd George
on 27th November 1914 Scott learnt of Lloyd George and Admiral
Fisher's grave disquiet over recent Admiralty failures in the South
Atlantic and particularly over the performance of the Maditerranean
Fleet from whose clutches in October 1914 the German battlecruisers
'Goeben' and 'Breslau' had escaped through the Straits of Messina
to Constantinople, where they played a crucial role in 'persuading'
Turkey to join the Central Powers. Lloyd George informed Scott
that he believed there had been 'a society job' 4 to protect the
Commander of the Mediterranean Fleet, Sir Berkeley Mime, from facing
court martial. Not only was there no hint of all this in the Manchester
Guardian but a leader on 28th November 1914 argued strongly that
these questions (the loss of Admiral Craddock's squadron in the South
Atlantic and the escaped German battlecruisers) will be publicly
thrashed out in time but the right time is not now'.
On 13th October 1915 Scott wrote to L.T. Hobhouse, the London editor
of the Guardian that 'a wounded man - an educated corporal just back
from Loos sends a letter to us - too damaging for publication - from
which it appears that in that engagement we shelled our own men'42
At the time, the paper was running stories such as that of 12th
October 1915 headlined : 'Germans suffered ininense losses and a
• complete defeat'. At no stage during this period was the story from
the 'educated corporal' even hinted at. Even the vague suggestion, in
a leader on 2nd November commenting about Sir John Freich' s deapatch
about the Loos engagement that all might not be well with the British
forces was tempered with the coninent that '...even our defeats, some
of them, have shown finer racial qualities than all the German
victories'. When Lloyd George became Prime Minister in December
41. Trevor Wilson, The Political Diaries of C.P.Scott (New York,
Cornell University Press, 1970) p. 110-11.
42. ibid. P. 141.
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1916 Scott naturally became privy to far tore confidential
information. As a frequent breakfast-table guest at 10 Downing
Street he periodically heard Lloyd George 'enlarging on the stupidity
of the soldier...including Haig' and of how in the Prime Minister's
opinion, 'all the men who had made reputations in the War were
civilian or civilian-trained' . 	 No hint of these views, even at
the time of Robertson's 'resignation' as C.I.G.S. in February 1918
when Scott had early notice that Robertson was to be replaced by
Wilson, ever leaked as far as Manchester.
Another press figure in almest daily and intimate contact with Lloyd
George and other senior politicians and officials was Sir George
Riddell, Secretary of the N.P.A. and chief proprietor of the News
of the World. He heard from Lloyd George of the 'very bad'
arrangement for the supply of shells as early as October 1914; he
learnt from journalist Stephen Graham in February 1915'a gloomy account
of the Russian prospects in the East'; he himself told Sir Reginald
Brade, Permanent Secretary at the War Office, on the 17th of March
1915 that 'the man in the Street does not know the real facts
regarding Neuve Chapelle' and like Scott, Riddell often heard of Lloyd
George's low opinion of the generals, of how they lacked vision
and of how the civilians, according to Lloyd George, 'have been too
easily led by the soldiers' as a result of which 'all these great
offensives have been failures and. . .many glorious lives have been
sacrificed'. After a visit to Verdun in September 1916 Lloyd George
told Riddell that 'the public know only half the story. They read
of the victories; the cost is concealed'44
But Riddell kept these facts and opinions to himself during the war
and appeared to have passed nothing on to his editor, Elmsley Carr.
While, it was admitted in The News of the World on the 21st of
February that Russia had suffered a setback in the fight for Prussia,
readers were told, (despite Stephen Graham's information to the
proprietor) that 'there is nothing to indicate that the 'German
43	 Wilson, op. cit., (1970) P. 297.
44.	 Riddell, op. cit. (1933), p. 33, p.65; pp.207-8, 218.
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Victory "reported in Berlin is nothing more than a circumstantial
fiction of the kind that has made German war news notorious'. On
21st ?vlarch 1915, a few days after Riddell's conversation with Brade,
readers of his paper learnt that 'As fuller. . .accounts of the battle
of Neuve Chapelle become available the action grows in brilliancy
and importance. When the moment for hand to hand fighting came some
of the Germans were only able to drag themselves to their knees
begging for mercy'. While he heard Lloyd George castigating the
Generals and questioning the strategic usefulness of the offensives,
Riddell's newspaper reminded its readers that 'We must trust our
Generals and not be impatient,' (26th September 1915) and that as far
as the offensives were concerned '...the only gospel the Germans
respect is the gospel of the sword and with heavy blows its doctrine
is being heavily exploited by the Allied troops...' (26th August
1916 at the time of the Somne offensive).
Right wing editors like Garvin, Blumenfeld and St. Loe Strachey, too
old for active service, had a strong desire to 'do their bit' for the
country and the element of patriotic 'sacrifice' was a powerful motive
for them when it caine to censoring their own material. Strachey told
his readers as early as August 1914, shortly before the announcement
of the landing of the British Expeditionary Force in France that 'the
press...an enormous existing power for good or evil...has been given
its opportunity of self suppression and has used it nobly'. (The Spectator
15th August 1914). They seemed to believe that they had a public duty
in war-time to suppress any form of criticism or report which reflected
badly on the efficiency, integrity or strategic conceptions of the
senior commanders in the armed forces. This 'protection' took on an
extremely partisan form during 1915 when, with dead-lock on the Western
Front, press support for 'side shows' in the Dardan.elles and Salonika,
(sponsored by the former 'Radicals' Lloyd George and Churchill),
gathered momentum. Strachey told Haig in December 1915 that
he had been busy countering the doubts being expressed in the
press about the viability of the Western Front strategy and that he
could '...well understand how sick soldiers must be of us journalists.
When I look back upon the record of my profession I am bound to say
it is a sorry one. . .journalists have failed to get the public to
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realise that as a general rule nothing is more futile than to
judge by bare	 '.45
Strachey wrote to Haig on 27th October 1916 again apologizing as a
journalist for press comments which had suggested that the Some
offensive had been a .failure and had led to enormous and unnecessary
losses. 'There are', he wrote to Haig 'the beginnings of a most
dangerous thing here, an attempt to work on people's feelings
in regard to casualties and to ask whether they are really worthwhile.
That of course is ruin and therefore I thought the best thing was
stamp upon it at once' . 46Strachey had already earned Haig' s gratitude
for an article in The Spectator for 26th August 1916, 'The Bedrock
of War', in which Strachey defended the Western Front offensive
strategy and urged the nation not to listen 'to people whose nerve
gives way. . let them (the British people) remember that their duty
is not to flinch and not to embarrass the Conmander-in-Chief by
cries of "This slaughter is more than we can endure" but to make up
their minds to see the thing through whtever it costs in tears, blood,
human anguish...' In May 1918 Strachey carried self-censorship in
the interests of senior military personnel to the point Of
completely censoring any account of the Maurice debate, a Lloyd George
tour de force in which the Prime Minister totally (but falsely)
discredited the fonner Director of Military Operations,Sir Frederick
Maurice who had accused Lloyd George of lying over the number of
troops under Haig's command on the Western Front at the beginning of
1918. Strachey assured Maurice on 10th May 1918 that 'This Saturday's
paper will have nothing about the Debate' .
R.D.Blunienfeld, editor of the Daily Express was also aware like
Riddell as early as October 1914 that the British forces in France
were facing a serious shortage of shellsBluxnenfeid learnt this from
an old friend and regular correspondent, Major General later Field
45. Strachey to Haig, 31st December 1915. Strachey Papers, S/J 1/ 1.
1-buse of Lords Record Office.
46. Strachey to Haig, Strachey Papers, S18/1/3. ibid.
47. Strachey to Maurice, Strachey Papers, S/1O/8/2. ibid.
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Marshal Sir Julian Byng but he published nothing in his paper about
it at the time. 48
 Like many other editors during the war, Blumenfeld
placed rabid patriotism before the pusuit of objective journalism.
As editor of the most stridently jingoistic newspaper of the period,
it didn't suit him to use the information about shell shortages until
it could be used as a club to beat about the head of the Liberal
Mininistration and about Lord Haldane's head in particular who was
blamed by the Express for having 'cut down' on the establishment at
Woolwich thus causing current shell shortages. (Daily Express,5th
December 1914). Like Strachey,Blumenfeld was anxious that nothing
should appear in the press which reflected adversely on the courage
or enterprise of the British forces and their commanders. He did not,
for example use information sent to him from France in November 1916
about troops of the 21st Division on the Somme who had abandoned
their packs and of other units getting 'tight on a cask of run' Nor
did he use or o judge from the tone of his leaders, appear in any
way affected by the information and opinions he was receiving privately
fromAshmead Bartlett in September, 1917 about 'These d-optimist
generals who live in French chateaux. .men, with few exceptions...of
the most indifferent intellect who...have succeeded in the last
five months in killing, permanently wounding and maiming 21,727
Officers, and 344,614 N.C.O's (and).. .have hardly moved the Hun an
inch'. 50Blumenfeld later described Ashinead Bartlett as 'clever and
outspoken but not always discreet. . . he fell foul of the authorities
at the Dardanelles and made no end of a fuss in his letters home'.51
But Blumenfeld did take notice and act when senior army officers wrote
letters home making 'no end of a fuss' as did General Charteris,
Haig's senior Intelligence Officer on 30th December 1917 urging Blumenfeld
48. Major General Sir Julian Byng to Blumenfeld, 28th October 1914,
Blumenfeld Papers. By 1-46. House of Lords Record Office.
49. T.H. Buck to Blumenfeld, 21st November 1916, ibid.




todiscount rumours that staff changes at G.H.Q. (including his own
dismissal) had any 'connection direct or indirect with the Cainbrai
show.., my departure is not at the request or the desire of either
the C-in-C or my imediate superior officers-very much the reverse'52
Blurn.enfeld duly obliged on this- occasion with a front page story in
January 1918 headed 'The Rumours of Cambrai/No One Sent Home/Greatest
Killing of the War' in which it was stated that'The Daily Express
understands that no one has been ungunitied and no one is likely to
be... (at Cainbrai) we killed more Germans and wounded more men than
the Germans ever lost on one day on the Western Front.. .our machine
gunners were physically sick of the killing. . . the recent changes at
GJ{.Q. have nothing to do with the Caznbrai affair'.
The difficulties facing editors over the issue of self-censorship
were well described by Garvin of The Observer in a letter to his
son Gerald, later killed on the Somme. Garvin complained on 22nd
October 1915 that 'my job is exceedingly difficult. If one speaks
out, it is an unpleasant and thankless task apt to be misunder-
stood by the blissfully ignorant, never can one speak out plain
enough without risk of causing more disquiet than understanding.
If one is reassuring and talks like Pangloss whatever happens, one
simply encourages fatheads in delusion and even statesmen in
inadequacy. To hit the point of stimulating without disorganizing
and getting action forward without shaking nerves. . . is an extraordinary
tax on juclgement. .. 	 Such a view helps to explain why Garvin said
nothing about the submarine menace which as he learnt from Fisher
in February 1915 was 'a bit more serious than is officially pretended'.54
52. Charteris to Blumenfeld, Blumenfeld Papers, Char/i -2, House of
Lords R&ord Office.
53. J . L Garvin to Gerald Garvin, 22nd October 1915, Garvin Papers,
Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London.
54. Garvin to Gerald Garvin, 8th February 1915, ibid.
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It also perhaps explains an absurdly optimistic conclusion
drawn by The Observer at the end of an article about the set-
back at Neuve Chapelle which described how many British troops
had been held up by unbroken barbed wire, shot down by German
machine guns and others had been hit by shrapnel from British
artillery shells but nonetheless Neuve Chapelle was 'in spite of
all this. . .a memorable victory'. (18th March 1915). Such attempts
to 'stimulate without disorganizing' must indeed been an 'Extraordinary
tax on judgement' and amply confirm Garvin's own claim made to his
son in September 1915 that 'I have never given anything away...
(I) . . .always sacrifice journalism. . .to the public good' .
Amy Strachey,in a biography of her father made the quip that
'the way to keepa secret is to tell it to a journalist in
confidence' 56 and there is clearly a problem for journalists in
senior positions about how to use, if at all, the information gleaned
from the inner sanctums of political power. Scott's view on the
matter was very clear. He told Garvin in 1915 that 'he never dreamt
of using information got in that way except as a guide to judgement
and he was most upset when a highly placed 'source' revealed
information to journalists less inclined to remain silent than
himself. 1hen such a source, Admiral Fisher, told T.P. O'Connor,
proprietor of The Star what Fisher considered to be the grave naval
situation facing the country, Scott records in his diary that he
spent a good deal of his time on 3rd March 1916 'seeing O'Connor and
pressing on him by every means in my power the obligation of a deadly
secrecy as to the naval peril - a hard task for a born journalist' 58
Also like Scott, Riddell took a dim view of those journalists or
officials who broke the 'off the record' code of self-censorship. He
was for example as critical of Sir John French for having collaborated
with Repington in publishing the shell shortage story in 1915 as he
55. Garvin to Gerald Garvin, Garvin Papers, (14th September 1915)
op.cit.
56. Cited in John Wale, Journalism and Government, (London, Macmillan &
Co., 1973) p.16.
57. Trevor Wilson, op. cit., (1970), p. 160.
58. ibid., p.102.
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was of Robertson Nicoll, editor of the British Weekly for having
published 'a most depressing account' of conditions in the trenches
learnt from Lloyd George, publication of which Riddell considered
to be most 'injudicious'.59
It was not just editors who felt obliged to sacrifice their
professional standards for the sake of the war effort. Those
journalists closest to the actual fighting, the war correspondents,
particularly the five accredited to G.H.Q. on the Western Front,
obliged by their undertaking to the authorities to refrain from
all criticism of individual conunanders or operations, carried this
to the point where as one of the five, Philip Gibbs was able to
write in the introduction to a reprint oE his despatches in 1918
'There is no criticism in this book, no judgement of the actions of
men, no detailed sununing up of success or failure. That is not
within my liberty or duty as a correspondent with the Armies in the
-	 60Field'.
Such discretion was the hallmark of aLnost all the war correspondents
from the commencement of hostilities whether they had signed any
official undertaking or not. The History of The Times refers with
pride to the 'important negative service...that was rendered at
the beginning of the war'.61 The History of The Times was referring
to the .silence observed-in the press about the German
victory over the Russians at Tannenbrg, and in paiticular to the
self-censorship ex ercised by Gerald Campbell, The Times
correspondent with the French armies in Lorraine who made no mention
in his despatches of the gigantic losses sustained by the French forces
there in the opening weeks of the war. According to the History of The
Times 'it is impossible that Campbell can have failed to hear many
details of the disastrous battle in Lorraine in which the French
59. G.A.Riddell, op. cit. (1933) p.33.
60. Philip Gibbs, From Bapaume to Passchendaele (London, William
Heinemann (1918) p.6.
61. The History of The Times , Vol IV op. cit. (1952) p. 232.
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• were defeated with losses of about 300,000 or nearly 25% of the
combatants. No word of this, a rate of wastage never equalled in
all the rest of the war, appeared in his messages to the paper nor
even in his private letters to Dawson. . .Had it been known in
England that France had lost a quarter of a million men from her
regular army in the first month of the war, British determination
must have been gravely weakened' •62
The correspondents at G.H.Q. pooled their stories each day which
were then censored by military censors who lived with them, before
being telegraphed to the Press Bureau for onward transmission to
Fleet Street. But as Gibbs wrote shortly after the war : 'We
identified ourselves absolutely with the armies in the field...
there was no need of censorship of our despatches. We were our
own Censors' •63 Official briefings by staff officers who had become
their friends were accepted often without question and bland
innocuous stories filed for publication even at the height of the
most serious engagements. Writing of his despatches about the Somme
battles, one of the correspondents, W. Beach Thomas (Daily Mail!
Daily Mirror)confessed that ' I was thoroughly and deeply ashamed
of what I had written for the good reason that it was untrue'.64
Gibb's despatches about the British failure at Cambrai in 1917
are eloquent testimony, of the total 'identification' with the army
staff view of events at the expense of objective journalism.
Enemy forces were always 'formidable' or in 'new strengths'. When
on 5th December 1917 British troops who had taken Bourdon Wood on
20th November were forced to evacuate the position, the story is
written up almost as a triumph of British generalship : '...the
operation has been very secretly carried out. . . the enemy (were)
thoroughly deceived. . . (and) . . .heavily bombarded and attacked empty
(British) trenches' at which the British soldiers 'chuckled
62. The Histor)rof The Tines op. cit., (1952) p.345.
63. Philip Gibbs, Adventures in Journalism, (London, William Heineinann
1923). p. 231.
64. W. Beach Thomas, A Traveller in News (London, Chapman-Hall 1926),
p. 164.
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at this furious advance upon mythical defenders. It seemed a
huge joke to our men...we left nothing behind and destroyed
dug-outs and works which the enemy had built and we had occupied
during the fortnight's adventure'. (Daily Telegraph/Daily Chroniclç
6th December 1917).
It was not that men like Gibbs and Beach Thomas were unaware of a
more realistic state of affairs at the front. A few weeks after
writing that piece, Gibbs was telling an audience of journalists
and politicians in London, such grim stories of 'what the war in
the West really means' that his audience, as CP. Scott noted in
his diary were 'strongly affected'. 65 Lloyd George who was present
was so upset at what he heard of 'generals...absolutely callous as
to the gigantic casualities, ordering splendid men...to do perfectly
impossible things, such as to advance against uncut wire with
enfilading machine gun fire' that he told Scott 'I can't go on with
this bloody business...I would rather resign'P6 But none of this
realism appeared in the war correspondents' despatches because had
it done so and had their despatches managed to avoid the censorship,
they believed, with some justification that British morale at home
and at the front would have been seriously jeopardized. Like their
editors and the majority of their fellow journalists, they believed
that in the short term, defeat of the Germans was more important than
truthful journalism. Indeed it was a complaint of Swinton, (Eye
Witness) that editors at home were so concerned that his reports from
the front should nt shock or depress -his readers that 'in addition
to what was cut out by the censors, the papers frequently omitted
portions of what I had written', for fear that some of his descriptions
of the fighting 'being too strong meat for the public'.67
There was also present in the correspondents' minds the vexed
question of newspaper rivalry. They had been sent out by their papers
to write descriptive pieces in a racy, professional manner which
65. Trevor Wilson, op. cit. (1920) p. 324.
66. ibid.
67. Swinton, op. cit, (1935) p.87!8.
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sold newspapers. Had they clashed with the censor and been sent
home they had been made aware that their papers could not have sent
out a replacement which would have left their employers at a grave
coninercial disadvantage. While an accredited correspondent with
the Allied forces at Gallipoli, Ashmead Bartlett, who was later
sent home by Hamilton for sending out uriauthorised messages, made
a note in his diary on 9th May 1915 of some of the ethical and
coninercial considerations which the war correspondents were faced
with : 'It is heartrending work having to write what I know to be
untrue and in the end having to confine myself to give a descriptive
account of the useless slaughter...for the benefit of the public
at home when what I wish to do is to tell the world the blunders
that are being daily committed...Yet I am helpless. Any word of
criticism will be eliminated by the censor and there would be a
row with headquarters rendering my position more difficult. Today
I feel inclined to stop writing half truths, to resign. . . (but)...
I have my employers to consider and all the expense they have
incurred' .
Editors with a tendency to censor Swinton' s innocuous copy would
naturally be inclined to suppress home news if they believed it
might undermine the war effort. As the Glasgow Herald observed on
26th November 1914 '1hen the inner history of these times is written
it will be found that a very great deal of the restraint an&reticence
shown by the newspaper press has been the outcome of a spontaneous
readiness to ease the censor's responsibilities and it will also
be discovered that it has applied to a much wider field of affairs
than the censor himself has known to exist'. Not surprisingly
the principal victims in this 'wider field' of self-censorship
were the pacifist groups and individuals whose speeches and activities
if reported on at all, were written up by most newspapers in a
hostile and disparaging maimer. When Keir Hardie asked some searching
questions in the House of Conmns about British diplomacy prior to
the outbreak of war, the Daily Mail ran the headline : 'The British
68. Ellis Ashmead Bartlett, The Uncensored Dardanelles(Loridon,
Fb..ttchinson & Co. 1928), p.161.
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Pro German Leader/Mr. Keir Hardie/Reveals His Colours' followed
by a report which described Hardie as 'a gloomy browed man. . .chief
of the Socialist Party, "queer Hardie" as he has been called, is
an anti-militarist, pro-Zulu and lastly pio-German...he has been the
advocate of almost every lost cause. Unlike his German socialist
friends, he is not a patriot first and a Socialist next. German
socialists are fighting for their country. He has insulted the
King and honoured bomb throwing'. (Daily Mail, 28th August 1914).
Pacifist leaders like Philip Snowden often complained at public meetings
about what he described as 'press lies-lies directly and. lies by
suppression of vital information..	 Snowden was drawing attention
in this speech to the absence of press coverage of the number of
nationwide meetings being held in the Autumn of 1916 calling for a
negotiated settlement. As Mrs.Snowden told an audience at Briton
Ferry in South Wales on 3rd December 1916 'If it were not for the
silence of the Press you would know that story (of the large number of
meetings) has been repeated in every industrial centre in the country
and whether our Government realises it or not, the thoughtful part
of the po.pulation...is seriously considering this question'. 7° This
is what disturbed Repington as well but from obviously different
metives. In an . entry in his diary which gives significant and
unbiased support to the Snowden.' contentions, Repington noted on
12th December 1916 that 'an Intelligence Man' had told him that
there were 'about one hundred peace meetings a week throughout the
country and that they were not reported' (in the press) •71
The Snowdens and other pacifists had reason to be sceptical over
their press coverage. Even some socialist editors, critical
enough in peace-ti.me of the distortions and suppression of the
'capitalist' press, when. faced during the war with stories of the
growth of pacifist feeling, were inclined to place them firmly on
69.	 2nd December 1916, P.R.O. HO 45/10814/312987/10.
70. ibid.
71. Repington, Vol.1, op. cit. (1920) p.409.
- 194 -
the spike. Robert Dell, the Paris correspondent of the New
Statesman, angry that his editor Clifford Sharp had done just
that to a ntnnber of his stories, wrote to Sharp in November
1915 : 'I have not exaggerated French losses. They were enormous
in the recent offensive : the regiment of a man of my acquaintance
was reduced to 38 out of 3000.... no French government can long
resist the demand for peace which is becoming too general to be
disregarded in the army.. ,72 Along with other British editors,
the only losses Sharp was interested in were German ones. Writing
at the time when he was in receipt of Dell's despatches, Sharp
informed his readers on the 30th of October 1915 that 'There has
been encouraging news from France this week. .. (German counter-
attacks against the British in Artois and against the French in
Champagne) 'have failed completely with losses which in some cases
are known to have been immense'.
It was not just editors who believed that news of pacifist meetings
should be strictly censored. A reporter for the Morning Post who
had covered an I.L.P. conference in April 1915 was most upset to
discover that a speech made by C.H. Norman in which Norman had blamed
poor French generalship for recent Allied losses and which the reporter
had censored on the spot, had been published by The New Age. He
wrote indignantly to H.A. Gwynne, his editor that 'it seems to me to
illustrate the evils of a censor. I suppressed it because I believed
the censors would have suppressed it. . . 'ivhen Gwynne raised the
matter with the Press Bureau, he was told that the Director of Public
Prosecutions had refused to act against Norman on the familiar grounds
that a prosecution would entail 'giving a much wider circulation to..
mischievous and inaccurate statements'
72. Cited in Edward S. Hymans, The New Statesman (London, Longman &
Co., 1963) p.S5..6.
73. Parker to Gwynne, 8th April 1915, P.R,O. I- 139/23/A911/Part 1.
74. Cook to Gwynne, 27th April 1915, ibid.
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We have recorded a picture in this chapter of editors, proprietors
and individual journalists ex ercising a censorship themselves over
material which they considered, quite independently of any official
authority, to be either too dangerous or detrimental to the war
effort. It was a practice which occurred across the political spectrum
from the giants of Fleet Street to the most obscure provincial
journals and from the beginning to the end of the war. The
Lincoinshire weekly, The Epworth Bells boasted to its readers on
the 3rd of October 1914 that 'it must be owned that the British Press
as a whole has behaved very well. Many items of the greatest possible
interest in possession of the editors have been kept secret'. In
May 1918, Robert Donald, editor of the Daily Chronicle assured the
Press Bureau that 'we always censor articles ourselves before troubling
you with them'. 75
 It caine asasurprise to many journalists and
certainly to many politicians and Servicemen that the press could
behave in such a patriotic or 'responsible' manner. Despite the
1912 agreement between the press and the Service Departments, when
war caine in 1914 Service chiefs and their political masters could
not quite believe that journalists could be trusted to censor their
own material or even be capable of doing so. Hence the emergence
of the Press Bureau, a voluntary half-way house which left journalists
confused and resentful that their patriotism had been questioned and
their professionalism underrated. Given the almost inevitable
blunders coninitted by the Bureau, it did not take long for a consensus
to emerge in the press which argued that the official censorship
was unnecessary and that with sufficient technical guidance the
newspapers could do the whole job themselves.
P.E. Hainer, President of the National Union of Journalists, was
proud to claim in a speech to his union in 1915 that journalists
had only one desire during the war and that was 'to subordinate all
considerations to the one purpose of serving the country' •76 There
is in Hamer's claim and in most public references by the press to
75. Robert Donald to the Press Bureau, 17th May 1918. P.R.O.
11) 139/14JA561/24.
76. Institute Journal, 30th April 1915.
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self-censorship, a strong element of pride, the suggestion that
by abandoning their natural instinct to 'publish and. be  damned'
they were behaving as responsible citizens and in the process
doing the nation a great service. There were some muted doubts
expressed as to the ethical validity of such a posture but these
were few and far between. Mest journalists at home and abroad
became, during the war, patriots first and journalists second.
But in doing so, did they debase the coinage of objective
journalism and in the words of Norman Angell make of the British
press 'a more reptile instrument than Bismarck could ever hope to
make'	 Many critics would agree with Angell and argue that had
the war correspondents reported what they saw and the editors what
they heard, public opinion would have forced a British government
to settle for peace and many millions of lives saved frout useless
slaughter. The post-war mood of bitterness and disillusionment
with the behaviour of the press is well caught by C.E. 'bntague,
a former leader writer on the Manchester Guardian who was present
at Ancre on the Somme in July 1916 and who recalled with savage irony
in 1922 how after 'the most bloody defeat in the history of Britain...
our press came out bland, copious and graphic with nothing to show
that we had not had a good day - a victory really. Men who had
lived through the massacre read the stuff open mouthed. . .Black was
an aspect of white...the papers had been seen to be untrue'.78
Journalists like Angell and bntague were naturally bitter and shocked
at what they regarded as the devaluation of truth and the ethical
standards of their profession but their criticisms and those of later
comentators tend to ignore the historical reality of the volatilç
nature of British public opinion, a luxury that war-time reporters
and editors could not afford to do. They had before them the examples
of public hysteria which Arthur Moore's despatch had evoked and the
panic caused when nmurs circulated in 1915 that Kitchener had been
77. Norman Angell, The Press and the Organization of Society,
(London, Labour Publishing Co., 1922) p.6.
78. C.E. bntague, Disenchantment, (London, Chatto & Windus, 1922) p.98.
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sacked. They had to decide just how truthful an account of the
war the public could stand without a severe breakdown occurring in
national morale, which as ardent patriots with a passion for victory
no less sincere than their readers, they had no desire to bring
about. It is relatively easy in retrospect to select the likes of
Philip Gibbs and Beach Thomas for condemnation for having 'written
jauntily about life in the trenches (and for having) kept an inspired
silence about the slaughter.. . ' But the war correspondents were
aware that the entire nation scrutinized their every word and had they
written of incompetence and useless slaughter and had their copy
managed to avoid the field censorship, the Press Bureau' s
and their own office censorship, the most likely effect would have
been panic, disbelief and demands for their ininediate recall.
As for the editors, self-censorship although a daily routine, was
never an easy task, particularly in war-time when truth and criticism
could perhaps cost lives or damage to the national cause. As The
History of The Times recalls : 'The editorial exclusion of anything
likely to check the flow of recruits was decided upon with the greatest
unwillingness as a choice between extreme evils' •80 Believing that
they exerted iimnense power over public opinion during the war,
editors became ultra cautious, fearful that the nation's destiny
could be at stake if they published material which undenined public
faith in the justice andultimate success of the national cause. Besides,
as hard-headed professionals, few of them had any desire to be vilified
in Parliament or see their papers burnt at the Stock Exchange to the
accompaniment of a drastic fall in circulation, the penalty suffered
by Northcliffe, the most independent of their number, for occasionally
printing what he believed to be the truth, harmful as it might be
to 'the national interest'.
79. Philip Knightley, op. cit. (1975) pp.128-9.
80. The History of The Times , op. cit. (1952) p.129.
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Underlying some of the criticism of self-censorship during the war
has been the argument that a newspaper has a public duty to publish
whatever it believes to be the truth concerning events of naticmal
importance. Claiming Baizac as his authority Sisley Huddleston
writing in the Atlantic vbnthly in November 1920 put forward the
view that journalists should suppress nothing and 'tell no lies for
only in that way will there be no more wars'. Olive Schreiner,
writing twenty years later but in no less a mood of post-war
disillusionment stated forcefully that 'a daily paper not based on
an attempt to disseminate the truth is a cup of poison sent round
every morning to debilitate the life of the people' 81 But do
newspapers have such moral obligations, particularly in war-time?
They are not public institutions entrusted by an electorate with
democratic duties to perform and it can be argued that they have
every right to suppress an item they consider might be offensive
to their readers or detrimental to the national interest. Lucy
Salimn, goes so far as to argue that newspapers have 'the universal
prerogative of selection; the public has the moral right to know
whatever concerns the public welfare but it has no moral right to
compel the press to be the medium through which it acquires this
knowledge' 82
But the problem with this argument is that during the war, newspapers
in Britain were the only medium through which the public could acquire
information concerning the 'public welfare' and with the forniation
of the Coalition Government in May 1915 they were also the only voice
of public criticism. In these circumstances there was a moral duty
on the press to provide as accurate and critical account of events
as possible. By cooperating so thoroughly with the official censorship
and by administering a censorship on their own account, British
newspapers failed to carry out their moral obligations to the nation
81. Cited in Wilson Harris, The Daily Press (Cambridge University
Press, 1943) p.12.
82. Salmcn, The Newspaper. and the Historian, op. cit., (1923) p.448.
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believing with some justification that by so doing they were
contributing ininensely to the successful sustaining of the British
war effort. The cost to the journalistic profession was its post-
war credibility and international reputation for integrity and
truthfulness, which at the time seemed a small price to pay when
thousands of men, some of them colleagues, were daily paying a




"The meaning of words had no longer the same relation to things
but was changed by men as they thought proper" '. Thucydides,
cited by C.E. ?vbntague in 'Would Truth or Lies Cost bre?' in
Nineteenth Century And After, July 1921.
Press censorship did not vanish from the scene the nxment hostilities
ceased in November 1918. The Bureau's staff were very keen to lay
down their pencils but were instructed by the War Cabinet to remain
at their posts keeping a watchful eye in particular over the news
and propaganda emanating from Bolshevik Russia. But by 16th December
1918 the Bureau reported that there had been a drastic fall in
the number of items submitted and on 10th January 1919 Swettenham,
in a memerandum to the Home Office made the point nre forcefully:
'...the justification for our continued existence was to prevent the
spread of Bolshevik propaganda (but) the situation has changed
considerably...Bolshevism is (now) so discredited and the results
of the recent election have shown so clearly the sensible view
taken by the people of this country that we doubt whether propaganda
on this subject can do real harm here...the directors work has become
a sinecure' .
	 with such a strong demand for unemployment the
Home Office recomnended to the War Cabinet that the Bureau cease
operations from 30th April 1919. This was ininediately opposed by the
War Office who wanted the Bureau to continue to censor items about the
British forces operating in Russia but the Cabinet overruled the War
Office and on 2nd April 1919 the Press Bureau 'Fitly enough announced
its own approaching demise'. (Liverpool Daily Post, 3rd April 1919).
Press reaction to the closure announcement was characteristically
diverse but alnst universally critical of the war-time censorship
and of the role played by the Bureau. The Daily Mail for example
1. Swettenhaxn to Harris, Home Office, 10th January 1919,
P.R.O. I-J 139/37/A1674/Part 1/1.
- 201 -
thought it a great pity that April the 1st had not been the day
chosen to make the announcement and went on to voice the familiar
complaint that 'when the Press Bureau was started we were told that
there would be a stream of authoritative information to the Press.
It has actually been a voice pipe for the Departments, big and little'
(3rd April 1919). Although the Bureau had been called into existence
primarily to replace the pre-war Joint Committee as an official
guide for the operation of voluntary press censorship, this was not
fully appreciated at first by the press which regarded it as an
embryonic Ministry of Information which would assist them in promoting
the national cause. 1en it became clear to editors that the Bureau
would be a mouthpiece of departmental censorship rather than an
agent of propaganda, the full force of their resentment against
officialdom's distrust of the press was launched against it.
But it should not be inferred from the Daily Mail' s comments that
in the words of A.J.P. Taylor '.. .the newspapers contained no news'
This is not true. The newspapers throughout the war re full of
military information about the war obtained from the international
press and from a small army of free-lance correspondents - a lot of
it exaggerated, optimistic and censored by the cable censors but
nonetheless news and lots of it. The newspapers were never totally
dependent on the often sparse official paragraphs issued by the
various G.H.Q.'s through the Press Bureau, to fill their pages. Nor
were they particularly deprived of news by cable censorship for
they employed military experts like Repington, Colonel A.M. Mirray
and L. Cornford Cope whose interpretations and opinions in 'filling
out' the official pronouncements in extensive articles, often
accompanied with detailed and accurate maps, were never shackled by
any officially imposed censorship .Newspapers claimed they were starved
of news because they did not like the delays to cablegrams, inevitable
in any system of cable censorship. But more importantly they made
the claim because they did not like paying free -lance correspondents
and foreign news agencies for news, when they had, for the early
part of the war, staff correspondents kicking their heels in Fleet
2. A.J.P. Taylor, The First World War, op. cit., (1963), P.56.
- 202 -
Street unable to go to the front because of the ban on war
correspondents. Taylor argues that it was typical of the
rigid censorship that 'The British were not told that the
expeditionary force were retreating from rvbn' . But it was
through the enterprise of one of these free-lance correspondents
that the British did learn alnost immediately about this retreat,
with the active connivance of the official censorship, even though
the British public refused at first to believe it.
The Manchester Guardian like the Daily Mail recognized that in
criticizing the censorship in 1919 it was necessary to go beyond
the Press Bureau to the Service and other government departments
for as its leader of the 3rd of April 1919 stated, the Bureau
'was often blamed for the misdeeds of others for it was but a
humble in&trunient. in the hands of departments which laid down
rules for it. It is not, therefore, the Press Bureau that deserves
to be criticised as the censorship in general which did much
harm by hampering free discussions and suppressing infoniation
which publicity could only have done good'. The Admiralty
exercised censorship over the Gennan wireless, the Home Office acted
at various times against the pacifist press quite independently of
the Bureau. Field censorship examined the war correspondents
copy without reference to the Bureau and Competent Military
kithorities occasionally acted against local papers and journalists
in breath of D.O.R.A. Regulations, albeit under restraint from
the War Office and Home Office. The activities of these authorities
tended to be lumped together in the public mind as 'the censorship'
with the Bureau in some way responsible and the Manchester Guardian
was justified in drawing its readers attention to this confusion.
But th Bureau was no 'humble instrument'. The censorship sections
of the Service departments regularly consulted the Directors of
the Bureau and in some areas, such as Foreign Affairs, the Bureau
exercised censorship virtually on its own behalf after December 1915.
Nor was the Manchester Guardian justified in suggesting that these
3.	 Taylor, op. cit., (1963) p. 57.
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various departmental activities 'hampered free discussion' during
the war years. Isolated actions like the brief suppression of
The Globe and Forwardand the spasmodic destruction of pacifist
literature were not typical of the way news or the newspaper press
were treated by the authorities. No press in Europe was as free
to criticise its government as was the British press; no journalists
in Europe enjoyed as much liberty to attack politicians, Service
departments and even serving officers as British journalists -
attacks and criticisms which evoked occasional threats of
retaliation but nonetheless were published and without official
reprisal. As Herbert Samuel told the House of Commons in 1916, the
picture 'of a shackled Press, silent, tongue tied,oppressed by a
Government at once timorous and tyrannous is a picture which I think
can be disproved by anyone who chooses to go to any bookstall and
spend a half-penny on almost any organ' .
There was more justification in the charge that information had
been suppressed 'which publicity could only have done good'.
The suppression at official request of news of the sinking of the
'Audacious' was unwise in 1914 and perverse by 1918 but such
requests for total suppression were exceedingly rare and like all
the other requests was ignored by some journals. IThat the Manchester
Guardian did not emphasize was that the suppress ion and manipulation
of news during the war was carried out with the voluntary collaboration
of most newspapers and that the level of cooperation between the
newspaper press and the various censorship authorities was for the
most part very close indeed. This voluntary element was a key
factor in the operation of the British system. There was no legal
obligation on newspapers to obey the official instructions and
requests nor to submit copy to the Bureau forcensorship. They
did so because in the words of the Newspaper Press Directory the
press '...submitted with unquestioning loyalty; with few exceptions
it supported the government in every way, doing its possible best
4. House of Comons Debates, 5th Series, 8th May 1916, Col. 423.
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in every circumstance to forward• the great issue of winning the war
...having always the secret conviction that half the restrictions
were useless and absurd'.5
This patriotic commitment of the press in effect made an official
press censorship unnecessary as many newspapers pointed out during
the war. Because British newspapers reached the neutral countries
and through them Gennany,the officially stated reason for having
a censorship was to prevent information of possible value reaching
the enemy through press publications. Details of the names and
activities of individual regiments and soldiers letters from the
front were for example censored on the grounds that such information
could be of value to the enemy High Command. But as the newspapers
tirelessly pointed out such information was generally known to the
enemy through normal military intelligence gleaned from such sources
as P.O.Ws. It was for example very annoying for the Manchester
Guardian to learn of an engagement involving the Manchester Regiment
from a bulletin broadcast on the German wireless.On the other hand
it was strongly argued by Balfour when First Lord of the Admiralty
that suppression of detailed information about ZepLin raids was
vital on the grounds that Zeplin navigation was so inaccurate that
only through newspaper. reports would the German authorities be able
to learn with any degree of certainty where their raiders had
inflicted damage. But to gain such intelligence from British news-
papers bearing in mind their well earned reputation for exaggeration
and inaccuracy would be a vast and self defeating task.
A voluntary system also raises a major question of journalistic
ethics of how far newspapers which exist to report news as truthfully
as possible should participate surreptitiously in a state-sponsored
scheme of suppression. In a voluntary system journalists become in
effect the censor and inevitably part of the executive machinery of
the state; in a wholly state-run system, they take orders like every
5. Newspaper Press Directory, (1920).
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other member of society and are relatively free of the meral dilenn'na
of having to decide how far to betray their professional objectivity
for the sake of the interests of the state. The Newspaper Press
Directory already cited had little doubt on this matter : 'Whatever
may be in store in the future it can honestly be said that the British
Press as a whole has worthily maintained its honourable repute and
that its personnel is still animated by the highest standards that
have always prevailed in the journalistic profession' But any
system of voluntary censorship is endemically unfair in its operation
and inevitably encourages a debasement of standards. The lofty, self-
righteous tone of the Directory rings a trifle hollow when set against
the record of newspapers demanding adnii.nistrative action .aga±nst
their contemporaries for ignoring official instructions, the unedifying
spectacle of newspapers applauding and encouraging the destruction
of pacifist literature and the evidence of newspapers anxious to
publish false and misleading information - all 'in the national
interest'. At the same time, the very existence of a press censorship
however voluntary or inefficient, undermined to some extent the
credibility of British newspapers both at home and abroad and as
Harold Evans editor of The Times has recently pointed out about
the D Notice system in general: 'Third World journalists are always
saying "But you are censored by the D Notice system, are you not?"
I think the perception of the relative freedom of the British press
is affected in an adverse way by the existence of the D Notice system
misunderstood' . (sic.)
By late 1915 press and political opinion was almest universal in its
belief that the voluntary press censorship was unfair, inefficient
and unnecessary, the embodiment in many ways of the weakness and
failures of the Liberal laissez faire state in its efforts to wage
war. Liberals became increasingly concerned that it had become the
tool of the military, indifferent to the virulent press attacks upon
6. Newspaper Press Directory, op. cit.,(192O).
7. Harold Evans, submission to the Defence Committee on the D Notice
System, 22nd July 1980, Sessional (Parliamentary) Papers (HCDC
773), p. 121.
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Liberal politicians like Haldane and Churchill while allowing the
jingos, the military experts like Repington and the press barons
like Northcliffe to do and say just what they liked. Unionists saw
in its voluntary character and in its ineffectiveness to publicise
the war and suppress pacifist opinion, typical manifestations of
the weak minded Liberal approach to prosecuting the war. Both sides
demanded action - a tougher press censorship and in effect a state
controlled press, a paradoxical situation in that neither side had
any real desire to place the press in chains.
The issue of the press censorship became one of the major battle-
grounds in the struggle between those who argued that only the
imposition of state control over almost all aspects of British
society would win the war and those who fought a mainly losing battle
for the values and ways of the free enterprise laissez-faire state.
The credibility of the Asquith premiership was undennined by the
daily assaults in Parliament and the press on 'the Censorship' which
were certainly a contributory factor to his eventual downfall. The
inefficiencies and occasional foolish decisions by the censors were
a gift for Asquith's enemies and it is perhaps not surprising to
discover that the calls for a tougher censorship quickly died away
with the coming to power of Lloyd George and a more overtly rigorous
prosecution of the war. But the voluntary press censorship remained
to the end, one of the few surviving monuments of the lassez-faire
ideal, the 'logically indefensible compromise' 8
 of a free but censored
press.
If press and Parliament were so united in their belief that it was
unnecessary, what kept the press censorship in existence? The
pectator on 13th November 1915 for example argued a very convincing
case for a totally uncensored press in which 'Free rein would be
given. . . to every sort of inaccuracy, wild surmise and "perilous
disclosure". . .and although the exact truth would of course be published
in the medley and would be extremely damaging to our interests
8.	 Sir Edward Cook, op. cit., (1920), p.44.
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if known by the enemy to be the truth - it would probably be
impossible for him to disentangle it from other statements that
flatly contradicted it. The false and the true would cancel one
another. We can imagine a German intelligence officer trying to
garner information from the confusion of a wholy uncensored Press.
We fancy he would have to own himself defeated'.
The press censorship remained because, as in many other aspects
of the war, the military authorities said it was necessary and
the civilians, in Government and in the press, deferred to what
they considered to be expert opinion. As The Spectator itself
acknowledged : '.. the overwhelming opinion of the naval and military
experts is that a Press Censorship is indispensable. The only thing
for sensible laymen to do therefore is to accept the situation'.
The deeply held Service view that the press were not really to be
trusted held sway throughout the First World War and on into the
future. Commenting on the closure of the Bureau, the Daily News
told its readers on 3rd April 1919 that 'We hope the nation will
never again have to consent to its revival'. The Manchester Guardian
hoped that 'the time has come to abolish the censorship root and
branch and to let everywhere have light' (3rd April 1919). But the
Services had other ideas. The behaviour of a few mavericks like
Ashmead Bartlett, Keith 4irdoch, Arthur Maore and Charles Court
Repington had made a far nxre lasting impression on Service minds
than a host of patriotic and subservient editors and war correspondents
and in planning for the future they were not going to taice any
chances. Both Services insisted on the retention of the Admiralty!
War Office/Press (and now Air) Committee after the war thus perpetuating
in Britain, unlike mest other countries, a voluntary press censor-
ship over Defence items, a practice which has persisted to this day
much to the astonishment of foreign journalists who according to
Leonard Downie of the Wathirgton Post in evidence tO the Defence Committee
on the D Notice System find it 'unusual and amazing' (The Times,
23rd July 1980).
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The voluntary press censorship was more than 'unusual and amazing' -
it was also an extremely effective method for the Service Departments
and other government authorities to exercise surreptitious influence
and occasional control over the press without resort to the more
crudely repressive, albeit more open methods of censorship practised
in most of the belligerent countries. A situation in which the news-
paper press, despite public protestations, was willing to implement
instructions and accept guidance filtered through to it by a
Press Bureau which in the words of a 1923 CID memorandum 'divorced
the Service Departments from control of a subject which gives rise to
such acute political controversy as Press Censorship' was considered
by the War Office to be an 'experience... (which) cannot be improved
upon' 9 Not surprisingly, it was a system that was reconinended by
the Service Departments in 1923 to be revived in the event of a future
large scale war.
For the press, the experience was less satisfactory. Like many British
institutions, voluntary censorship begun in 1912 and administered
during the war by the Press Bureau was an ad hoc arrangement which
grew into an established system without the principal participant,
the newspaper press, fully considering the implications. Voluntary
censorship was and is a deeply corrupting practice for British
journalism because, by encouraging an already well developed propensity
for self-censorship and discretion 'in the national interest,' it
undermines the moral authority of newspapers as critics and objective
seekers after truth. Too many times during the First World War,
editors postured as critics of the censorship in the leader columns
while reflecting the officially inspired viewpoint in their news
stories, an unhealthy situation for them and their readers.
For society in general, a voluntary press censorship was and is
even less satisfactory. If a press censorship was necessary during
the First World War - and the military and naval authorities produced
little evidence that it was - then it should have been imposed and
9. C.I.D. Sub Committee on Censorship Memorandum, June 1923,
P.R.O. Cab 15/12.
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administered by those authorities. The eventual effect of
encouraging journalists to become censors on behalf of the
executive was to induce a sense of disbelief by many of the
public in the newspaper press and to encourage an all round
cynicism in the integrity of public institutions - a heavy
price for which we are still paying.
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PosrCRIvr
'The one hard and indisputable fact about censorship is that
there is nothing, absolutely nothing, to be said in its favor'.
Robert D. Sununers Wartime Censorship of Press and Radio op. cit.,
(1942) p.28.
In the Thirties, an Inter-Departmental Committee on Censorship met
once a year to revise the war-time plans. Despite the presence
on the committee until 1937 of Sir Frank Mitchell, former Assistant
Director of the Press Bureau, few of the experiences of the First
World War censorship appear to have sunk in. When the Press and
Censorship Division under the Ministry of Information was established
at the outbreak of war in 1939 (the original idea of a War Press
Bureau had been abandoned) this equivalent of the Press Bureau suffered
the same agonies of news starvation, interdepartinent strife and press
abuse as its First World War predecessor. 'There have been delays,'
Lord Macmillan, Minister of Information complained to the Cabinet
in September 1939 but 'a large part of the blame which attached to
the Censorship has been due to causes over which the Ministry has
no control...namely the long delay before a decision can be obtained
from the Service Departments on any question...
Following Lord Macmillan's resignation in October 1939 (the F.E. Smith
of the Second World War) Walter M.rnckton was appointed Controller of
Censorship over a newly created Press Publicity Bureau separate from
the Ministry of Information but, to ensure maximum confusion, still
housed in the Ministry of Information building at Senate House.This
Bureau was to deal only with material voluntarily submitted by the
press - all other censorship having been taken from the Ministry of
Information and placed with the separate Departments - a recipe
for confusion which at least the Press Bureau was spared in the First
World War.
1. Lord Macmillan, Cabinet Memorandum, 18th September 1939.
P.R.O. Cab. Preni 1/439.
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As the system was voluntary Ivbnckton had the same sort of problems
of unfairness and enforcement as did Cook and Swettenham and the
other Press Bureau Directors in the First World War. On 26th
November 1939 we find him writing to Lord Camrose proprietor of
the Daily Telegraph that his paper was'inaking the system of
voluntary submitting more difficult. . .by refraining from submitting
matter which in my judgement ought certainly to be submitted. . . the
effect upon the other newspapers has already been to exasperate
them because their competitors are allowed to insert something
which they are advised to omit in the public interest'.2
Like the Press Bureau Directors in the First World War, vbnckton
found himself frustrated that his Bureau had no power of enforcement
and even more frustrated and annoyed to discover how extremely
reluctant the Service Departments were to become entangled in any
direct confrontation with the press. Minckton drew the Cabinet's
attention on 21st December 1939 to a case involving the Daily Telegraph
and the Admiralty in which lbnckton had requested 'a witness from
the Admiralty to give evidence that the matter published contains
information of real value to the enemy (but) I have found that they
(the Admiralty) are not prepared to go so
	 '. 3The over%lming sense
of dj vu in reading such comnents is reinforced by discovering that
Nonckton, like Buckmaster in the First World War, went on to advise
the Cabinet that '...a voluntary system will not be effective unless
it is operated by one single responsible department which makes and
answers for all decisions. A compulsory system may be the alternative'.4
But this alternative was not applied because in April 1940 Mnckton
got his way and responsibility for all press censorship was returned
to his Bureau under the overall control of the Ministry of Information.
2. Mnckton to Canirose, 26th November I939, P.R.O. Cab. Prein 1/439.
3. ?vbnckton, (Cabinet ?vmorandum) 21st December 1939, ibid.
4. ibid.
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?vbre significantly for the survival of the voluntary system,
Brendan Bracken was appointed Minister in 1941 and for the first
time in its history, a voluntary war-time censorship had a political
master who really understood the press and who enjoyed direct and
personal access to the Prime Minister. But the full story of press
censorship during the Second World War must be left to other
historians who in addition to the press will have to take into
account the vast output and effect of broadcasting and how ef±ectively
this was supervised by the censorship authorities. Historians might
also like to investigate other areas related to the present study--
a comparative view of British press censorship in the two wars being
an obvious follow-up. Further work could well be done, using German
sources, to investigate the operational use, if any, made by German
military intelligence of British press sources. There is also a
rich vein to tap in pursuing the point made by numerous contemporary
commentators that the First World War censorship undermined the
credibility of the post-war British press and public institutions -
how far is this valid and to what effect? Finally the D.Notices. A
history of the D Notices from 1912 to the recent findings of the Third
Report of the Defence Committee and beyond would make not only a
fascinating and topical story but a valuable contribution to the study
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